Ambushes. Theory

To capture prisoners, documents, samples of weapons and military equipment, along with searches and raids, ambushes are used, which consist in the advance and secret placement of a unit (group) on the enemy’s routes for a surprise attack on him.

Ambushes can also be set up to destroy the enemy, especially his nuclear weapons.

Ambush as a method of reconnaissance is used in all types of combat operations, on any terrain, in various meteorological conditions and at any time of the day, in front of the front, on the enemy’s flanks and in his rear. It can be organized by units conducting reconnaissance (combat reconnaissance patrols, reconnaissance groups, deep reconnaissance groups) and a unit (group) specially designated for this purpose, usually consisting of up to a reinforced platoon.

To set up ambushes in order to destroy the enemy, units consisting of up to a reinforced company (motorized rifle, tank) can be assigned.

The success of a unit's actions in an ambush depends on the secrecy of its location, readiness to conduct accurate fire, determination, endurance and skillful actions of personnel.

The targets of an ambush attack can be single soldiers, officers or a group of soldiers and officers on foot or on motorcycles, cars, armored personnel carriers, small reconnaissance patrols and marching security units, as well as launchers of unguided and guided missiles, atomic artillery weapons, weapons delivery of missiles, nuclear charges and other types of weapons on the march (in motion).

Ambushes are set up in places that provide a secretive (camouflaged) location of a unit (group), near roads, trails, at bridges, crossings and passages in barriers, at water sources and at other points where the appearance of single soldiers, vehicles or small groups of the enemy is most likely .

The method of attacking from an ambush depends on its purpose, situational conditions, the strength of the enemy and the composition of the unit conducting the ambush. You can attack from an ambush silently, as well as after inflicting a sudden fire defeat on the enemy, followed by the capture of prisoners, documents, weapons and military equipment.

Units conducting reconnaissance and ambush attacks should strive to carry out silently (without opening fire, using grenades, mines, etc.), so that their actions do not attract the attention of the enemy.

When setting up ambushes against a superior enemy or armored targets, the second method is usually used - an attack after inflicting a sudden fire defeat.

When conducting combat operations in conditions of direct contact with the enemy, ambushes are organized by order of battalion and regiment commanders and are arranged at joints, flanks, in front of the security line, as well as in the depths of the enemy’s battle formations. When units operate in reconnaissance, ambushes are arranged by decision of the commanders.

A unit (group) sent into an ambush for a certain period of time returns back upon completion of the task or after the expiration of the time for which it was sent.

A unit (group) for operations in an ambush can be divided into squads (soldiers) of attack, support and observers.

Attack Squad ( everything said below about attack and support sections also applies to soldiers assigned to the same task) suddenly and swiftly attacks the enemy and captures prisoners, documents, weapons and military equipment. To attack the enemy, soldiers and sergeants are appointed, physically strong, dexterous and decisive, who are proficient in the techniques of attacking an armed enemy. The composition and weapons of the attack squad depend on the target of the attack and the method of capturing the prisoner. When attacking single enemy soldiers or officers, two scouts are usually assigned to each captured prisoner.

The support squad is usually assigned in cases where an attack on the enemy is carried out after he has been defeated by fire, as well as to cover the actions of the attack squad, if necessary. For this purpose, soldiers and sergeants are selected who know how to accurately throw grenades and confidently fire in close combat. To inflict fire damage on the enemy, both standard weapons and weapons of reconnaissance vehicles are used.

Depending on the situation and terrain conditions, the support department may be located in one or two places.

Observers are appointed in order to timely warn the commander that the enemy is approaching the ambush site. They observe the enemy's likely routes of movement or an identified enemy against whom an ambush is being organized.

The task of setting up an ambush for the unit (group) commander is usually set on the ground or on the map. When setting a task, information about the enemy, the place, time and purpose of the ambush and the order of actions after completing the task are indicated.

Having understood the received task, the unit (group) commander determines the order and hidden route of advance to the ambush site.

The unit advances to the ambush site in a formation that ensures secrecy of movement and combat readiness in case of a sudden meeting with the enemy. In order not to reveal your location with traces of vehicles and other signs, it is better to approach the ambush site from the side opposite to the enemy’s appearance.

As the group reaches the ambush site, the unit (group) commander organizes observation and (if the situation allows), positioning the unit in a sheltered place in readiness to fire in case the enemy suddenly appears, personally studies the situation and terrain in the ambush area and determines: the most likely direction the appearance of the enemy, the method of attack, the composition and location of the attack squads, support and observers, what tasks to assign them, where and what to prepare or set up barriers on the enemy’s likely routes of movement, as well as the order of the unit’s actions after completing the task or when the enemy discovers the ambush site. Squad (crew) commanders are also involved in studying the area.

