The Colonel had to be an active participant in the most dramatic periods of our history. Throughout the fifty revolutionary years of the First and Second World Wars, he was always where he was needed.

In the photo: Colonel Andrey Melnik, deputy commander of the Sich Riflemen Corps, 1920 (?)

A. Melnik was born on December 12, 1890 in the village of Volya Yakubova not far from Drohobych, in the Lviv region. The foundations of national consciousness and patriotism were formed in their home, where Ivan Franko was especially revered and they followed the living example of their father, who was not only a good owner, but also a famous public figure.

He received combat training in the legion of Ukrainian Sich Riflemen, during the First World War he fought against Russian army on the territory of Galicia. There his extraordinary talent as a military organizer manifested itself. At first, A. Melnik was entrusted with the leadership of the detachment, and subsequently led a hundred USS riflemen.

In the battle for Berezhany on Mount Lysonya, Andrei Melnik was captured by Russians and interned in the village. Dubovitsa near Tsaritsyn. In a concentration camp above the Volga, he meets Yevgeny Konovalets. When the fire of the Ukrainian revolution began to burn in Kyiv in 1917, Melnik and Konovalets escape from captivity and join the struggle for the revival of the national state.

A characteristic detail is that both are twin cities, despite changes in governments and metamorphoses political life, persistently developed the Ukrainian armed forces, because they were convinced that it was possible to gain and maintain statehood only when there was a combat-ready and patriotic army.

In the “service record” of those times, A. Melnyk does not have “political positions”, only military ones: deputy commander of the Siege Riflemen Siege Corps, acting commander of the USS Corps, chief of staff of the Separate Sichovy Riflemen Detachment, chief of staff of the UPR Army, assistant group commandant Sichev Streltsy. In December 1918, A. Melnik was awarded the military rank of Ataman of the Army of the Ukrainian People's Republic.

Unlike many of his contemporaries, who fell into despair and apathy after the defeat of the UPR, Andrei Melnyk found the strength not to lose optimism and faith in the Ukrainian state. Already in exile, in Galicia, together with E. Konovalets, he takes on the organization of the Ukrainian Military Organization, the forerunner; in particular, he becomes the regional commandant of the UVO.

In April 1924, A. Melnik was arrested and spent four years in a Polish prison. After his release, he worked for some time as a manager of the estates of Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church.

The circumstances were such that after the tragic death of the first chairman of the OUN, Colonel Konovalets, which occurred as a result terrorist attack committed by agent Sudoplatov in Rotterdam, Melnyk had to head an organization that, at the beginning of the twentieth century, concentrated almost the entire revolutionary potential of the Ukrainian nation.

Andrey Melnik headed according to the oral will of Yevgeny Konovalets. His task was to preserve the OUN as a national force, capable of all available methods and by means of fighting against the enemies of the Ukrainian people and through a national revolution to obtain the Ukrainian Independent Cathedral State. As chairman he enjoyed great authority. Colonel Melnik was given the best characteristics.

The poet Evgeny Malanyuk called him “a man of silk and steel”; well-known ideologist of nationalism Nikolai Sciborsky: “This is one of the fundamental figures of the Liberation Struggle. Who else, if not him, should continue? And to continue you need experience. History does not recognize improvisation.”; UPR Army veteran Roman Sushko: “This is great person who never failed."

The always reserved Oleg Olzhich, when it came to Melnik, did not hide his emotions: “You have to be able to endure breaking ribs in one word in order to talk about the endurance of a revolutionary... Yes, this is not a leader like Yevgeny Konovalets, less so a strategist and politician. This is the character of a chief of staff, but a person who never breaks down and has a sense of the essence of history.”

A. Melnik also enjoyed due authority in church circles. This is how Archbishop Ivan Buchko of the UGCC recalled him: “Colonel Melnik is best person, whom Ukrainians can have as a leader. Hardworking, pious and respected by everyone - he says little, but he does... He will always justify trust... Andrei Melnik is trusted by the people and the people are proud of him.”

Even after the split of the OUN in 1940, when many nationalists, mainly the so-called “regionalists,” left the Organization, almost all outstanding figures of the national liberation movement remained loyal to the colonel, among whom Yulian Vassian, the ideologist of the OUN, the author of program documents of the founding Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists in Vienna in 1929; Mykola Sciborsky is the author of the work “Naziocracy,” which became the cornerstone in the system of ideological foundations of Ukrainian nationalism. These are Nikolai Kapustyansky, Dmitry Andrievsky, Evgeny Onatsky and a number of other famous figures, which once again confirms the extraordinary personality of Andrei Melnik.

