| Days of military glory (victory days) of Russia | 5th of December. The day of the start of the counter-offensive of Soviet troops against Nazi troops in the Battle of Moscow (1941)

5th of December

The day the counteroffensive began
Soviet troops against Nazi troops
in the battle of Moscow
(1941)

Battle of Moscow

By the number of troops, military equipment and weapons, scope and intensity of hostilities, the Battle of Moscow in 1941 - 1942. was one of the largest in the history of the Second World War. It took place over an area of ​​up to 1000 km along the front and up to 350-400 km in depth, which was equal in area to England, Ireland, Iceland, Belgium and Holland combined. For 203 days there were furious, bitter and bloody battles, in which over 7 million soldiers and officers, about 53 thousand guns and mortars, about 6.5 thousand tanks and assault guns, and more than 3 thousand combat aircraft fought on both sides. The Battle of Moscow was a decisive military event in the first year of the Great Patriotic War.

Even in Directive No. 21, the Wehrmacht was tasked with reaching Moscow as quickly as possible. After the first successes, Hitler demanded from the command and troops “to occupy Moscow on August 15, and end the war with Russia on October 1.” However, Soviet troops stopped the enemy with active and decisive actions, inflicting heavy losses on him.

By December 5, the crisis of the German offensive came. Having suffered heavy losses and exhausted their material resources, the enemy began to go on the defensive. At the same time, by the beginning of December, the Supreme Command Headquarters near Moscow had concentrated significant strategic reserves. On December 5–6, the troops of the Kalinin, Western and Southwestern Fronts launched a decisive counteroffensive. Despite the stubborn resistance of the enemy, severe frosts and deep snow cover, it developed successfully. km.

The counteroffensive began on December 5-6, 1941 on the front from Kalinin to Yelets. The fighting immediately became fierce. Despite the lack of superiority in manpower and technical means, severe frosts, deep snow cover, the troops of the left wing of the Kalinin and right wing of the Western Front, already in the first days of the counteroffensive, broke through the enemy’s defenses south of Kalinin and north-west of Moscow, cut the railway and the Kalinin highway - Moscow and liberated a number of settlements.

Simultaneously with the troops advancing northwest of Moscow, the troops of the left wing of the Western and right wing of the Southwestern Front launched a counteroffensive. Strong attacks by the Red Army troops on the flank groupings of Army Group Center, intended to encircle Moscow, forced the fascist German command to take measures to save their troops from defeat. By January 7, 1942, Soviet troops advanced west by 100 - 250

On December 8, Hitler signed a directive on the transition to defense on the entire Soviet-German front. Army Group Center was given the task of holding strategically important areas at any cost.

On December 9, Soviet troops liberated Rogachevo, Venev, Yelets, December 11 - Stalinogorsk, December 12 - Solnechnogorsk, December 13 - Efremov, December 15 - Klin, December 16 - Kalinin, December 20 - Volokolamsk. On December 25, Soviet troops reached the Oka River on a broad front. On December 28, Kozelsk was liberated, on December 30, Kaluga, and at the beginning of January 1942, Meshchovsk and Mosalsk.

By the beginning of January 1942, the troops of the right wing Western Front reached the border of the Lama and Ruza rivers. By this time, the troops of the Kalinin Front reached the Pavlikovo-Staritsa line. The troops of the center of the Western Front liberated Naro-Fominsk on December 26, Maloyaroslavets on January 2, and Borovsk on January 4. The counteroffensive developed successfully on the left wing of the Western Front and in the Bryansk Front zone (recreated on December 18, 1941 as part of the 3rd, 13th and 61st armies; commander General Ya. T. Cherevichenko, member of the Military Council A. F. Kolobyakov, Chief of Staff Major General V. Ya. Kolpakchi).

The troops of the Bryansk Front, in cooperation with the troops of the left wing of the Western Front, reached the Belev, Mtsensk, Verkhovye line by the beginning of January 1942. This created favorable conditions for the encirclement of Army Group Center.

For valor and courage shown in fierce and bloody battles, 40 formations and units were awarded guards ranks, 36 thousand soldiers and officers were awarded orders and medals. The Battle of Moscow was the beginning of a radical turn in the Great Patriotic War.

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Battle of Moscow

Medal "For the Defense of Moscow"

Medal "For the Defense of Moscow" established by the Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces dated May 1, 1944 on the establishment of the medal “For the Defense of Moscow.” The author of the medal design is the artist N. I. Moskalev.

The medal “For the Defense of Moscow” was awarded to all participants in the defense of Moscow:

All military personnel and civilian personnel of the Soviet Army and NKVD troops who participated in the defense of Moscow for at least one month from October 19, 1941 to January 25, 1942;
- persons from civilian population who took a direct part in the defense of Moscow for at least one month from October 19, 1941 to January 25, 1942;
- military personnel of the Moscow air defense zone and air defense units, as well as civilians, were the most active participants in the defense of Moscow from enemy air raids from July 22, 1941 to January 25, 1942;
- military personnel and civilians from the population of the city of Moscow and the Moscow region who took an active part in the construction of defensive lines and structures of the defensive line of the Reserve Front, Mozhaisk, Podolsk lines and the Moscow bypass. partisans of the Moscow region and active participants in the defense of the hero city of Tula.

The medal “For the Defense of Moscow” is worn on the left side of the chest and, if there are other medals of the USSR, is located after the medal “For the Defense of Leningrad”. As of January 1, 1995, approximately 1,028,600 people were awarded the medal “For the Defense of Moscow.”

The medal “For the Defense of Moscow” is made of brass and has the shape of a regular circle with a diameter of 32 mm.

On the front side of the medal is the Kremlin wall. Against the background of the Kremlin wall is a T-34 tank with a group of soldiers on it. On the left side of the medal there is an image of the monument to Minin and Pozharsky and on the right side of the medal there is a tower.

Above the Kremlin wall you can see the dome of the Government building with a flag, on the flag there is a hammer and sickle. Airplane silhouettes above the dome. At the top of the medal along the circumference is the inscription “FOR THE DEFENSE OF MOSCOW.” At the bottom of the medal there is a laurel wreath around the circumference, and at the lower ends of the branches there is a five-pointed star. Front side The medal is bordered by a convex edge.

On the reverse side of the medal is the inscription “FOR OUR SOVIET MOTHERLAND.” Above the inscription are a hammer and sickle.

All inscriptions and images on the medal are convex.

Using an eyelet and a ring, the medal is connected to a pentagonal block covered with a silk moiré ribbon 24 mm wide. The ribbon has three longitudinal olive stripes, each 5 mm wide, and two red stripes, each 4 mm wide. The edges of the ribbon are edged with narrow red stripes.

In the fall of 1941, almost the entire European territory of the USSR was occupied by German troops, and the enemy was rushing to Moscow, which was only a few kilometers away. Her loss for our country could mean defeat in the war. Our country has never been in greater danger.

Background

After Hitler came to power in 1933, a tough regime was established in Germany. totalitarian regime with the indisputable authority of the German leader (Führer). Soon he defiantly breaks all the restrictions of the Versailles Peace Treaty, gradually turning Germany into a formidable military power. By 1939, Hitler succeeded in annexing Czechoslovakia, Austria and the lands of the demilitarized zone through provocations and sending troops with impunity, with the full connivance of England and France. On September 1, 1939, Germany unleashes the most terrible war in the history of mankind; German troops invaded Poland. By 1941, Germany and its allies controlled virtually the entire European continent. The Third Reich demanded even more blood: the Soviet Union was next in line.

Map of Europe by the summer of 1941.

In May 1940, the German military command, on Hitler's personal orders, began developing a plan for the invasion of the USSR, despite the Molotov-Ribbentrop Allied Pact concluded between the two countries. Already on December 12 of the same year, the “Barbarossa” plan was developed, which was based on the tactics of “blitzkrieg”, a quick war. According to the plan, the Soviet troops were to be destroyed through deep strikes of tank wedges, which were supposed to split and encircle the main forces of the Soviet army. Special attention was given to the capture of Moscow:

« Quickly reaching Moscow. The capture of this city means a decisive success both politically and economically, not to mention the fact that the Russians will be deprived of their most important railway junction.»

It was planned to end the war by the end of autumn, that is, in 4-5 months with access to the Astrakhan-Volga-Arkhangelsk line. In the occupied territories, according to the Ost master plan, the population from the occupied territories of the USSR was supposed to be massively resettled to Western Siberia, and a small part was to be Germanized. The Russians were supposed to be completely destroyed. The “liberated” territories were to be inhabited by German colonialists.

Map of the Barbarossa plan.

From the beginning of the spring of 1941, German troops began to concentrate near the USSR border. In March, the Germans collected information about Soviet troops concentrated in the western regions Soviet Union. Rovel’s group, a squadron of high-altitude bombers converted for photography, played a big role in this. They flew at an altitude of more than 10 kilometers, and were inaccessible to Soviet fighters. A powerful intelligence network was also organized from residents of the western regions annexed to the USSR in 1939-1940. Thanks to reconnaissance, before the offensive, the Germans had comprehensive information about the location, number and equipment of the Red Army, which was the reason for the particular success of German operations in the first days of the war.