As a result of studying the situation and terrain, the unit (group) commander makes a decision to set up an ambush and assigns a task to his subordinates (gives a combat order).

When setting a mission (in a combat order), the unit (group) commander indicates:

• landmarks (if necessary);
• information about the enemy;
• task of the unit (group);
• locations of squads (soldiers, tanks, armored personnel carriers, fire weapons) and their tasks;
• the procedure for opening fire and actions when capturing prisoners (documents, weapons) and after completing the task;
• signals (opening fire, attack, retreat) and a deputy.

In addition, the procedure for the evacuation of the wounded and killed, as well as the delivery of prisoners, captured documents, samples of weapons and military equipment, the procedure for the unit’s actions when an ambush is detected by the enemy, and, if necessary, who, where and what kind of barriers are prepared (installed) are indicated.

Having given the combat order and making sure that his subordinates have correctly understood the assigned task, the unit commander gives the command to occupy the ambush site with squads in accordance with the received task.

Attack squads are located in a convenient location for attacking the enemy (usually in the center of an ambush) and in close proximity to him (at a distance from throwing a grenade).

The support squad occupies a position on one or both flanks (behind) of the attack squad, from which it is possible to fire at the attack objective.

The unit commander personally places observers. They are located in places that make it possible to detect the enemy's appearance in advance and establish his approach to the ambush site. In this case, observation should be all-round in order to prevent the possibility of the enemy unexpectedly appearing in the ambush area from any direction.

Given time and terrain conditions, obstacles (including mines) and various kinds of obstacles can be installed or prepared for installation on the enemy’s likely routes of movement, for example, stringing wire across the road, damaging bridges, creating rubble on forest roads, etc. This work usually performed by specially appointed soldiers and sergeants under the direct supervision of the unit (group) commander.

In order to camouflage the ambush site, all traces left by tracked and wheeled vehicles, as well as other signs by which the enemy can detect a unit in ambush, must be carefully camouflaged or eliminated. Obstacles created on the enemy's likely routes of movement should look natural so as not to arouse suspicion. The personnel of the unit located in ambush must observe the strictest discipline and camouflage.

The commander of the unit (group) is usually located with the attack squad. However, he must personally observe the approaches to the ambush and see the signals of the observers.

When a unit acts in reconnaissance, very often the situation may develop in such a way that, given the generally favorable conditions for setting up an ambush, the commander of the reconnaissance group (reconnaissance patrol, combat reconnaissance patrol) will have extremely limited time to organize it. In this case, the unit commander, quickly assessing the situation, accepts decision to organize an ambush.

Having made a decision, he immediately leads the unit to the selected ambush site, indicates the location of the attack and support units, organizes observation and assigns a task to the units, fire weapons, and determines the order of actions during the attack and after completing the task.

Rice. 1. Scheme of actions of a reconnaissance patrol when setting up an ambush.

Monitoring the actions of the enemy (object of attack) will very often be assigned to a patrol vehicle, the task of which is assigned by radio.

Below is an option for organizing an ambush by the commander of a reconnaissance patrol.

The patrol car, having reached the edge of the forest (Fig. 1), observes the movement of a 1/4-T vehicle with three soldiers from Rebeke. The main forces of the reconnaissance patrol at the intersection of the clearings.

Having assessed the current situation, the commander of the reconnaissance patrol decides to set up an ambush at the end of the clearing near the road with the help of two squads, and leave the crew of the patrol vehicle in place to observe the enemy’s actions.

Having given the order to the commander of the patrol vehicle to monitor the moving enemy vehicle and the settlement of Rebeke, he leads the main patrol forces to the ambush site and assigns the task to his subordinates:

“A 1/4-T vehicle with three enemy soldiers is moving along the road from Rebeke to Esbeke.

The platoon organizes an ambush near the road (shows on the ground). My car is located to the left of the clearing, 50 m from it, the car of the second squad is located to the right of the road, 10 m (shows on the ground).

The attack squad is the second and two scouts from my crew, the eldest is the commander of the second squad. The squad will camouflage itself in the bushes and, when the enemy vehicle stops, capture the prisoner. Capture is ensured by the actions of two reconnaissance vehicles, and, if necessary, by machine gun fire. I'm in my car.