The real test for A. Melnyk was the events in Carpathian Ukraine in 1939. The revolutionary breakdown on the Silver Land, the emergence of the Carpathian-Ukrainian State, and as a consequence - fundamental changes on the political map of Europe - all this required an adequate position of the OUN and its new chairman A. Melnyk.

The idea of ​​statehood of Carpathian Ukraine was perceived by A. Melnyk as a logical and natural result of the struggle of the Ukrainian people for their national independence. Therefore, the best cadres of the OUN were thrown into Transcarpathia, into the very whirlpool of the struggle.

The heroic position of the OUN members, the armed resistance of the Carpathian Sich members to the Hungarian occupation showed that the Ukrainian people are ready for decisive action in the name of the independence of Ukraine.

With the outbreak of World War II, conditions arose for the active activities of the OUN in Ukraine. However, differences in assessments of the political situation led to a split in the OUN. Motivating the need for decisive, “revolutionary” actions, in 1940 he headed the “Revolutionary Wire of the OUN”.

During the years of Ukraine, A. Melnik was first under house arrest, and from February 1944 he was imprisoned in the Sachsenhausen concentration camp. However, his imprisonment did not affect the activity of the OUN.

The first OUN marching groups went to Ukraine in the summer of 1941, immediately after the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War. At the same time, the leadership of the OUN Special attention paid to the so-called “Middle and Eastern lands", which were under Bolshevik occupation for more than twenty years. The leading and best forces of the OUN were sent there.

A total of three roads led to the east. The northern marching group of the OUN followed the route Dubno - Shepetovka - Zhitomir - Kyiv - Poltava - Kharkov. Srednyaya - Proskurov - Vinnitsa - Uman - Kyiv - Donbass. The southern route ran from Vinnitsa to Odessa and Nikolaev. The movement to Kyiv was led by O. Olzhich, a famous Ukrainian scientist and poet, deputy chairman of the OUN.

It was O. Olzhych who came up with the idea of ​​​​creating the Ukrainian National Rada in Kyiv, which later became an important statist institution in enslaved Ukraine. The Ukrainian National Rada appeared in early October 1941 at crowded meetings in Kyiv. UNRada was headed by Professor Nikolai Velichkovsky. In its structure and political orientation, UNRada was reminiscent of the times. This symbolized the continuity of state tradition.

The UNRada consisted of 130 delegates representing all Ukrainian lands and was not a one-party formation. It included members of various political trends: from hetmans to nationalists. The guiding core was the presidium, which, in addition to Professor M. Velichkivsky, included engineer Anton Baranovsky, geologist Ivan Dubina and member of the OUN line Osip Boydunik.

The Constituent Assembly adopted a Declaration and Appeal, the author of which was O. Olzhych, and where the main tasks of the UNRada were formulated, namely: to worthily represent the Ukrainian people before German officials who are in Ukraine; fight Bolshevik propaganda and agitation among the population; fight Bolshevik sabotage and sabotage by all means; to educate youth physically and spiritually into respectable citizens; to affirm civil and social values: to develop national culture and education, to restore church and religious life, the economy, and agriculture.

After the defeat of the national liberation struggle, A. Melnik made a lot of efforts to unite disparate political formations abroad. Thus, in 1948, a new Ukrainian National Rada was created, which included political forces that recognized the Acts of January 22, 1918 and 1919, which proclaimed the Ukrainian People's Republic as an independent and conciliar state of the Ukrainian people.

Through the efforts of A. Melnyk, world Ukrainians united in the World Congress of Free Ukrainians as a supra-party institution that has represented the interests of Ukrainians for a long time. Thus, one of the foundations of Ukrainian nationalism was realized in practice - to strive for conciliarity and national solidarity, to help the resistance forces in Ukraine.