The German command skillfully used disinformation. It was widely believed among soldiers, including German ones, that German troops, having received the right of passage through the USSR, would soon go to the Middle East, and then to India, Britain's main colony. Conflicting information was thrown in about the date and the very possibility of a German attack on the USSR. The tanks arrived just before the attack itself. It became known only on June 21 that Germany would start a war, but the Soviet command no longer had time to deploy the army.

German troops were divided into three attack groups: Army Group North was supposed to attack Leningrad, Army Group South was to attack Kyiv and Donbass. The most numerous and equipped was Army Group Center, which was supposed to move in the Moscow direction. There was one tank army each in the southern and central directions, and two in the central direction.

Start of the war

22 June 1941 3:15 minutes without a declaration of war, German bombers crossed the border and attacked the main military bases, airfields and ports of the Soviet Union. In a matter of hours, 1,200 aircraft were destroyed - half of the USSR air fleet. Upon learning of this, Aviation General Kopec shot himself. And at 4 o’clock in the morning the Germans began a massive artillery barrage from all guns against the Soviet border fortifications. Immediately after it, the main forces of the Wehrmacht went on the offensive.

Despite the stubborn resistance of the Soviet troops, the Germans quickly advanced hundreds of kilometers forward with tank breakthroughs, creating several large “cauldrons” at once. Only near Smolensk, at the cost of enormous efforts and sacrifices, was it possible to hold back the enemy for almost 2 months.

After the capture of Smolensk at the end of August, despite the objections of Kh.V. Guderian, the main striking forces of the tank armies were sent to the Southern and Northern Front: Hoth's 2nd Panzer Army was sent to help Army Group North to break through to Leningrad, and Guderian's 3rd was sent to block Soviet troops near Kiev, which led to to the closure of the largest cauldron in the history of wars - the Kyiv cauldron.

The German movement towards Moscow continued only on September 30. A further series of battles, operations and other military operations in the Moscow direction between the forces of the Third Reich and Soviet troops was called the Battle of Moscow.

The main forces of the Nazis were concentrated in the Moscow direction: almost 2 million people (44% of all personnel), half of all aviation, 14 thousand guns and mortars - about a third of the total. The main tank forces were also deployed here, about 1,700 or 75% of the total: the 2nd and 3rd tank groups returned, and E. Hoepner’s 4th tank group was secretly transported from the Leningrad Front for reinforcement. The troops of Army Group Center were commanded by Marshal F. von Bock. The Germans’ path to Moscow was blocked by three fronts: the Western Front under the command of I.S. Konev, to the south - Bryansk under the command of Colonel General A.I. Eremenko. Reserve front under the command of S.M. Budyonny was located in the second echelon and covered the Western and Bryansk fronts. The total number of Soviet troops was 1,250,000 people, they were much inferior to the Germans in numbers and equipment, while most of The tanks available to the Soviet troops were old models. The units themselves were understaffed and poorly trained. During the month of absence of offensive operations by the Wehrmacht, the troops of three fronts themselves tried to go on the offensive. The order to prepare for defense was given only on September 27, and the Soviet troops did not have time to sufficiently strengthen their positions.

The German command developed an operation codenamed "Typhoon". The idea of ​​the operation was extremely simple: with powerful blows from large mechanized groups, to encircle the main forces of the Red Army troops covering the capital and destroy them in the areas of Bryansk and Vyazma, and then quickly bypass Moscow from the north and south with the aim of capturing it. After the operation began, Hitler said: “The city must be surrounded so that not a single Russian soldier, not a single resident - be it a man, woman or child - can leave it. Suppress any attempt to leave by force. Make the necessary preparations so that Moscow and its surroundings are flooded with water using huge structures. Where Moscow stands today, a huge sea should appear, which will forever hide the capital of the Russian people from the civilized world».

Typhoon Plan Map

Bryansk and Vyazemsky boilers

On September 30, two days earlier than the main forces, Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group rushed on the offensive, striking the left flank of the Bryansk Front, but much further south than the front commander, Colonel General Andrei Eremenko, expected. Within three days, the tanks of the 2nd Tank Group reached the rear of Eremenko’s troops and moved through Orel to Tula. Guderian's task was to cover Moscow from the South.

Oryol-Bryansk offensive German troops.

On October 2, the offensive of the main German forces began. The enemy misled the Soviet command regarding the main attack; the main defensive forces were concentrated on the Smolensk-Vyazma road, but the tank groups of Hoth and Gepner struck to the north and south, respectively. Aviation struck the headquarters of the Western Front, which led to communication problems and partial loss of control. Having created the necessary numerical advantage at the sites of the main attacks, the Germans easily penetrated the insufficiently fortified positions of the Soviet troops, and by October 5, they closed the Vyazemsky pocket. More than 600 thousand people were surrounded along with the Bryansk cauldron.

Vyazemsk offensive operation of German troops

However, even when surrounded, Soviet troops continued to fight bravely, pinning down the main forces of the Germans, preventing them from breaking through towards the capital. Only a few divisions advanced on Moscow, and the troops of the Bryansk Front, despite Eremenko’s wound, were able to break out of encirclement by October 23 with significant losses. They held back the Germans for 17 days, allowing the Soviet command to strengthen the Tula area. They managed to get out of the Vyazemsky cauldron with heavy losses, but under the leadership of Lieutenant General Lukin, the Soviet troops fought steadfastly, and the Germans had to concentrate 24 divisions to defeat them. The consequences of the defeat were extremely severe: according to German data, more than 660 thousand people were captured, not to mention the remaining losses. Moscow turned out to be virtually defenseless; the Germans were already on the outskirts of the capital, but they did not have the strength to defend it.

On the edge of the abyss

In the South, Guderian's tanks were rushing towards Tula. In this direction, the 1st Guards Rifle Corps of Lelyushenko was formed, but the approach of units and reinforcements could only be carried out on October 4-6. But already on October 3, several tank divisions, led personally by Hines Gudarian, broke into Oryol. The headquarters of the newly formed corps in Mtsensk was less than 50 km (about a day's journey). When Mtsensk was captured, Tula opened up, followed by Moscow. Thanks to operational actions on heavy bombers, despite fierce fire from the ground and a large number of enemy fighters in the air, Soviet paratroopers arrived at the airfields near Orel. There were only about 1,500 of them, but they were able to hold back the breaking through enemy tanks for 19 hours. By evening, the fresh 4th Tank Brigade, formed near Stalingrad, arrived under Colonel M.E. Katukov with new tanks T-34 and KV-1, which were superior in their parameters to enemy tanks. Even Guderian himself noted:

« For the first time, the superiority of Russian T-34 tanks manifested itself in a sharp form. The division suffered significant losses. The planned rapid attack on Tula had to be postponed for now.”

Here, near Mtsensk, Katukov used his famous tactics of tank ambushes. Camouflaged tanks on both sides of the highway calmly waited for the German armored column to approach 200-300 meters, and from ambushes they opened fire on the leading and trailing enemy vehicles. Creating a traffic jam, Soviet tank crews shot the immobilized enemy.

Despite the enemy's numerical advantage and the personal command of one of the most talented Wehrmacht generals, Guderian, Lelyushenko's forces and tank brigades were able to stop the German advance. And the attempt at a roundabout maneuver undertaken by the German command was stopped by a counterattack by the strike unit of the 4th brigade of Katukov. As a result, the attack on Tula was postponed until October 25, thereby gaining time to strengthen the city and prepare for the siege.

The Soviet command could not allow this important strategic junction, which allowed the Germans to easily reach Moscow, to fall into the hands of the Germans. Another 1st Guards Rifle Corps from the personal reserve of the headquarters was moved to the Orel-Tula highway, in the area of ​​​​the city of Mtsensk.

To the north, some German units continued the attack on Moscow, including the 2nd Panzer Division "Das Reich", which was the elite of the German tank and motorized forces. On her way stood only a detachment of paratroopers and saboteurs of 430 people, armed only with guns and Molotov cocktails. On the Ugra River he managed to stop the advance of the enemy vanguard.

The cadets of two Podolsk schools, Artillery and Infantry, were raised on combat alert. They were urgently sent to Maloyaroslavets to contain the advanced German forces. This was the first battle for the young cadets, but for two weeks they held off a much superior enemy and tanks. Of the 3,500 people, only 300 remained alive...

At this critical moment, Stalin summoned G.K. from Leningrad. Zhukov and on October 10 appointed him commander of the Western Front. The front consisted of the surviving units that did not end up in the Vyazemsky cauldron. On October 21, Zhukov became responsible for the defense of the capital.