Procedure: When an enemy car approaches, I drive my car onto the road and, blocking the path, stop him. At the same time, the car of the second squad enters the road and cuts off his possibility of escape. The second squad surrounds the car and captures the prisoner, and then retreats to the edge of the forest and removes the enemy car from the road.

The signal for an attack is when my car enters the road.

My deputy is Sergeant Petrov.”

The actions of a unit in an ambush are determined by the method of attack and depend on the strength, composition and actions of the target of the attack.

Having positioned itself in ambush, the unit should not reveal itself in any way. Observers silently warn the unit commander about the enemy's approach using a set signal.

If the attack is carried out on single soldiers and officers or small groups of the enemy, then they should be allowed to approach the center of the ambush location, and then suddenly, without opening fire, at the command (signal) of the unit (group) commander, attack them and capture them. The unit (group) allows a larger group and individual enemy vehicles to come within close range, and then suddenly opens fire on them and launches an attack.

In other cases, an attack on individual enemy vehicles (a car, an armored personnel carrier, a tank) is carried out after they have been knocked out (detonated) by fire, a grenade or a mine.

When attacking a reconnaissance patrol, a marching guard unit, or another enemy unit, they are brought within close range and, at a signal from the unit (group) commander, are hit by sudden fire. In this case, tanks (guns) fire primarily at tanks and armored personnel carriers, and if they are not there, at cars and manpower. Machine guns and other fire weapons concentrate fire on enemy personnel. After defeating the enemy, under the cover of fire from support squads, the attack squad, at the signal of the unit (group) commander, quickly attacks the enemy. The surviving enemy soldiers and officers are captured, the dead are searched, and the vehicles are inspected. Documents found during the inspection of the dead and the vehicles are confiscated. New types of weapons and military equipment are being taken away. Conventional signs (emblems) on enemy military equipment are photographed, sketched or remembered.

The unit commander most often personally directs the actions of the attackers and, together with them, participates in the capture of prisoners, and then, if the situation allows, organizes the concealment of traces of the ambush.

After completing the task, the unit (group) acts in accordance with the instructions received: continues to perform the previously assigned task or joins (returns) to its troops.

If the ambush was carried out silently, the unit continues to operate covertly in the future.

When an ambush is detected by the enemy, when a surprise attack is ruled out, at the command of the unit (group) commander, the enemy is defeated by fire and, depending on its strength, the unit attacks, or, taking advantage of his confusion, retreats to the location of his troops, or continues to carry out the previously assigned task.

When a unit is detected and pursued by the enemy, the attacking unit with captured prisoners, documents, samples of weapons and military equipment is the first to withdraw. The rest of the squad, under the command of the unit commander, covers their retreat, destroying the pursuing enemy with fire and grenades. Having broken away from the enemy's pursuit, the unit continues to carry out its assigned mission.

Captured prisoners (documents) are interrogated (studied), and the intelligence information received is reported to the commander who sent the unit to reconnaissance. Depending on the instructions received, prisoners, documents, samples of weapons and military equipment are delivered to headquarters or remain in the unit until the assigned task is completed.

When setting up ambushes at night The unit should be positioned at reduced intervals and as close as possible to the probable route of the enemy’s movement on one side of the road, in order to eliminate the risk of hitting the unit’s personnel with fire. Night vision devices can be used to observe the enemy, but without irradiating the area with infrared light sources.

in winter The same techniques and methods of action of units in an ambush are used as in the summer. When a unit is positioned in ambush Special attention should be given to masking tracks in the snow and ensuring trouble-free operation of weapons and military equipment in conditions low temperatures and deep snow cover. The personnel are provided with warm uniforms, anti-frostbite products, white camouflage coats, and, if necessary, skis.

Ambushes in the mountains They are usually located near mountain roads, trails, and passes. It is more profitable to set up ambushes along roads and trails passing through narrow valleys, gorges, through forest areas and canyons. At the same time, you should not always choose roads and paths for moving a unit to the ambush site, since the enemy will also set up ambushes near them. To covertly advance to the ambush site, it is better to use difficult terrain. The unit (group) assigned to set up an ambush will often have to act on foot. Therefore, personnel must know the techniques and methods of movement in the mountains and be provided with special equipment to overcome various mountain obstacles.

When organizing an ambush in narrow valleys and gorges, the attack unit is usually located near the road, trail, and the support units are located on elevated places on one or both sides of the valley or gorge, so that fire is ensured in the direction of the enemy's appearance. At the ambush site, rubble is made of stones and fallen trees on the roads, and, if necessary, mines and landmines are installed.