Plan
Introduction
1 A. Melnik - head of the OUN
2 Polish campaign
3 Late 1939-spring 1941 - “Bandera’s sabotage”
4 1941-1945
5 Post-war period
Bibliography

Introduction

Organization of Ukrainian nationalists (Melnikovtsy) (OUN (M)) (Ukr. Organized by Ukrainian Nationalist (Melnikizіvtsi)) - the often used name for the “original” OUN after the appearance of in the spring of 1941 - the OUN with the leader Stepan Bandera (OUN)) . From the beginning of World War II, she collaborated with the occupying German administration, creating UDC (“Ukrainian Auxiliary Committees”) in the cities of occupied Poland, with the control center - the UCC in Krakow. After the start of Operation Barbarossa, its supporters and members of the “marching groups” began to be systematically destroyed by the structures of the OUN (b), with the goal of forming a “Sovereign Cathedral Ukrainian State with the leader S. Bandera.” The result of this was the transfer by the Germans of both “leaders” to Berlin in July 1941 and repressive actions against overzealous OUN(b) supporters on the ground. After the occupation of Kyiv by the Germans, the OUN(M) proclaimed the creation of the Ukrainian National Rada, which was not supported by the Germans, who soon dissolved it, and its members were repressed and shot. After the transition of the OUN(b) to a semi-legal position in the fall of 1941, the OUN(m) remained a completely legal organization operating in the Third Reich. In 1943-1944, the UCC took part in the formation of the SS division "Galicia". At the beginning of 1944, A. Melnik was arrested in Berlin and transferred to the special barrack “Zellenbau” of the Sachsenhausen concentration camp, where S. Bandera and a number of other political figures from all over Europe had been staying since 1942. In September 1944, the leaders of both OUNs were released and recruited to form and lead the “anti-Bolshevik forces of Europe.” After the defeat of Germany, the OUN(M) leadership fled to the zone of occupation of the Western Allies. By this time, the number of its supporters in comparison with the OUN(b) looked quite modest, and in order to counter the aggressive expansion of the OUN(b), it moved towards rapprochement with other nationalist emigration movements, which ultimately led to a departure from the dogmas of the early 1930s -X. By the early 1980s of the 20th century (as the main iconic figures of the movement died naturally), the OUN(b) lost its position among the Ukrainian diaspora. In 1993, it was legalized in Ukraine as a public organization of national democratic direction.

1. A. Melnik - head of the OUN

After the actual defeat of the OUN and UVO networks in Poland in 1934-1935, the main OUN centers in Berlin, Danzig and a number of other cities remained unaffected, but the influence of the organization was limited only by the existing environment of Ukrainian emigration. By this time, instead of the envisaged broad representation in the Governing Body of the OUN (PUN), only three figures remained - O. Senik-Grybovsky, Yaroslav Makar-Baranovsky and Richard Karpat-Yary, who formed the “narrow leadership of the OUN”, which actually led the organization. After the liquidation of leader E. Konovalets on May 23, 1938, the “narrow leadership” controlled the OUN until the situation in Europe began to develop rapidly, pointing to an imminent war. In September 1938, Konovalets’s deputy in the formally existing UVO, A. Melnik (who until that moment was in charge of forests in the office of Metropolitan Sheptytsky of the UGCC), arrived in the free city of Danzig. On the evening of September 11, 1938, at a meeting of the “narrow leadership of the OUN,” a resolution was adopted, which stated

"1. In accordance with the will of the sl.p. Leader Evgen Konovalets, the Narrow Leadership of the Ukrainian Nationalists proclaims Colonel Andrey Melnyk the Head of the Leadership of the Ukrainian Nationalists and the Leader of the Nationalist Movement. 2. From today (September 12), the leadership of the OUN, UVO and all organized structures of the Nationalist movement will be taken over by Colonel Andrei Melnik. 3. Proclaimed sl.p. Leader Evgen Konovalets The Second Gathering of Ukrainian Nationalists is convened and conducted by the Head of the Leadership Andrey Melnik. »

But the congress, scheduled for the fall of 1938 (still by Konovalets), was postponed, although the commissioner (still by the same Konovalets) Yaroslav Stetsko did not change. The miller was recommended to leave the territory of Poland and he moved through Berlin to Italy, to Rome. Meanwhile, the main “partner” of the OUN in Germany became the 2nd department of the Abwehr (“sabotage and psychological warfare”), which set the following tasks for the OUN - the destruction of important objects on the territory of the future enemy, the escalation of instability, and the staging of uprisings. The department’s tasks also included creating a “fifth column” on enemy territory. The preparations for the “Ukrainian uprising” were led by the head of the Abwehr station in Breslau. The OUN was actively involved in the work of the German intelligence services. In the summer of 1939, a meeting between A. Melnik and Canaris took place in Vienna. As part of the preparation of the OUN to participate in hostilities on the territory of Poland, a special unit of Galician emigrants was formed - “Military Units of Nationalists” (Ukrainian “Vіyskovі Vіddily Natsionalistіv” (ВВН)) under the leadership of Colonel Roman Sushko. As the German aggression initially planned for the end of August drew closer, OUN activity on Polish territory intensified. The foreign leadership also did not stand aside - at the beginning of August, Melnik issued an order on the formation of preparatory commissions to begin organizing the Second Great Gathering of the OUE, which took place on August 27-29 in Rome. It confirmed Melnyk’s powers and approved a new political program and the organization’s Charter. The OUN established for itself a monopoly on the ideology and organization of political life in the planned “Ukrainian Sovereign Council Power”, the construction of which was planned on the basis of a national democracy under the unity of command of the OUN. The head of the OUN was granted the rights of the Leader of the Nation, who obeyed only “the god of the nation and his own conscience.”