Soviet troops retreated to the Mozhaisk defense line, the last defensive line on the outskirts of Moscow. The Mozhaisk line consisted of three defensive lines: the main one and two rear ones. The forward strip was located approximately 120-150 km from Moscow and ran from the Moscow Sea (Ivanskovskoye Reservoir) to Kaluga. It consisted of barriers, bunkers, bunkers, Eskarpov, Conteskarpov, Forest rubble. Construction began in July 1941, but by mid-October the defensive structures were only 50% complete. However, the line still presented a difficult obstacle for the enemy. The armies of the Western and Reserve Fronts who managed to retreat defended themselves. Their total number barely reached 90 thousand people, which did not allow organizing defense along the entire line, so the troops were stationed only on the main roads and directions leading to Moscow. German troops everywhere had both numerical and technical superiority. Only the courage, endless devotion to the Motherland of each warrior, experience and resourcefulness of the field commanders made it possible to temporarily hold back the enemy’s advance. Every day, every hour won in these battles made it possible to bring new reserves to the capital from the depths of the country and from other sectors of the front.

The Germans delivered the main blow towards Mozhaisk, where the Germans sent 4 fully equipped divisions, including Das Reich. Particularly fierce battles took place on the Borodino field, where 130 years earlier the Russian army fought Napoleon. Here the 32nd Rifle Division under the command of Polosukhin fought off numerous German attacks for 6 days, inflicting significant losses on them. In five days, the Germans advanced only a couple of hundred meters, which came at a huge cost to them. Only after the capture of Mozhaisk did Polosukhin’s division retreat.

With incredible efforts, by the 20th of October they managed to stop the advancing enemy on the Protva and Nara rivers, on the second line of the Mozhaisk defense line. In the South, Guderian's tanks encountered the stubbornness of the Tula defenders. The offensive in the northwest of Moscow with the capture of Kalinin (Tver) also stopped by the end of October. The Germans failed to quickly encircle the capital from the north, despite the fact that more than 20% of the advancing troops of Army Group Center were concentrated there. From Soviet units, located near the city, the Kalinin Front was created under the command of Marshal Konev, which held back significant enemy forces in the North of Moscow.

The first and most zealous offensive of the enemy was stopped, it fizzled out. At the end of October, continuous heavy rains began, turning the roads into impassable mud swamps, where even tanks got stuck. To continue the offensive, the Nazi troops, in addition to rest, needed restoration of losses, fresh reinforcements and provisions. But “General Mud,” as the Germans called the mud, greatly complicated the activities of the supply system. However, the importance of this factor cannot be exaggerated, because both the Germans and the Soviet troops had to use the same roads. At this time, significant forces were transferred to Moscow to defend it. The counteroffensive near Leningrad, in which famine had already begun, was canceled - the released forces were transferred to the capital. After the Soviet-Japanese conflicts on Lake Khasan and Khankin Gol in 1938-39. in the Far East there was a significant group numbering more than 1.5 million people. The eastern units were well trained and armed, and were in constant combat readiness. On September 14, Soviet intelligence officer in Japan Richard Sorge transmitted an encryption with the following text:

« According to Invest's source, the Japanese government has decided not to act against the USSR this year, however, the armed forces will be left in the MCG in case of an attack in the spring of next year if the USSR is defeated by that time».

Richard Sorge. The great Soviet intelligence officer. Already in October 1941, he would be arrested by Japanese counterintelligence and after some time sentenced to death.

However, right up to the defeat at Vyazma and Bryansk, the Soviet leadership did not dare to significantly weaken the eastern border, since Stalin did not trust Sorge much, and the Japanese often made very unexpected attacks. However, to save the capital, fresh forces were needed that could turn the tide of the battle. The Japanese command still did not dare to start a war with the Soviet Union until the Germans captured Moscow, despite Germany’s assurances of an imminent victory over “Russia.” Although reinforcements were vitally needed on the Western Front, the Soviet command did not completely weaken the group on the eastern border. The basis of the troops that stood up to defend the capital were newly formed divisions and brigades.

After the capture of Kalinin and the offensive near Mozhaisk, foreign embassies and government institutions gradually began to evacuate from Moscow, and on October 16, factories and public transport stopped working, the metro and the main buildings of the capital were mined. German air raids intensified. Provocateurs have become more active in the city. It was impossible to allow panic in the capital. On October 17, a respected party leader in the capital, Alexander Sergeevich Shcherbakov, spoke on the radio. He assured residents that Moscow would not be surrendered. Businesses and public transport soon resumed operations. To give Muscovites more confidence, posters announcing upcoming concerts and performances were hung in the city.

On October 20, Moscow was transferred to a state of siege, because the enemy was already close to the capital. Fortifications, machine gun and artillery points were created throughout the city, it was forbidden to turn on lights at night so as not to attract the attention of enemy bombers, and huge airships hovered over the entire city. The Muscovites themselves tried to help the front in everything: they built fortifications around the city, created forest debris; weapons and ammunition were produced in the city itself; huge sums were collected by people into a donation fund for the needs of the front; a people's militia was created. Residents knew that the enemy was dangerous and he was very close, but this did not plunge them into panic, but only assured them that in this difficult hour, everyone’s task was to make every possible effort for the common cause, to protect the capital and to defeat the enemy.

Moscow parade

By the beginning of November, the situation at the front began to level out somewhat, a powerful defense system was created on all approaches to Moscow, but it was still too early to talk about success. To raise the morale of the capital's residents and its defenders, a military parade was held on November 7 on Red Square in honor of the anniversary of the Great October Revolution.

The front line was only a few tens of kilometers from the capital. I. Stalin personally ordered the preparation of the parade in conditions of absolute secrecy. Secrecy was necessary - some of the equipment and soldiers for the parade were removed directly from the front, thereby weakening some of its sections. Massive bombing of Moscow by German aircraft brought more losses to the Luftwaffe than to the city. However, if the German command had learned about the parade on Red Square, it would certainly have abandoned all the bombers at its disposal, because the entire top leadership of the USSR along with Stalin had to watch the parade.

In order to prevent the enemy from breaking through, the Soviet command decided to start battles on several sectors of the front at once. And to protect Moscow from air raids, several squadrons of fighters, about 550 aircraft, were deployed. Until the late evening of November 6, even the commanders of the units involved were not informed that their soldiers were participating in the parade. However, since mid-October they had been engaged in drill training, ostensibly for a military review, which was supposed to be held in mid-November. The artillery for the parade was removed directly from the firing positions, and rifle divisions were also transported from the front.

Already on the night of November 7, the parade was moved 2 hours earlier: to 8 am instead of the usual 10. Invitations to the parade for journalists, foreign guests and residents of the capital were delivered several hours before the parade itself.

The day before the parade, meteorologists predicted high clouds and heavy snowfall for November 7, which virtually ruled out the possibility of an enemy airstrike. The red stars installed on the Kremlin towers were uncovered and lit.

On a snowy, frosty morning on November 7, the parade began at exactly 8 a.m. It was commanded by General Pavel Artemyev, commander of the Moscow Military District, and received by Marshal Semyon Budyonny. However, instead of hosting the parade, I.V. personally held the floor. Stalin. Many in the city thought that he had long been evacuated from the city. To dispel these rumors and demonstrate his confidence that Moscow would not be surrendered to the enemy, the first secretary of the party personally spoke on Red Square. At 8:10 minutes, all radio receivers in the country broadcast Stalin’s speech, which was heard even in the most remote corners of the Soviet Union. It ended with these words:

“You are waging a war of liberation, just. Let the courageous image of our great ancestors - Alexander Nevsky, Dmitry Donskoy, Kuzma Minin, Dmitry Pozharsky, Alexander Suvorov, Mikhail Kutuzov - inspire you in this war! Let the invincible banner of the great Lenin overshadow you! For the complete defeat of the German invaders! Death to the German occupiers! Long live our glorious Motherland! Her freedom! Her independence! Under the banner of Lenin, forward to battle!”

The parade included cadets, soldiers of rifle divisions, cavalry, artillery and new tanks brought from Siberia and Arkhangelsk. The troops that paraded along Red Square went straight to the front, confident in their victory, which they conveyed to their comrades.

Holding a parade on Red Square in these terrible November days was of great importance. Despite all the dangers, the parade showed the whole world and, first of all, Germany that Moscow was not broken, and the Soviet army was not destroyed in the fields of Rzhev, Vyazma and Kiev, but was alive, ready to fight for the freedom of its Motherland. The myth about the flight of Stalin and the top leadership from the capital was dispelled, and his speech gave incredible enthusiasm to both the residents of the city and the soldiers at the front.

It is believed that Hitler also accidentally stumbled upon Stalin's speech while turning his radio, and became completely furious when he realized what was happening in Moscow. He contacted the first available commander of the aviation unit, ordering the bombing of Red Square to begin. On this day, Moscow anti-aircraft gunners and fighter corps destroyed about 40 German aircraft. The air defense forces fulfilled their promise, preventing a single enemy bomber from even approaching the parade site.

The second stage of the German offensive operation in the Battle of Moscow

By mid-November the ground was frozen enough to allow the Germans to continue their attack on Moscow. Their tanks could move off roads. However, the defense of the Soviet troops by this period was significantly strengthened, and the number of fortifications increased. Fresh units from Siberia approached Moscow and Far East, from the regions of the Far North. This time the Soviet command guessed the main directions of the enemy’s attack and tried to especially strengthen these areas.