Reconnaissance units usually set up ambushes at bends and turns of roads and trails, which allows them to get close to the enemy and suddenly attack him.

Ambushes in the forest It is most advantageous to arrange it at the edge of the forest, forest clearings, near roads and clearings passing through ravines, around the bends of forest roads. When moving to the ambush site, it is necessary to exercise special caution so as not to run into an enemy ambush. The unit in ambush is usually located on one side of the road (clearing).

Ambushes in a populated area It is most advisable to arrange it on its outskirts and at street intersections. Personnel assigned to attack should be located outside buildings (structures). It can be located in roadside ditches, front gardens, courtyards, and around the corners of buildings. Personnel and combat (reconnaissance) vehicles assigned to support the actions of the attackers can be located in buildings and behind various types shelters (fences, stone walls). To fire, you should use windows, breaks in walls and fences, etc.

Attics (roofs) are used to observe the enemy's approach. tall buildings, water towers, observation (fire) towers, trees.

Platoon in fire ambush

A fire ambush in defense consists of the advance and covert placement of a motorized rifle platoon (squad, tank) in front of the front or on the flank of the advancing enemy in order to inflict maximum damage on him with sudden direct fire and dagger fire in combination with mine-explosive barriers.

A motorized rifle (tank) platoon from the second echelon of a company (battalion, regiment) can be assigned to a fire ambush.

Depending on the conditions of the situation, the availability of forces and resources at the company (battalion) commander, the platoon can be reinforced with a flamethrower squad and a sapper squad.

Under the conditions under consideration, a squad may be assigned a flamethrower crew, and a platoon and squad may be assigned a portable mining kit.

A fire ambush is usually organized on terrain that has natural obstacles and irregularities that make it difficult for the enemy to quickly deploy and maneuver in order to escape from sudden fire. At the same time, the location of the ambush must provide a covert location for the platoon (squad, tank) and have good conditions for observation, firing and escape route. Fire ambush positions are usually chosen in tank-dangerous directions in strongholds (defense areas), in the spaces between them, or on the flanks. The most advantageous places for fire ambush positions are the reverse slopes of heights, folds of terrain, the outskirts of populated areas, the edges of forests and bushes.

Platoon order of battle under the conditions under consideration, it is usually built in a line. On terrain convenient for creating a fire pocket, flank squads can be moved slightly forward. Depending on the situation, personnel can operate in infantry fighting vehicles (armored personnel carriers), and sometimes on foot.

On foot, a platoon will operate, as a rule, in the depths of a strong point (defense area), when the enemy advances on foot.

In this case, infantry fighting vehicles (armored personnel carriers, tanks) are placed behind the firing positions at a distance of up to 50 m, so that they reliably cover the squads with their fire.

At positions for fire weapons, trenches are created and carefully camouflaged. Traces from the tracks of infantry fighting vehicles (armored personnel carriers, tanks) are covered by trees with uncut branches attached to them.

The fire system is built in such a way that the enemy is hit at point-blank range, with dagger and crossfire.

Mine-explosive barriers are usually set up along the enemy's possible escape routes after a sudden fire strike from an ambush.

The success of a platoon's actions in a fire ambush is achieved by: maintaining secrecy when moving into the fire ambush area and careful camouflage; skillful organization of the fire system, creation of a zone of the main fire destruction (fire bag) with the widespread use of mines; the absence of a template in the organization and methods of action of squads, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, tanks; correct determination of the moment of opening fire from an extremely close distance (point-blank range), the use of other unexpected and sudden actions in order to deceive the enemy; clear organization of interaction in the platoon, with supporting artillery and the battalion (company) that sent the fire ambush; display of restraint, courage and initiative by personnel; the use of deceptive actions.

Organizing a fire ambush. The platoon assigned to the fire ambush when setting a problem usually the composition, location, and order of destruction of the advancing enemy and actions after completing the task are indicated. After receiving the mission, the platoon commander understands it, assesses the situation and, based on this, makes a decision on the map, which he reports to the company (battalion) commander and communicates to his subordinates. Then he secretly leads the platoon to the ambush site, places it, organizes observation and close security, and conducts reconnaissance. During reconnaissance, he selects positions for squads (firing positions - tanks) and assigned fire weapons, organizes a fire system, after which he gives a combat order, organizes interaction and combat support. In this case, special attention is paid to organizing careful camouflage of squad positions and firing positions of infantry fighting vehicles (armored personnel carriers), tanks from ground and air enemies, the order of opening fire and the use of minefields to defeat the enemy. If necessary, squad commanders (tanks) are given a collection point after completing the assigned task and the order of withdrawal.