2. Polish campaign

With the German attack on Poland on September 1, 1939, World War II began in Europe. The VVN became part of the German-Slovak group striking from Slovak territory. Members of the OUN welcomed the German army. Its fighters provided significant assistance in orienting German aviation - they provided light and visual signals. Attacks were carried out on small retreating Polish units. In a number of areas in the rear of the Polish army, small armed uprisings took place. In addition to the killings of military and police, the killings of civilian Poles by Ukrainian nationalists were also noted - for example, 13 civilians were killed in Volyn alone. Due to the rapid advance of German troops, the armed units of the OUN did not provide any significant impact on the course of the Polish Wehrmacht company. At the same time, Melnik was in Berlin, where on September 4 he was received by a representative of the German Foreign Ministry, who promised him a solution to the Ukrainian problem, and a little later in Vienna, at a meeting with Canaris and his deputy Lahousen, he was informed about the possibility of the emergence of a “Western Ukrainian state” in border with the USSR, although it was indicated that active negotiations were currently underway in Moscow regarding the future of Polish territory. Melnik even managed to prepare a list of the future government, but the start of the “liberation campaign” of the Red Army on September 17 did not allow these plans to come true.

3. Late 1939-spring 1941 - “Bandera’s sabotage”

After the formation of the “zone of German interests” and the “liberated territory” of Western Ukraine in the former south-eastern lands of Poland, which soon “reunited” with the Ukrainian SSR, but even before the establishment of a clear and protected border between them, A. Melnik gave the order for the transfer of the majority of OUN members into German territory, and those who remained were ordered not to conduct active actions and to remain deeply secretive.

At the same time, back on September 12, 1939 (shortly before the fall of Warsaw), at a special meeting on Hitler’s train, issues regarding Poland and the ethnic Ukrainian population of Poland were discussed. According to Hitler’s plans, on the border with the USSR it was necessary to create “spacer states” between “Asia” and the “West” - Ukraine (in the territory of Galicia and Volyn) and Lithuania loyal to the Third Reich. Based on the political instructions of Ribbentrop, Keitel formulated a task for Canaris: “You, Canaris, must organize an uprising with the help of Ukrainian organizations working with you and having the same goals, namely Poles and Jews.” Ribbentrop, specifying the forms of the uprising, especially pointed to the need to exterminate the Poles and Jews. By “Ukrainian organizations” they meant the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. The result of these instructions was the so-called “Canaris Memorandum of September 12, 1939”, presented in the materials of the Nuremberg Tribunal as document 3047-ps).

Released by that time from a Polish prison, S. Bandera, like a number of other leading members of the OUN from Galicia, released from Polish prisons, ended up in Krakow, which by that time was one of the coordination centers of the Abwehr. There, the young active leader of the OUN found support from Richard Yary, who oversaw the OUN’s relations with the German intelligence services. According to Lev Rebet's version, Bandera's supporters found support from certain German military circles, while Melnik's group had connections with the political elite of Nazi Germany.

In November 1939, about 400 Ukrainian nationalists began training in Abwehr camps in Zakopane, Komarn, Kirchendorf and Gackestein.

By the end of autumn 1939, the leaders appointed by PUN Melnik were simply ignored locally by Bandera’s supporters.

In November 1939, Melnik summoned OUN member Bandera, who was then in Germany, to include him in the PUN and appoint him as a referent for organizational affairs of the Region. Bandera, who arrived in January 1940, refused all proposed appointments and demanded a redistribution of power and reform of the PUN.