The German troops received, albeit insignificant, reinforcements, the Wehrmacht soldiers rested and believed that they only had to make the last decisive effort and the Soviet Union would collapse under the strength and pressure of the soldiers of Greater Germany. At the sites of the main attacks, the Germans outnumbered the Soviet troops several times. The Nazis advanced with particular frenzy, because wintering at the front was not at all part of their plans, the uniform of their army was not designed for Russian frosts.

The Germans' plan remained the same: to encircle Moscow with powerful flank attacks. The Germans transferred the 3rd and 4th tank groups of Hoth and Gepner and several motorized and infantry corps to the North-West from Moscow to the area of ​​Pushkino and Volokolamsk. They had to continue their offensive to the east to establish control over the Istra Reservoir, Klin, Krasnaya Polyana, and the Canal. Moscow and advance further. Guderian continued to lead the offensive in the south, on Tula and Kolomna, without which an attack on the capital of the USSR from the south would have been impossible. On November 16, the Germans began the second stage of the offensive.

The German tank armies struck towards Klin and Istra. Two tank and two infantry divisions of the German army managed to break through the Soviet defenses in the Klin direction and, at the cost of huge losses, they advanced 25 km in 5 days. After the 20th, when two more corps were transferred, Nazi troops were able to break through to Klin, which was defended with particular staunchness by the 16th Army of General Rokossovsky. The Germans pushed the defenders back into the city, where the battle took place for every house. Another part of the German troops of the northern group tried to break through the Volokolamsk Highway to Istra, but the path was defended by five tank brigades, including Katukov’s 1st Guards Brigade. Due to the enemy's numerical superiority in personnel and equipment, Soviet tank crews used tank ambush tactics, which allowed them to inflict significant damage on the enemy, hold back their onslaught and retreat with minimal losses. Only on November 23 did the Germans enter Istra. On November 24, Rokossovsky’s units left Klin to avoid being surrounded. Soviet troops were also forced to surrender Solnechnogorsk to the enemy, retreating to new lines of defense, even closer to Moscow. There were only a few kilometers left to the capital, so Soviet soldiers stood like a wall in every area.

The mechanized groups of the 3rd and 4th armies of the Wehrmacht only intensified the onslaught after the capture of Istra and Solnechnogorsk, they reached Yakhroma and Krasnaya Polyana. It was through Krasnaya Polyana, located only 27 km from the capital, that he walked shortest path to Moscow. The Germans took the village for the first time on November 24; they even managed to bring 300 mm guns there, the firing range of which allowed them to open fire even on the Kremlin. However, having learned about the long-range artillery that had been brought, Stalin personally ordered Rokossovsky to recapture Krasnaya Polyana from the enemy. All forces and reserves located nearby were used. The battle for the village went on non-stop for almost the whole day. Only in the evening did Soviet soldiers enter Krasnaya Polyana. There they received many trophies from the retreating enemy, including long-range guns.

To the northeast, German troops, having occupied Yakhroma, were able to reach the Moscow-Volga canal. However, after their withdrawal, Soviet troops blew up the spillways of the canal's reservoirs, which created a water flow that prevented the Germans from crossing.

In the south, despite clear numerical and technical superiority, Guderian's troops were never able to take Tula. Therefore, he ordered to bypass Tula from the eastern side, but attempts to close the ring around the city and take Serpukhov were unsuccessful. And after 3 days of fighting near Kashira, the German tank corps was repulsed to its original positions by a brave raid by General Belov’s cavalry, which, depending on the situation, fought both on foot and on horseback. By the end of November, enemy offensive operations in the south ceased.

In the North, the Germans also had little strength left to continue Operation Typhoon. Finally, on November 29, the Nazis were able to capture the bridge across the canal. Moscow and cross. But this breakthrough was eliminated by the approaching 1st shock army General Kuznetsov, although it was not yet fully formed. The Germans were again driven back to the other side. On December 1, the Germans were able to retake Krasnaya Polyana and several nearby villages. On December 2, one of the German officers who was there wrote that from a telescope one could observe life in the capital. This was an officer from the 2nd Tank Division, who had already been brought uniforms for the ceremonial parade through Red Square. Fierce fighting ensued, but this was the last success of the German troops. Gepner's motorcyclists made their way closest to the capital and managed to get to Khimki, but their detachment was completely destroyed. The Germans had no reserves left, the soldiers were exhausted by the incessant fighting and the cold, and their morale had fallen. The Typhoon plan failed.

At the same time, the Soviet troops retained the main forces, and new reserves were trained, received equipment and replenished the troops. The German units of Army Group Center were greatly stretched and weakened. It was only necessary to choose the moment to strike back.

Counteroffensive near Moscow

By the beginning of December, sufficient forces had already been concentrated near the capital to launch a counteroffensive. By November 30, the Supreme Command had prepared a basic counteroffensive plan, which was personally approved by Stalin.

As a result of the German offensive, which aimed to encircle Moscow, large ledges formed in the south and north of the city, where the Wehrmacht strike forces were concentrated. This allowed the Soviet armies to attack these groups simultaneously from the front and flanks, and Guderian’s units were generally under threat of encirclement. At the same time, simultaneously with the Kalinsky and Western Fronts, the right wing of the South-Western and the left wing of the North-Western Fronts were supposed to go on the offensive, facilitating a general counterattack in the Moscow direction. The rest of the Western Front was assigned to attack in the central sector in order to pin down the German forces and prevent them from transferring formations to the Red Army breakthrough areas.

About 1,100 thousand Soviet soldiers and officers, 7,652 guns and mortars, 415 rocket artillery installations, 774 tanks (including 222 heavy and medium) and 1,000 aircraft were concentrated near Moscow. The German Army Group Center had 1,708 thousand people, about 13,500 guns and mortars, 1,170 tanks and 615 aircraft. However, the Soviet command managed to compensate for the lack of numbers due to the successful choice of the moment to launch a counteroffensive, when the enemy stopped, but had not yet had time to go on the defensive and build defensive positions, as well as due to surprise. The German commanders simply did not believe in the possibility of the Soviet army going on the offensive after such significant losses in recent months war. The day before the offensive, the commander of Army Group Center von Bock announced the complete exhaustion of the forces of the defenders of Moscow. But the Germans were also exhausted, and communications were too extended.

The Soviet troops did not have sufficient numbers and equipment to encircle and destroy the enemy with a single blow, therefore, during the counter-offensive of the Soviet troops, operations were carried out to liberate the territories occupied by the Nazis and the fortified areas created. However, this was a general counter-offensive, which was carried out almost simultaneously along the entire length of the front from Kalinin to Yelets.

Kalinin offensive operation

The 29th and 31st armies of the Kalin Front had an advantageous strategic position, being on the flank of the main troops of the northern offensive group of Army Group Center, which is why they launched a general counteroffensive near Moscow. Without giving the enemy a sufficient pause to recuperate and create fortifications, the left wing of the Kalinin Front, after large-scale artillery bombardment, went on the offensive on December 5. Thus began the Kalinin operation. Its tasks included the destruction of the 9th Army of the Wehrmacht, located in the Kalinin area, the capture of the city, and then assistance in the defeat of the Klin-Solnechnogorsk enemy group by the troops of the Western Front, which began the offensive the next day.

The 29th, under the command of I.I. Maslennikov, already on the first day, having crossed the Volga, wedged into the enemy’s defenses west of Kalinin. The 31st Army of V.A. Yushkevich, after stubborn three-day battles, broke through to the south of the city, cutting off all communications of the Nazis. Due to the danger of encirclement, the Germans began to retreat. The occupiers who were in Kalinin were asked to surrender, but they refused the ultimatum. After a stubborn assault on December 16, Soviet troops took the city.

The front was ordered to vigorously pursue the enemy's Klin group, try to outflank it and encircle it. To help the bloodless 29th and 31st armies, the 30th Army and the 39th Army were allocated from the headquarters of the Supreme High Command. On January 1, 1942, the troops of the Kalinin Front captured Staritsa, and by January 7 they reached the Volga in the areas of Rzhev, Zubtsov, and Gorodishche.

Klin-Solnechnogorsk offensive operation

On December 6, the right wing of the Western Front launched an offensive in the Klin-Solnechnogorsk direction. The objectives of this operation included the destruction of the main offensive forces of the Germans in the northern sector and, above all, the 3rd and 4th tank armies. The Klin-Solnechnogorsk operation was attended by the 30th Army of the Kalinin Front under the command of Major General D.D. Lelyushenko, which was advancing from the north, and three armies of the eastern wing of the Western Front: 1st Shock V.I. Kuznetsov, 20th Major General A. A. Vlasov and the 16th Army of Lieutenant General K. K. Rokossovsky.

During the first four days of the offensive, which began on December 6, 1941, Soviet troops advanced 30-40 kilometers. In the sector of the 20th and 16th armies, the Germans began to retreat only on December 9th. The Germans tried to fortify themselves along the Leningrad highway and launched several powerful counterattacks, but they were repulsed by Soviet troops and went on the offensive again. On December 12, Klin was liberated. However, a serious obstacle to the further attack on Istra for the 16th Army was the explosion by the Germans of the dam on the Istra reservoir: the ice dropped several meters and was covered with a layer of water of 35-40 cm on the western shore. This obstacle stopped the advance of the Soviet troops for some time. However, K.K. Rokossovsky singled out 2 mobile tank groups from his forces: the northern one was headed by General F.T. Remezov, and the southern one - M.E. Katukov. On December 11, Govorov’s 5th Army also went on the offensive. The commander of the Western Front, G.K. Zhukov allocated a third mobile group, consisting of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps of Dovator and several tank battalions.