Conducting a battle by a platoon. Until the enemy approaches the fire ambush site, the platoon does not reveal itself in any way. As the enemy approaches the line designated for opening fire, the platoon, at the command (signal) of the commander, suddenly defeats him at close range and pushes him back to pre-installed minefields. In this case, the enemy, acting in pre-battle or marching order, has the leading and trailing vehicles of the column destroyed in order to hinder his maneuver, and then the rest. If the enemy advances in battle formation, then his destruction is carried out mainly by fire on the flank. Dismounted infantry are hit by dagger and crossfire.

In the practice of combat activities of troops, there is also such a method of action in a fire ambush. The enemy column passes by the ambush position, and is then suddenly attacked and destroyed by fire from the rear.

After completing the assigned task, the platoon acts in accordance with the instructions of the commander who sent it.

Ambushes. Combat examples

Actions of a rifle platoon in an ambush

In February 1945, the command of the 358th Infantry Division learned that the movement of fascist troops had increased along the highway running from Medenau to Krogau.

What is this – redeployment? New parts arriving? If redeployment, then for what purpose? All these questions required a speedy answer.

The rifle platoon was ordered to pass through the front line of enemy defenses (2 km south of Melenhof) at night and organize an ambush on the highway in order to capture prisoners and documents.

Of all the most convenient places to cross the front line, the platoon commander chose a blind beam that began near the front edge of the defense and went to the German rear. Having specified in what cases and where the riflemen and artillerymen would provide assistance to his platoon, he checked the equipment of his soldiers, the fit of equipment and uniforms, and divided the platoon into two subgroups. At night, the platoon safely crossed the front line and reached the designated ambush site. One of the subgroups was supposed to capture the prisoner and documents, the other was to be ready to cover the actions of the capture subgroup and, if necessary, distract the enemy.

Along the highway, columns of Nazis moved in one direction or the other, tanks and artillery passed by.

- What if it stays like this all the time? – the capture group commander whispered to the platoon commander. The commander did not answer. He himself was worried that the task might be disrupted. There was no point in staying the day. The sparse bushes in which the soldiers lay were a useless shelter.

But then a car suddenly stopped in one of the columns passing by. Apparently, an officer got out of the cab and began to angrily reprimand something to the driver.

“The car has broken down,” thought the platoon commander.

The officer stopped a truck passing by, soldiers from a car parked on the side of the road got into it and drove off. The driver, lifting the hood, was tinkering with the engine.

- Let's! – the platoon commander commanded the commander of the capture subgroup. The subgroup soldiers rushed to the car. The driver was stunned and twisted, but suddenly the unnoticed soldier sitting in the cab started shooting. He was hit by a burst from a machine gun, and a bag with letters fell out of the cabin.

Quickly dragging the captive driver, the capture subgroup began to retreat towards the beam. And at this time, trucks from another convoy approached the lonely car. Apparently sensing something was wrong, the Nazis stopped, an officer came out of the lead car, shone a flashlight on the corpse of the dead man and commanded something. Soldiers began jumping out of their cars, loading their weapons. A few minutes later, the Nazis set off in pursuit, noticing the traces of the departing subgroup, but it managed to move away to a decent distance, and the covering subgroup was waiting for the Nazis at an advantageous line to first stop the pursuers, then carry them along with them into the forest, which was located about two kilometers from the gully. However, the Nazis were obviously in a hurry and soon turned back without accepting the battle.

The prisoner and the letters, which contained the conventional numbers of the new units, confirmed the guess of our command: the Nazis were transferring fresh forces to this section of the front. It became clear that they were preparing to attack

Our troops fought successful offensive battles in Right Bank Ukraine. But in the fall of 1943, in the area of ​​Zhitomir, the Nazis launched a strong counterattack, which somewhat slowed down the pace of our offensive. Was this counterattack unexpected for our troops? No. Thanks to the skillful actions of our scouts and search groups, the Soviet command was able to establish the expected time of the counterattack, which significantly reduced its effectiveness.