Although already in the first days of December 1939, the Krakow branch of the OUN (which was already actually subordinated to S. Bandera), without coordinating its actions with the Central Wire of the OUN (PUN) under the leadership of A. Melnik, sent a courier to Lvov with instructions on the preparation of the OUN for armed action. The courier was intercepted by the NKVD, which managed to capture a number of OUN leaders. Due to significant losses in the underground network, PUN issued an order at the beginning of January 1940 to refrain from active actions and go deep underground. The Krakow branch of the OUN, led by Bandera, continued to prepare an armed uprising, sending armed “shock” groups from the General Government to territory controlled by the USSR. The first such group was sent at the end of January 1940 and was intercepted by border guards; some of the other groups managed to pass unnoticed.

Melnik Andrey Antanasovich (Melnik Andriy) (1890-1964) - one of the leaders of Ukrainian nationalists; Colonel of the UPR Army. Harvest With. Volya near Lvov (Austria-Hungary). Former manager of the estates of Metropolitan A. Sheptytsky. Member of the First World War; commander of a hundred legion of Ukrainian Sich Riflemen as part of the Austro-Hungarian army. In 1918 he took part in the formation of the kuren of the Sich Riflemen (Kyiv) as part of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR). In 1920-1921 inspector of military missions of the UPR. Brother-in-law of E. Konovalets, founder of the OUN. Together with Konovalets, he created the Ukrainian Military Organization (UVO). After the liquidation of Konovalets on October 11, 1938 by the Soviet special services, he proclaimed himself his successor and headed the Provod Ukrainian Nationalists (PUN). Since 1938 - an agent of German military intelligence (nickname "Consul-1"), then of the Gestapo. On 08/27/1939, with the support of the Uniate Metropolitan A. Sheptytsky, he took the post of head of the OUN. 02/11/1940 Bandera’s supporters at a conference in Krakow stated that governing body OUN - PUN does not meet the needs of the OUN in its composition, and Melnyk and PUE came to power on the basis of the mythical testament of Konovalets, and were not elected in accordance with the resolutions of the first “Great Gathering of Ukrainian Nationalists” (VZUN). The second VZUN (Bandera members) in April 1941 expelled A. Melnik from the OUN and forbade him to speak on behalf of this organization. Melnik sent a letter to the beginning on February 6, 1943. OKW wrote a letter to V. Keitel asking him to resolve the issue “of involving the Ukrainian armed forces in the fight against Moscow,” then he actively made statements about the creation of an independent Ukrainian state. 02/26/1944 arrested by the Gestapo and imprisoned in Sachsenhausen. After the war, he collaborated with the American intelligence services OSS - CIA. In 1947, at the 3rd Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, he was elected leader of the PUN. Died in Clairvaux (Luxembourg).

Ukrainian nationalist organizations during the Second World War. Documentation. In two volumes. Volume 2. 1944-1945. Curriculum Vitae. P. 1054.

Pawns in someone else's game [The Secret History of Ukrainian Nationalism] Berdnik Miroslava

OUN split. Bandera and Melnikovites

Just on the eve of Germany's attack on the USSR, a split occurred in the leadership of the OUN. Two groups emerge - Melnik and Bandera. True, the split has been brewing for a long time. This is what General Nikolai Kapustyansky, one of the leaders of the OUN, recalled: “Colonel Melnik is reforming our political representation in Nimechchyna, as he despises the centurion Riko Yariy, yearns for a report from the government in the sums that were collected overseas... All this, and also unrecognized before the leadership of hundreds. An ardent cry from her side... the overly ambitious people were very dissatisfied. Yariy said to us on the sidelines in the storm: “Well, now there will be war!” From that time on, they began to mount an opposition that lashed out at German officials, leading to a split in the OUN.”. Well, “mounting an opposition” was not difficult, especially in the presence of such ambitious, aggressive and, moreover, young competitors as Bandera and his group. By this time, Bandera had been released by the Germans from a Polish prison and appeared in Krakow.

According to the description of Abwehr member Erwin Stolze, Bandera was a “careerist, fanatic and bandit.” The reason for the split in the OUN was a statement made by Bandera and his like-minded people to the leadership of the Krakow branch of the OUN.

Baranovsky, Sushko, Gribivsky and other members of the wire were accused of collaborating with Polish intelligence. They demanded that Andrei Melnik remove these OUN members from their leadership positions in the line. The miller refused to comply with these demands. In response to this, Bandera and his supporters declared Melnik incapable of further leading the “national struggle for the independence of Ukraine,” accusing him of condoning provocateurs, slowness and inability to use the situation to wage an active struggle against the Soviet Union, and also forbade him to carry out any action under the “branded "The name of the OUN. Bandera's supporters emphasized: “The Organization will fight skin care as a result of these precautions, like sabotage.”