To develop the offensive on the right wing of the Western Front, the use of mobile groups was vital importance. Using their maneuverability, they delivered unexpected and powerful attacks on the enemy’s flanks, even reaching their rear. Particularly impressive results at this stage of the counteroffensive were achieved by the mobile group L.M. Dovatora, who carried out daring raids on the rear of the Istra group, inflicting heavy losses on it. By December 15, the groups of Remezov and Katukov walked around the Istra Reservoir on both sides. The German defense in the Klin-Istra sector was completely broken through, which forced the German command to order a rapid retreat to the west. On December 20, Volokolamsk was liberated. By December 25, the troops of the right wing of the Western Front reached the Lama and Ruza line, which they were unable to break through on the move. The fighting here became protracted.

As a result of the Klin-Solnechnogorsk and Kalinin operations, the enemy was thrown back in the most dangerous area by 100-120 kilometers. Dozens of cities and hundreds of villages were liberated. Thanks to this, communication between Moscow and cities in the North-Western direction, primarily with Kalinin, was completely restored. A direct connection was established between the Western, Northwestern and Kalinin fronts. The German units suffered huge losses, the main forces of the 9th Army of Strauss, the 3rd and 4th Panzer Groups of von Hoth and Hoepner were defeated. As a result of long battles in the absence of normal winter uniforms, many Wehrmacht soldiers received severe frostbite, and German hospitals were filled with the wounded and sick. Due to the loss of warehouses and lack of fuel, German soldiers simply abandoned some of the equipment.

Tula and Kaluga offensive operations.

In the southern direction, the Soviet offensive also developed quite dynamically. To eliminate the threat to Tula and Moscow from the south, it was necessary to defeat Von Kluge's 8th Army and Heinz Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group. The troops of the left wing of the Western Front included the 49th and 50th armies, the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps of General P.A. Belova. They were reinforced by Golikov's fresh 10th Army.

The location of Guderian's tank group was in a large salient south of Tula, which made it possible to hit his troops from several sides at once. The Soviet command took advantage of this, hoping to dismember the forces of the 2nd Tank Group and subsequently completely destroy it with converging attacks from the 10th Army, General Belov’s cavalry, and units of the 49th and 50th Army.

The Tula operation began on December 6. Golikov’s 10th Army advanced directly from the rear territories, and therefore its attack was completely unexpected for the Germans, who had a very small group in the east. Taking advantage of the favorable situation, formations of the 10th Army under the command of General F.I. Golikov knocked the enemy out of Mikhailov on the move, and on December 7 they advanced almost 30 km into the enemy’s position. At the same time, Belov’s cavalry broke through the enemy’s defenses from the north and by December 9 occupied the city of Venev. On December 8, the strike groups of the 49th and 50th armies also went on the offensive. The Soviet command faced the prospect of not only dismembering, but also encircling part of the forces of Guderian’s tank group east of Tula. However, due to high snow cover and lack of large quantity The equipment of the 49th and 50th armies moved slowly, and the successful defense of the Germans on December 9 on the western banks of the river. Shat and R. Don was able to slow down the advance of the 10th Army. Only this allowed most of the forces of the 2nd Tank Group to break out of the pocket and retreat to positions on the Upa River, although with the loss of a significant part of the equipment. On December 11, Stalinogorsk was liberated, and a few days later Yasnaya Polyana and an important stronghold - Uzlovaya station. By December 16, the threat to Moscow from the South was removed, and Soviet troops forced the Germans to retreat from near Tula. However, G.K. Zhukov ordered the troops to continue their offensive and liberate Kaluga.

On December 20, a mobile group detached from the 50th Army quietly approached the city and began the assault. After persistent 10-day fighting, the city was liberated. On December 24, the Bryansk Front was recreated from the forces of the left wing of the Western Front, which continued the offensive. On December 28, Belov captured Kozelsk. General Belov's cavalry was able to disorganize the enemy's defenses with its raids, allowing the 10th Army to continue its advance and take Belev and Sukhinichi on December 31. By January 8, the forces of the 10th Army were able to break through to the Vyazma-Bryansk railway. Here Golikov’s army was stopped by the enemy who had managed to gain a foothold.

Narofominsk-Borovsk operation

The last to launch a counteroffensive were the troops operating in the center of the Western Front. The conditions here for this turned out to be the most unfavorable in comparison with the situation on the flanks of the Western Front. German troops relied on a previously prepared defensive line, which was built over the course of two months. By mid-December, these were fully equipped strongholds with trenches, dugouts and communication passages. There were minefields, anti-tank and anti-personnel barriers. And the 4th German Army, which defended the line, fought almost no hostilities in the last month and a half, and therefore actually had no losses.

On December 16, after active artillery preparation, the 33rd Army of General M.G. Efremova launched an offensive near Naro-Fominsk. However, despite the protracted battles and heavy losses, the Soviet troops failed to make significant progress until December 22. Only after the successful offensive of the left wing of the Western Front did a serious gap appear in the German defense, into which Zakharkin’s 49th Army rushed. By the end of December 22, it had advanced 52 km and created a threat of envelopment by the 4th German Army from the south. The Nazis retreated to Kaluga due to the danger of being surrounded.

The beginning of the withdrawal of German troops allowed Army General G.K. Zhukov gave the order to General Efremov to increase pressure on the enemy. The battles for Naro-Fominsk flared up with renewed vigor. Overcoming fierce enemy opposition from part of the 222nd Infantry Division, Colonel F.A. Bobrov captured the city from the north, and the forces of the 1st Guards Motorized Rifle Division, Colonel S.I. Iovleva - from the southwest. On December 26, Naro-Fominsk was captured. On the same day, Zhukov gave the order to pursue the enemy in the Mozhaisk and Maloyaroslavets directions. Balabanovo was liberated on December 28, Maloyaroslavets on January 2, and Borovsk on January 4.

Rzhev-Vyazemsk operation

The Soviet command decided not to stop the offensive and, without giving either its troops or the enemy troops time to rest and regroup, on January 8 it began the large-scale Rzhev-Vyazma operation, as part of the general offensive of Soviet troops on all fronts. Her goal was extremely simple. The troops of the right wing of the Kalinin Front from the area north-west of Rzhev were supposed to strike at Sychevka, Vyazma, and the troops of the left wing of the Western Front from the Kaluga region - in the direction of Yukhnov, Vyazma. At the same time, the remaining parts of the Western Front were supposed to launch an offensive. It was planned to encircle, dismember and destroy the enemy group in the areas of Rzhev, Vyazma, Yukhnov, and Gzhatsk.

On January 8, the 39th Army of the Kalinin Front broke through the enemy’s defenses and rushed towards Sychevka and Novodugino. The 22nd Army launched an enveloping attack from the North-West, occupied Selizharovo, crossed to the other side of the Volga on January 9 and soon entered the battle for the city of Bely. Konev brought the 29th Army of General Shmetsov and the 11th Cavalry Corps of Colonel Sokolov to the breakthrough site. The offensive was quite successful and by the end of January the troops of the Kalinin Front managed to reach the outskirts of Smolensk, deeply enveloping Army Group Center from the west and interrupting many of its communications.

On January 10, the Western Front began its offensive, and by January 22, Efremov’s 33rd Army was able to break through the front and a few days later reach the line 6-7 km west of Vyazma. General Belov's group broke through the front to the south, crossed the Warsaw Highway and rushed towards the city from the south. On January 26, a 3,000-strong landing force was dropped west of Vyazma, and the 11th Cavalry Corps rushed to Vyazma from the north. However, the Germans defended themselves fiercely. The loss of Vyazma would mean a split in Army Group Center. The Wehrmacht command was gathering reserves; at this critical moment, fresh forces began to arrive from Europe. The general offensive of Soviet troops on Vyazma on January 26 was unsuccessful.

In early February, the Germans were able to bring up their main reserves and repel attacks by Soviet troops. On January 23, the enemy north of Vyazma launched attacks on heavily extended positions of Soviet troops. As a result, Maslennikov’s 39th Army, Shvetsov’s 29th Army and the 11th Cavalry Corps found themselves isolated. On February 3, the Germans struck the site of the main breakthrough of Soviet troops southeast of Vyazma, in the Yukhnov area and restored the defenses on the Ugra River. And Efremov’s 33rd Army and Belov’s Cavalry Corps found themselves encircled. As a result, Soviet troops trying to encircle Army Group Center found themselves cut off from the main forces. Attempts to break through to the troops behind enemy lines and continue the offensive were unsuccessful, so they were ordered to break through to the front line on their own. The encircled troops had to switch to semi-partisan actions.