Melnik’s members, in turn, decided to expel S. Bandera, Y. Stetsk, R. Yaroy from the OUN and ordered them to come to the “revolutionary tribunal” created by Melnik. " We spent a long time, because it’s true that they were diligently protected by the upper clique, we just didn’t know, but before others, we were spoiled by this clique, to the point of such unguarded trust., - wrote in one of A. Melnik’s leaflets. - A little later, it became clear to us that a cabal of evil fools led the OUN to its death... They are morally deteriorating. Their pennies, requisitions and atrocities demoralized them. Demoralizing this massive influx of various evil-criminal elements. Demoralizing their evildoers against their own brothers, which formed the basis of the activity of people, creating among them scammers-provocateurs and soul-destroying brother-beaters.”

"Rik 1941, - wrote one of the members of the OUN leadership closest to Melnik, Z. Knysh, - having once again entered the history of our movement, like the beginning of a cruel era that has not ended yet today. Having initiated the devilish dance of passions, awakening the human beast shackled by moral lantzugs, and severing the hand of Cain, which grieved for the Donetsk “happiness of the knife.”

In his memoirs, R. Sushko’s former adjutant, Ivan Bisaga, who was in Krakow from the first days of the split, recalls what shameful means the nationalists used in the struggle for a leadership position in the organization. “It was only later that I realized that both Melnyk and Bandera served Hitler with allegiance, but were fighting with each other over the past... Members of the OUN-Banderists killed members of the OUN-Melniks And they killed one another, brothers by blood, for the sake of the high chair, in yak is guilty of sitting one of two: Miller and Bandera. I don’t know why, it’s important to explain, I took Melnik’s side and later learned that about 400 people on our side were killed by the Banderaites. The Melnykists did not lose themselves from the borg and, in turn, blamed hundreds and two more Banderaites... Working together with Kapustyansky, Sushko, Boidunnik, Baranovsky and others, I began to understand that the OUN (and the Melnykists and Bandera івці) carry out their work with permission and with the help of the fascists».

But the bloody massacres continued later. " The party blinded and in hatred until the true Surge of the nationalists, Stepan Bandera’s militants killed thousands of Ukrainians in a kind way. The victims of Bandera's terror were: O. Senik-Grybivsky, M. Stsiborsky, R. Sushko, Y. Baranovsky, U. Sokolovsky, I. Shubsky, two Prishlyak brothers, hundreds of lower organizational assets and nearly 4,000 ordinary members, sympathizers and fighters. The responsibility for the death of these people lies with Stepan Bandera and his lieutenants».

The main bloody actions against the Melnikov activists were planned and led by Nikolai Lebed. As the head of the Security Council of the Bandera line, he personally identified future victims and sought their elimination. On Lebed’s personal orders, Roman Sushko, Yaroslav Baranovsky and many others were destroyed. Lebed, together with his deputy M. Arsenich, discussed each “destructive operation” in detail. Based on the interests of the Bandera elite, through his agents Lebed jealously monitored the relations between the Melnikov competitors and German military intelligence. Shortly before Germany attacked the USSR, in a letter to a member of his line, I. Gambrusevich, Lebed wrote: “Melnikivtsi speak to each other like this: no. com.(German command - M. B.) prompted the OUN to create Ukrainian ties. viy.(Ukrainian military - M. B.) strength. Viy. Provid hugged the gene. Cap.(General Kapustyansky - M. B.), Sinclair, Ohm. - Pav. - senior(Omelyanovich-Pavlenko Sr. - M. B.) i Kurmanovich. The school is serving in one place during the term of the General Government. We don’t actually know what’s going on yet.”

Melnikov's followers also intensified their terrorist work against Bandera's followers. Abwehr agent and Melnik’s emissary Alexander Kuts, who was sent to the Soviet rear just before the war, spoke about this in detail. Andrei Melnik entrusted the preparation of secret murders of Bandera leaders to Yaroslav Gaivas. Yatsura (“Raven”) and Kuts were appointed his assistants. Bandera, Lebed, Ulitka, Starukh and Gabrusevich were subject to physical destruction.

These murders were to be attributed to the NKVD and the Poles. Kuts writes: “The preparation of terrorist acts was carried out very carefully, because there was little smell of those created in the name of the NKVD or Polish terrorist groups. For the effective encryption of the Millerites and the reconversion of emigration, so that terrorist acts against Bandera and his like-minded people were carried out by the NKVD and Polish terrorists, I and Gaivas have prepared a special sheet. This provocative leaflet threatens Bandera and his closest members of the organization. We decided to multiply this leaf and send it to the people we intended to help. At the same time, just to be clear, we decided to send the same letters to the address of various prominent Ukrainian “non-Bandera” activists.

Zeu, the meta -mi namiliti namysniti provocative attacks І іmenі Polyakiv drive one wire -winged Nationalist, who did not impended Banderivtsiv, Ale Buv Vidomiy Yak Vorog Polyakiv. According to Gaivas's statement, the terrorist act against Bandera was scheduled for the beginning of the spring of 1941, after the snow had gone and the ground had melted. This whole thing has been redone so that you can consume it without changing codes so that you can bury the corpses».

The split in the OUN ended with the formation of the so-called “revolutionary wire” (RP OUN). The breakaway part was led by Stepan Bandera and his associates Nikolai Lebed, Yaroslav Stetsko and others. After Bandera, this faction was also called OUN-b or simply Bandera.

The OUN-m, headed by A. Melnik, was taken over by the secret police - the Gestapo, and the OUN-b found itself under the wing of the Abwehr. However, this conditional division did not prevent the Gestapo from using the services of Bandera’s men, and the Abwehr from using the services of Melnik’s men.

The struggle between them was conducted, first of all, for the leadership of the nationalist emigration and for the monopoly right to speak before the fascist authorities as the only representatives of the “Ukrainian movement”, in order to receive more subsidies from their patrons. During this struggle, both factions committed murders of former like-minded people, seized each other's premises, transport, etc.

The Nazis were also interested in this split, since through it they had the opportunity to take the OUN members into their own hands.

The former chief of security and SD in the city of Rovno, Miller, referring to this split, cynically explained: “We gave out millions of rubles and made great efforts to replace Melnik with Bandera. We will spare nothing to make ten Banderas.”

True, already before the start of the Great Patriotic War, when preparing an attack on the USSR, the Germans tried to reconcile both warring sides.

The former head of the Abwehr department of the Berlin district, Erwin Stolze, testified during interrogation on May 29, 1945: “In the process of intensifying Ukrainian nationalist activities, which we carried out through our agents, already at the beginning of 1940 we became aware of friction in the leadership of the nationalist underground, in particular, between our agents Melnik and Bandera, and that these frictions were leading to a split nationalist movement.

For German intelligence during the period of preparation for the war against the USSR, when everything was needed for subversive activities, these frictions, especially the split, were disadvantageous. Therefore, at the direction of Canaris, in the summer of 1940, I took measures to reconcile Melnik with Bandera in order to gather all Ukrainian nationalists to fight against Soviet power.

In the summer of 1940, I received Bandera, who, in a conversation with me, accused Melnik of passivity, argued that he, Bandera, was the elected leader of the Ukrainian nationalists, but for the good of the cause, he would take all measures to make peace with Melnik.

A few days later I received Melnik, with whom I had a similar conversation. Melnik accused Bandera of careerism and argued that with his rash actions he would destroy the underground created on the territory of Soviet Ukraine, especially in the western regions.

Melnik argued that he, as a successor, received leadership of the nationalist movement from Konovalets, and asked to help him remain a leader for the unity of the organization. Melnik also promised to take all measures to reconcile with Bandera.

Despite the fact that during my meeting with Melnik and Bandera, both of them promised to take all measures for reconciliation, I personally came to the conclusion that this reconciliation would not take place...

With the German attack on Soviet Union Bandera intensified the nationalist movement in the areas occupied by the Germans and attracted a particularly active part of the Ukrainian nationalists to his side, essentially ousting Melnyk from the leadership. The aggravation between Melnik and Bandera reached its limit. In August 1941, Canaris instructed me to end contact with Bandera and, conversely, to keep Melnik at the head of the nationalists...

Shortly after cutting off contact with Bandera, he was arrested for attempting to form a Ukrainian government in Lvov.

To break ties with Bandera, we used the fact that in 1940 the latter, having received a large sum of money from the Abwehr to finance the created underground for the purpose of organizing subversive activities, tried to appropriate it and transferred it to one of the Swiss banks, from where we seized it again returned to Bandera."