In February, the forces of the 29th Army managed to escape from the encirclement. Maslennikov's 39th Army and the 11th Cavalry Corps, joining forces with the partisans, fought behind enemy lines until the beginning of summer, pinning down his forces in the Moscow direction. Efremov's 33rd Army, which tried to break out to its own people, was defeated, and the commander himself, who decided not to surrender, shot himself.

Insufficient equipment and fatigue and understaffing of the units that fought heavy battles starting in November did not allow the Nazis to be defeated on the move. The Germans managed to strengthen themselves, and the approaching reserves allowed them to stabilize the front. As a result, it was not possible to surround the enemy. The German losses were high, about 330 thousand people, which was about half the number of troops of Army Group Center. The 4th Panzer Group of the Wehrmacht was finally destroyed. However, after this operation, the Soviet troops had to temporarily stop the offensive: the initiative again passed into the hands of the Germans.

Yet, despite its incompleteness and large losses, the Rzhev-Vyazma operation was of the greatest strategic importance. The troops of the Red Army pushed the enemy back another 80 kilometers, and in the southern direction by 250 kilometers, and the troops of the Kalini Front captured Army Group Center from the West, which created favorable conditions for a future offensive in March 1943. Some other areas of the Smolensk and Kalinin regions were finally liberated. Thanks to this, the Soviet command also gained contact with partisan detachments, which were becoming more and more numerous behind enemy lines every day.

Map of the Rzhev-Vyazemsk offensive operation

For Hitler, the retreat of the German troops was a strong blow. He had to cancel the order to attack Moscow, and on December 8 he signed Directive No. 39 on the transition to defense on the entire Soviet-German front. On December 16, Hitler orders a ban on the withdrawal of large formations, ordering them to hold their positions to the last soldier and provide fanatical resistance to the enemy. Although this order made it difficult for the Soviet troops to advance, German troops were able to stop the Soviet offensive only in January-March, when reinforcements arrived from Western Europe and Germany.

Many German generals lost their posts for the defeat near the capital of the USSR: on December 19, the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Field Marshal General W. von Brauchitsch, was removed from his post, and Hitler personally took command of the army. On the same day, Field Marshal General F. von Bock was removed from his post as commander of Army Group Center, and Field Marshal G. von Kluge, who had previously commanded the 4th Army, was appointed in his place. Guderian lost his position, it was restored only in 1943, and Erich Hoepner was dismissed from the army. He would later take part in the July plot against Hitler, and after its failure he would be hanged.

The results of the December-January offensive of the Soviet troops seemed incredible. This was the first time in the entire Second World War world war a major defeat for the Germans: the famous Wehrmacht military machine could not overcome the tenacity, courage and dedication of Soviet soldiers, commanders and ordinary citizens. The Germans were not only stopped, they were defeated and driven back 100-250 kilometers from Moscow, thereby eliminating the danger of losing the capital. In his memoirs, the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, General Franz Halder, wrote his famous words about the Battle of Moscow:

“The myth about the invincibility of the German army is broken... Therefore, December 6, 1941 can be considered a turning point, and one of the most fatal moments in brief history Third Reich. Hitler's strength and power reached their apogee, and from that moment on they began to decline..."

The whole world saw images of broken German vehicles, tanks, and a column of captured Wehrmacht soldiers. Soon a Soviet documentary film “The Defeat of German Troops near Moscow” was released. » , featuring real footage from the front lines captured by brave cameramen. This film won an Oscar for Best Documentary, and the rest of the world saw that the Germans could retreat and surrender.

The victory near Moscow pushed F. Roosevelt and W. Churchill to closer relations with the USSR within the framework of the anti-Hitler coalition, and Turkey and Japan did not start a war against the Soviet Union. Soviet soldiers and simple people After this first victory, they perked up; now no one doubted that the enemy would be defeated.

At the German headquarters they began to talk about the company's loss. Moscow, which was the main target of the Germans in 1941, was not taken. The Barbarossa and Typhoon plans failed, the Germans realized that the eastern company was in best case scenario drags on long time, a war of attrition began, which Germany simply could not win. And the limited supply of fuel supplied to the Wehrmacht and the German economy from Romania forced the Germans in the spring of 1942 to move their main forces to the South-East of the USSR towards the Caucasian oil fields.

In the battle for Moscow, the Germans lost more than 500 thousand people, which was more than in all previous campaigns combined. The main forces of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th tank groups were defeated; in fact, the Germans lost 3/4 of all tank divisions, their main shock troops. In addition, the Germans lost 15 thousand vehicles, more than 2,500 guns and mortars. During the offensive, 11 thousand villages and cities, as well as the Moscow, Tula, Ryazan, and most of the Kalinin, Ryazan and Smolensk regions were liberated from the invaders.

The Battle of Moscow was won primarily thanks to the heroism and self-sacrifice of the Soviet people. For the valor and courage shown in battle, 40 units and formations were awarded the title of Guards, 36 thousand soldiers were awarded orders and medals, 187 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. More than 1 million people have been awarded the medal “For the Defense of Moscow” (including about 381 thousand military personnel and approximately 639 thousand civilians). On May 8, 1965, Moscow was awarded the honorary title “Hero City”.

But before the victory there were still 4 long years of bloody, desperate battles: the failure of the spring offensive of 1942 in Ukraine and Stalingrad, the Kursk Bulge in 1943, the lifting of the blockade of Leningrad, 10 Stalinist strikes and the liberation of the USSR - in 1944, the liberation of Europe and the capture of Berlin - in 1945 . However, this difficult and difficult path began precisely near Moscow, here our victory began to be forged, here the fate of Europe and the world was decided. Therefore, this is not just a day of military glory, but also the greatest triumph of our people, a symbol of the valor and heroism of the Russian soldier, who liberated the world from Nazism and gave freedom to future generations.

Peasant women leading captured German soldiers

The First Reich in Germany was considered to be the Holy Roman Empire of the German people (German nation), which existed from the mid-10th century to 1806, the Second Reich was the German Empire, proclaimed in 1871 and ending in 1918.

The USSR and Germany entered into a non-aggression pact. The countries also agreed to maintain neutrality if one of the parties starts a war with any third state. It is believed that the treaty was accompanied by a secret protocol on the division of spheres of influence in Europe, however, many scientists doubt its authenticity.

General Plan Ost (German: Generalplan Ost) for the management of the annexed eastern regions.

Encirclement of the enemy army.

One of the founders of the German tank forces, Colonel General, commander of the 2nd German Tank Army during the Great Patriotic War.

Refers to the SS - paramilitary forces of the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP) - Hitler's party. The division ranks 1st among SS units in terms of the number of recipients of the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross.

One of the greatest intelligence officers of the 20th century. Was of German origin and worked in Japan since 1933 as a correspondent for an influential German publication

Manchukuo. A puppet state under the Japanese military administration, created in 1932 after the invasion of China.

Name of the German air force during the period Nazi dictatorship

— The day of the start of the counteroffensive of Soviet troops against Nazi troops in the Battle of Moscow (1941)

December 5 - Day of Military Glory of Russia - The day of the start of the counter-offensive of Soviet troops against Nazi troops in the Battle of Moscow (1941), established in accordance with the Federal Law of March 13, 1995 "On Days of Military Glory and Memorable Dates of Russia."

The counteroffensive of the Soviet troops became the second stage of the Battle of Moscow in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. It was preceded by heavy defensive battles.

In September 1941, the German command developed an offensive operation of Army Group Center under the code name "Typhoon". Its immediate goal was to encircle and destroy the main forces of the Soviet troops west of Moscow and launch a rapid pursuit to prevent the Red Army from creating a new defense front on the immediate approaches to Moscow.

German troops began the offensive according to the Typhoon plan on September 30, 1941 in the Bryansk and October 2 in the Vyazma directions. Despite the stubborn resistance of the Soviet troops, the enemy broke through their defenses. At the end of November - beginning of December, German troops reached the Moscow-Volga canal, crossed the Nara River north and south of Naro-Fominsk, approached Kashira from the south, and captured Tula from the east. But they didn't go any further.

The defenders of the capital, together with the residents of Moscow and the Moscow region, heroically fighting the enemy, turned the city into an impregnable fortress. They fought the invaders day and night, at the front and surrounded, in the enemy rear and in the skies of the capital. By stubborn defense of their positions, counterattacks and counterstrikes, the introduction of fresh reserves and air strikes, they exhausted the enemy forces.

By early December, the Wehrmacht's forces were completely exhausted. Single attempts to advance in one direction or another were unsuccessful. The initiative began to shift to the side of the Soviet troops. By this time, the Soviet command had strategic reserves behind the front line, including Siberian and Far Eastern divisions.

At the beginning of December 1941, Soviet troops near Moscow numbered 1.1 million men, 7,650 guns and mortars, 774 tanks and one thousand aircraft. The Army Group Center opposing them had over 1.7 million people, about 13.5 thousand guns and mortars, 1,170 tanks, 615 aircraft.