As Stolze testified during interrogation, Melnik introduced Lahousen to a plan to strengthen the sabotage and espionage work of nationalists in the USSR and Western Ukraine and handed him a list of monetary expenses, which he asked to be reimbursed from Abwehr funds. During meetings with Stoltse, Melnik asked to be allowed to organize a special intelligence department under the OUN, which, in his opinion, would intensify the subversive activities of the OUN members and ensure communication with German intelligence officers. Miller's request was granted. The Germans appointed their agent, former CAA Colonel Roman Sushko, as head of the intelligence department.

After the war, Soviet authorities found out that Melnik was not only an Abwehr agent, but at the same time collaborated with the Main Directorate of Reich Security (RSHA). Lieutenant Siegfried Müller spoke about this during interrogation. During interrogation on September 19, 1945, he testified: “In 1940, during my work in the 4th department (Gestapo) of the Main Directorate of Reich Security of Germany, one of the leaders of the Ukrainian nationalists, Melnyk, visited the head of the 4th department, Schroeder, in the Gestapo office, where he received the necessary instructions for work.

I myself often saw Melnik within the walls of the Gestapo, and from the words of Schroider I knew that he proposed to Melnik to create an “Office for Ukrainian Affairs” in Berlin, the activities of which would be directed by German intelligence.

I also knew from Schroeder that the Gestapo was trying, by creating the “Office for Ukrainian Affairs” in Berlin, to consolidate the Ukrainian nationalist movement and, through Melnyk, to bring it under its permanent control.”

To the question - “What was the relationship between Melnyk and Bandera in the Office of Ukrainian Affairs?”- Lieutenant Muller replied that “During Melnik’s conversation with Shroider, the latter suggested that Melnik negotiate with Bandera about his participation in the work of the “Office for Ukrainian Affairs.” Schroeder said that Germany would need cadres of Ukrainian nationalists to use them in the East, under the general leadership of the Main Directorate of Imperial Security of Germany, to work among the Ukrainian population.

In November 1940, I went to work for the Abwehr, where I learned that Melnik, in addition to his connections with the Gestapo, worked for German military intelligence. He was a resident of Abverstelle-Berlin. I know about this because I myself worked as an intelligence assistant against the USSR at Abverstelle-Berlin.

Siegfried Müller further said that when he worked in the 1st intelligence department of Abwerstelle-Berlin as an intelligence assistant against the USSR, “Captain Pului worked in the same office with me, with whom Melnik was in personal contact and provided him with intelligence data about the Soviet Union. Melnik received all espionage information about the USSR from his supporters - Ukrainian nationalists in Western Ukraine, as well as from the station in the city of New Sol (Czechoslovakia).

In Pului’s affairs, I saw Melnik’s personal commitment to cooperate with Abverstelle-Berlin, accompanied by his photograph. Pului worked with Melnik under the pseudonym "Doctor Kuchert".

On September 1, 1939, Germany attacked Poland, thereby unleashing the second world war. Together with the Germans, Roman Sushko’s detachment also crossed the Polish border. Immediately after the occupation of Poland, the Nazis invited Ukrainian nationalists to work in the so-called “Ukrainian police” they created. And shortly before the attack on the Soviet Union, the Germans began mass training of OUN police personnel for the future occupation apparatus in Ukraine. For these purposes, “Ukrainian police” schools were created in the cities of Kholm, Przemysl and Berlin. They were led by Gestapo officers Müller, Rieder, Walter and others. Before the start of hostilities against the USSR, these schools managed to train about 400 police officers.

At the same time, German military intelligence began training agents on a large scale for espionage, sabotage and insurgent activities on Soviet territory. Thus, in a special camp on Lake Chiemsee, in Germany, Ukrainian nationalists were trained as saboteurs, and spies were trained in the Quinzgut military training center.

Along with this, special paramilitary detachments and groups were created from OUN members for subversive activities in the Soviet rear. One of these formations, numbering 200 people, was created in the summer of 1939 in the city of Wiener Neustadt, Austria.

He also testified about the financing of the OUN by Hitler’s intelligence former manager references of communication and security of the central wire of the OUN Miron Matvieiko. He wrote: “Even then, Bandera, Lebed, Stetsko, Shchukhevich, Lenkavsky sold their souls, and thereby the entire OUN, to Hitler’s Abwehr. All the “liberation” actions of that time, which were carried out under the leadership of Bandera, were generously financed by Hitler’s military intelligence.”