The Soviet command, preparing a counteroffensive, tried to do everything possible to hide its intentions from the enemy. However, it was not possible to completely conceal such a large-scale regrouping of troops. The reports received by the German side from intelligence, air and other types of intelligence noted the advance of large Russian forces to the north and south of Moscow. These messages did not receive adequate assessments from the German command. On December 4, the commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal Fedor von Bock, reacted to one of these intelligence reports as follows: “... The enemy’s combat capabilities are not so great that he could use these forces... to launch a large counter-offensive at this time.”

But contrary to all the forecasts of Field Marshal von Bock, at dawn on December 5, a counteroffensive of Soviet troops began near Moscow. The plan of the Soviet command was to simultaneously defeat the most dangerous strike groups of Army Group Center troops that threatened Moscow from the north and south. Already during the unfolding counteroffensive, the Headquarters determined its further goal: to defeat the entire Army Group Center.

On December 5, the Kalinin Front (commander Colonel General Ivan Konev) went on the counteroffensive, on December 6 - the Western Front (commander Army General Georgy Zhukov) and the right wing of the Southwestern Front (commander Marshal of the Soviet Union Semyon Timoshenko). The newly created Bryansk Front (commander Colonel General Yakov Cherevichenko) also took part in the operation. Despite the difficult conditions (lack of superiority in forces, severe frosts, deep snow cover), the counteroffensive developed successfully. On December 8, Hitler signed a directive on the transition to defense on the entire Soviet-German front. Army Group Center was given the task of holding areas that had important operational and military-economic importance at all costs.

During the Soviet counteroffensive near Moscow, several private operations were carried out in various directions, during which the enemy was knocked out of their positions. On December 9, Soviet troops liberated Rogachevo, Venev, Yelets, December 11 - Stalinogorsk (now Novomoskovsk), December 12 - Solnechnogorsk, Efremov, December 16 - Kalinin (now Tver).

Given the favorable situation, the Headquarters demanded that the front commanders expand the offensive front and conduct non-stop pursuit.

German troops resisted fiercely, obeying Hitler's "stop order" issued on December 16, which ordered them to hold their positions "until the last soldier", but they failed to carry it out. On December 19, Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, commander of the ground forces, was removed for retreating from Moscow. Hitler personally took this position. On the same day, the commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal von Bock, was removed from his post and replaced by Field Marshal von Kluge.

In the second half of December, the offensive of the Soviet troops of the right wing of the Western Front developed. On December 19, they reached the border of the Lama and Ruza rivers. The left wing of the Western Front and the Bryansk Front reached the Oka River on a broad front on December 25. On December 28, Kozelsk was liberated, on December 30, after many days of fighting, Kaluga, and in early January, Meshchovsk and Mosalsk.
The armies of the center of the Western Front liberated Naro-Fominsk on December 26, Maloyaroslavets on January 2, 1942, and Borovsk on January 4.

By January 7, 1942, Soviet troops defeated the formations of Army Group Center, which broke through to the near approaches to Moscow from the north and south, and successfully completed their task. The enemy's flank strike forces were driven back 100-250 kilometers from the capital, his 38 divisions were defeated, and over 11 thousand settlements were liberated.

The losses of German troops amounted to 103.6 thousand people. Soviet troops suffered significant losses - 380 thousand people. m, irrecoverable losses Soviet troops amounted to 139,586 people, sanitary troops - 231,369 people.

The strategic offensive, which unfolded over a vast area, was carried out in separate operational directions, as a result of which Soviet troops wedged themselves deeply into the German defense at the junction of Army Groups North and Center, disrupting operational cooperation between them. However, the lack of sufficient experience in conducting large-scale offensive operations, tank formations and a general lack of forces and means did not allow the main forces of Army Group Center to be encircled and destroyed.

Despite the incompleteness, the general offensive in the western direction achieved significant success. As a result of the counter-offensive near Moscow and the subsequent general offensive of Soviet troops, the enemy was thrown back 150-400 kilometers to the west, Moscow and Tula region, many areas of the Kalinin (now Tver) and Smolensk regions,

Germany suffered its first major defeat in World War II.

(Additional

The first day of Russia's military glory, which opened the account of its victories in the Great Patriotic War, is December 5 - the Day of the start of the counter-offensive of Soviet troops near Moscow.

In a battle that, in terms of the number of troops and military equipment, the scope and intensity of operations, the tragedy and greatness of its events, is one of the largest in the history of wars.
Within 203 days (09/30/41 - 04/20/42) over 7 million soldiers and officers, up to 53 thousand guns and mortars, about 6.5 thousand tanks and more than 3 thousand combat aircraft of the German Wehrmacht and The Soviet Armed Forces waged a fierce confrontation among themselves.

The Battle of Moscow includes two periods: defensive (September 30 – December 5, 1941) and offensive (December 5, 1941 – April 20, 1942). In the first of them, the Red Army carried out the Moscow strategic defensive operation and in the second - two strategic offensive operations: Moscow (December 5, 1941 - January 7, 1942) and Rzhev-Vyazemskaya (January 8 - April 20, 1942). Outside the framework of the latter, the Bolkhov front-line offensive operation of the Bryansk Front was carried out (January 8 - April 20, 1942).

The Red Army counteroffensive began on December 5-6, 1941 on the front from Kalinin to Yelets, and fighting immediately took on a violent character. Despite severe frosts, deep snow cover and the lack of superiority in manpower and technical means, the troops of the Western and Southwestern Fronts already in the first days of the counteroffensive broke through the defenses of German troops in their directions and liberated a number of populated areas.

Strong and decisive attacks by Soviet troops on the flank groupings of Army Group Center, intended to encircle and capture Moscow, forced the fascist German command to take measures to save their troops from defeat. On December 8, Hitler signed a directive on the transition to defense on the entire Soviet-German front. Army Group Center was given the task of holding strategically important areas at any cost.

However, this did not help. By the beginning of January 1942, the counteroffensive was successfully developing on the Western and Bryansk fronts. All this created favorable conditions for the encirclement of Army Group Center, and also removed the threat hanging over Moscow.

During the counteroffensive on December 5–6, Soviet troops liberated over 11 thousand settlements from the invaders and by the beginning of January 1942 pushed the enemy back 100–250 km, inflicting a heavy defeat on 38 enemy divisions. As a result of the counteroffensive and general offensive, the enemy was thrown back 150–400 km to the west. The successful advance of the Soviet troops forced Hitler on December 8 to issue a directive to go on the defensive along the entire front line. The strategic initiative passed to the Red Army.

In the Battle of Moscow, German troops lost about 500,000 people, 1,300 tanks, 2,500 guns, more than 15,000 vehicles and much other equipment. The moral damage inflicted on the enemy also turned out to be sensitive - Hitler's military tribunals convicted about 62,000 soldiers and officers for desertion, unauthorized abandonment of positions and disobedience to the orders of senior officers. 35 senior ranks of the German army were removed from their posts.

From a letter from Guderian to his wife: “Cold and worthless housing, lack of uniforms, large losses in manpower and equipment, meager supplies of fuel, all this turns combat operations into torture, I am more and more oppressed by the heavy burden of responsibility, which, despite any lofty words, no one can take it off my shoulders." Powerless to change anything, Guderian sat over maps and reports at his headquarters fifteen kilometers south of Tula in the world-famous landowner's estate in Yasnaya Polyana, where Leo Tolstoy lived and worked. Nearby was the writer’s grave, covered in ivy in the summer and now tightly covered in snow. Guderian allowed Tolstoy's family to stay in rooms in a large house, and he and his staff settled in the museum, but even here two rooms were set aside specifically for storing exhibits and were locked. There, in Tolstoy's rural home, on the night of December 5–6, Guderian decided to withdraw the advanced units of his tank army and go on the defensive. He had to admit: “The attack on Moscow failed. We were defeated.”

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75 years ago, the counter-offensive of Soviet troops began near Moscow. At dawn on December 5, the Soviet counteroffensive began near Moscow. The plan of the Soviet command was to simultaneously defeat the most dangerous strike groups of Army Group Center troops that threatened Moscow from the north and south. Already during the unfolding counteroffensive, the Headquarters determined its further goal: to defeat the entire Army Group Center.

On December 5, the Kalinin Front (commander Colonel General Ivan Konev) went on the counteroffensive, on December 6 - the Western Front (commander Army General Georgy Zhukov) and the right wing of the Southwestern Front (commander Marshal of the Soviet Union Semyon Timoshenko). The newly created Bryansk Front (commander Colonel General Yakov Cherevichenko) also took part in the operation. Despite the difficult conditions (lack of superiority in forces, severe frosts, deep snow cover), the counteroffensive developed successfully. On December 8, Hitler signed a directive on the transition to defense on the entire Soviet-German front. Army Group Center was given the task of holding areas that had important operational and military-economic importance at all costs.

During the Soviet counteroffensive near Moscow, several private operations were carried out in various directions, during which the enemy was knocked out of their positions. On December 9, Soviet troops liberated Rogachevo, Venev, Yelets, December 11 - Stalinogorsk (now Novomoskovsk), December 12 - Solnechnogorsk, Efremov, December 16 - Kalinin (now Tver).

German troops resisted fiercely, obeying Hitler's "stop order" issued on December 16, which ordered them to hold their positions "until the last soldier", but they failed to carry it out. On December 19, Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, commander of the ground forces, was removed for retreating from Moscow. Hitler personally took this position. On the same day, the commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal von Bock, was removed from his post and replaced by Field Marshal von Kluge.

In the second half of December, the offensive of the Soviet troops of the right wing of the Western Front developed. On December 19, they reached the border of the Lama and Ruza rivers. The left wing of the Western Front and the Bryansk Front reached the Oka River on a broad front on December 25. On December 28, Kozelsk was liberated, on December 30, after many days of fighting, Kaluga, and in early January, Meshchovsk and Mosalsk.

The armies of the center of the Western Front liberated Naro-Fominsk on December 26, Maloyaroslavets on January 2, 1942, and Borovsk on January 4.

By January 7, 1942, Soviet troops defeated the formations of Army Group Center, which broke through to the near approaches to Moscow from the north and south, and successfully completed their task. The enemy's flank strike forces were driven back 100-250 kilometers from the capital, his 38 divisions were defeated, and over 11 thousand settlements were liberated.

The losses of German troops amounted to 103.6 thousand people. Soviet troops suffered significant losses - 380 thousand people. According to other sources, irretrievable losses of Soviet troops amounted to 139,586 people, sanitary losses - 231,369 people.

Germany suffered its first major defeat in World War II. https://ria.ru/spravka/20151205/1335181199.html

Below are letters from German soldiers showing how their morale changed when they encountered resistance from Soviet soldiers. Already in the summer of 1941, it became clear to them that there would be no easy walk in the USSR, like in Denmark, Holland and France...

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We are located 90 km from Moscow, and this cost us many killed. The Russians are still putting up very strong resistance, defending Moscow, this can be easily imagined. By the time we get to Moscow, there will be more fierce fighting. Many who don’t even think about it yet will have to die. So far we have two killed by heavy mines and one shell. During this campaign, many regretted that Russia was not Poland or France, and there was no enemy stronger than the Russians. If another six months pass, we are lost, because the Russians have too many people. I heard that when we finish with Moscow, they will let us go to Germany."

I have been in Russia for more than three months now and have already experienced a lot. Yes, dear brother, sometimes your heart sinks when you are just a hundred meters away from the damned Russians and grenades and mines are exploding near you.

(From a letter from soldier E. Seygardt to brother Friedrich)

My beloved Tsylla. This, to be honest, is a strange letter, which, of course, no mail will send anywhere, and I decided to send it with my wounded fellow countryman, you know him - this is Fritz Sauber. We were in the regimental hospital together, and now I am returning to duty, and he is going home. I am writing a letter in a peasant's hut. All my comrades are sleeping, and I am on duty. It’s terrible cold outside, the Russian winter has come into its own, the German soldiers are very poorly dressed, we wear caps in this terrible frost and all our uniforms are summer. Every day brings us great sacrifices. We are losing our brothers, but the end of the war is not in sight and, probably, I will not see it, I don’t know what will happen to me tomorrow, I have already lost all hopes of returning home and staying alive. I think that every German soldier will find a grave here. These snow storms and vast fields covered with snow fill me with mortal horror. It is impossible to defeat the Russians, they...

(From a letter from Wilhelm Elman.)

This time we will celebrate Christmas in Russian “paradise”. We are again on the front lines, these are difficult days for us. Just think, Ludwig Franz has been killed. He got hit in the head. Yes, my dear Fred, the ranks of the old comrades are thinning and thinning. On the same day, December 3, I lost two more comrades from my squad... They’ll probably let us go soon; My nerves were completely gone. Neugebauer was obviously not killed, but seriously wounded. Sergeant Major Fleisig, Sarsen and Schneider from the old first company were also killed. Also the old sergeant major Rosterman. On 3.12 our last battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Walter, also died. Anft is also wounded. Bortusch and Koblishek, Muszczyk, Kasker, Leibzel and Kanrost were also killed.

(From a letter from non-commissioned officer G. Weiner to his friend Alfred Schaefer.)

Dear aunt, send us more cookies, because the worst thing here is bread. My feet are already a little frostbitten, the cold here is very strong. Many of my comrades are already wounded and killed, there are fewer and fewer of us. One fragment hit my helmet, and I also managed to run into a mine. But for now I got off happily.

(From a letter from soldier Emil Nykbor.)

Because of the lice bite, I scratched my body to the bone and so much that it took a long time for it all to heal. The worst thing is lice, especially at night when it’s warm. I think that advancing forward will have to stop during the winter, since we will not be able to launch a single offensive. We tried to advance twice, but received nothing but dead. The Russians sit in their huts with their guns so that they do not freeze, but our guns stand day and night on the street, freeze and as a result cannot fire. Many soldiers had frostbite in their ears, legs and arms. I thought there was a war

will end by the end of this year, but, as you can see, the situation is different... I think that in relation to the Russians we miscalculated.

(From a letter from Corporal Werner Ulrich to his uncle in Arsendorf)

We are moving forward extremely slowly, because the Russians are stubbornly defending themselves. Now they are directing attacks primarily against villages - they want to take away our shelter. When there is nothing better, we go into the dugouts.

(From a letter from Corporal Eckart Kirchner)

For more than a week now we have been standing on the street and sleeping very little. But this cannot continue for a long time, since not a single person can stand it. Nothing during the day, but the night gets on your nerves...

Now it has become a little warmer, but there are snowstorms, and this is even worse than frost. Lice can make you mad, they run all over your body. Catch them in the morning, catch them in the evening, catch them at night, and you still won’t catch them all. The whole body itches and is covered with blisters. Will the time soon come when you will get out of this damned Russia? Russia will forever remain in the memory of the soldiers.

(From a letter from soldier Hasske to his wife Anna Hasske)

(From a letter from Corporal Wilhelm Bauman to his wife)

Christmas has already passed, but we did not notice or see it. I never thought I'd have to be alive for Christmas. Two weeks ago we were defeated and had to retreat. We left most of our guns and vehicles behind. Only a few comrades were able to save their very lives and remained in the clothes that were on their bodies. I will remember this all my life and would never want to live it again...

Please send me a soap dish, as I have nothing left.

(From a letter from Corporal Utenlem to his family in Foritzheim, Baden)

Due to the events of the last 4 weeks I have not had the opportunity to write to you... Today I lost all my belongings, I still thank God that I still have my limbs. Everything that has happened so far pales in comparison to what I experienced in December. Christmas has passed and I hope that I will never have to experience a Christmas like this again in my life. It was the most miserable time of my life... I can’t even think about a vacation or a shift, I lost all my things, even the most necessary things for everyday use. However, do not send me anything unnecessary, since we must now carry everything on ourselves, like infantrymen. Send only some writing paper and a razor, but a simple and cheap one. I don't want to have anything valuable with me. What good things I had and everything went to hell!... Tormented by lice, we are freezing and leading a miserable existence in primitive conditions, moreover, without rest in battles.

Don't think I'm going to whine, you know I'm not, but I'm giving you the facts. Indeed, it takes a lot of idealism to maintain a good mood, seeing that there is no end to this condition.

(From a letter from Chief Coroner Rusk to his family in Weil, Baden)

"On Eastern Front I have met people who can be called a special race. Already the first attack turned into a battle for life and death” (Hans Becker, tankman of the 12th Panzer Division).

“The losses are terrible, they cannot be compared with those in France... Today the road is ours, tomorrow the Russians take it, then we again and so on... I have never seen anyone more evil than these Russians. Real chain dogs! You never know what to expect from them” (diary of a soldier of Army Group Center, August 20, 1941).

“During the attack, we came across a light Russian T-26 tank, we immediately shot it straight from the 37mm. When we began to approach, a Russian leaned out waist-high from the tower hatch and opened fire on us with a pistol. It soon became clear that he had no legs; they were torn off when the tank was hit. And, despite this, he fired at us with a pistol!” (memories of an anti-tank gun artilleryman about the first hours of the war).

“You simply won’t believe this until you see it with your own eyes. The soldiers of the Red Army, even burning alive, continued to shoot from the burning houses” (from a letter from an infantry officer of the 7th Panzer Division about the battles in a village near the Lama River, mid-November 1941).

“... Inside the tank lay the bodies of the brave crew, who had previously only received injuries. Deeply shocked by this heroism, we buried them with full military honors. They fought until their last breath, but it was just one little drama great war"(Erhard Raus, colonel, commander of the Kampfgruppe Raus about the KV-1 tank, which shot and crushed a column of trucks and tanks and an artillery battery of the Germans; in total, 4 Soviet tankers held back the advance of the Raus battle group, about half a division, for two days, June 24 and 25).

“July 17, 1941... In the evening, an unknown Russian soldier was buried [we are talking about 19-year-old senior artillery sergeant Nikolai Sirotinin]. He stood alone at the cannon, shot at a column of tanks and infantry for a long time, and died. Everyone was surprised at his courage... Oberst said before his grave that if all the Fuhrer's soldiers fought like this Russian, we would conquer the whole world. They fired three times in volleys from rifles. After all, he is Russian, is such admiration necessary? (diary of Chief Lieutenant of the 4th Panzer Division Henfeld).