The commander of the reconnaissance platoon was ordered to penetrate behind enemy lines along the river bank, heavily overgrown with reeds, and organize an ambush in the area of ​​the Khlivenki farm in order to capture a prisoner, samples of weapons and documents. The Khlivenki farm stood not far from the shore, and near it there was a rock road along which the Nazis transferred fresh units to the front. One day was allotted to complete the task. Making their way through dense thickets of reeds in waist-deep water, the scouts bypassed the flank of the enemy’s defense, which faced the river, and at dawn they approached the farm. What was listed on the map as Khlivenki was the ruins of two adobe huts and a barn.

“Well, maybe this is for the best,” said the platoon commander when the patrolmen, having examined the farm, returned to the reeds. “At least this farm won’t tempt any Germans to stay there, and we still have shelter.”

Having made their way to the ruins, the scouts took refuge in them and began to wait patiently. The commander, as ordered, organized surveillance reconnaissance in order to go out onto the road after dark and capture the prisoner. Groups of soldiers passed by the farm, carts pulled by, and individual cars passed by. All this was carefully recorded by intelligence officers. Suddenly, the entire well-thought-out plan was ruined by the weather. Blown cold wind, the rain poured down, which soon turned into downpour. After 10–15 steps nothing was visible.

“What are we going to do, commander?” – the eyes of the scouts seemed to ask. As if guessing their thoughts, the platoon commander said:

“We’ll take the prisoner now.”

All the scouts had captured camouflage capes, and the platoon commander decided to take advantage of this. On his orders, a group of five soldiers went out to the road and lay down near it. Along the road, columns of Nazis, 30–40 each, passed one after another. About five minutes later, the sound of wheels was heard and a cart appeared from behind the veil of rain. One Nazi was leading a horse by the bridle, choosing the road, two others were sitting in a cart.

When the cart passed by, the leader of the group gave a signal, the scouts jumped out onto the road and followed the cart, trying to overtake it. The Nazis did not pay any attention to those passing by. Suddenly one of the scouts rushed towards the soldier leading the horse, the rest jumped into the cart, and the Nazis, without having time to cry out, found themselves in the hands of the scouts. One of them had sergeant major's shoulder straps on his uniform.

A minute later the cart turned off the road and headed towards the ruins of the farm. Three prisoners were lying on a wet tarpaulin. Near the farm, one of the Nazis somehow untied his hands, jumped out and ran. A short burst of machine gun fire threw him to the ground. The sergeant major and another soldier were taken to headquarters. Under the cover of the same heavy rain, the scouts returned to their troops before nightfall.

In both examples given, the courage and bravery of the warriors comes to the fore. But the success of the case was predetermined not only by this, but also by the skillful management of their actions by the commanders. The platoon commanders were well versed in the situation. One of them successfully chose the place to organize the ambush and correctly organized the actions of the groups, the second showed initiative in choosing the time, skillfully assessed the situation in which he decided to capture the prisoner, and did not forget to use captured property to disguise his actions.

Tank platoon in ambush

In the January days of 1945, one of our tank formations, having completed the encirclement of the East Prussian group of Nazi troops, fought stubborn battles for several days with the enemy, who was trying to break through the encirclement and connect with the relief units.

During these battles, our reconnaissance established that to the east of the village of Shamshismshen, the enemy began to group infantry, tanks and assault guns in order to go on the offensive in the direction of Pliken. It was not difficult to guess that the Nazis decided to break through to the west here.

In order to prevent the enemy from carrying out his plan, our command decided to reinforce the thinned units of the motorized rifle brigade defending here, which was part of a tank formation, with tanks and artillery.

A tank platoon was sent to reinforce the motorized rifles. At one stage of the battle, the platoon received the task, operating from an ambush on the northern edge of the Dubovaya swarm, to prevent enemy tanks from breaking through along the road leading from Shamshyzshen to the southwest. The platoon was assigned the main line of fire: on the right - the north-eastern edge of the "Oak" grove, the south-eastern outskirts of Shamshyzshen, on the left - the north-western edge of the "Oak" swarm, the southern edge of the "Long" grove - and an additional one: on the right - the north-eastern the edge of the “Curve” grove, on the left is the right border of the main fire line.

The platoon had to interact with one of the motorized rifle companies directly defending Pliken. To ensure the actions of the tankers and protect them from a sudden attack by enemy tank destroyers, the platoon was assigned two sections of machine gunners.

After receiving the mission and understanding it, the tank platoon commander arrived on the northeastern outskirts of Pliken, where he informed the commander of the motorized rifle company about the mission he had received, familiarized himself with the situation, the organization of the company’s defense and the formation of its battle formation. During the reconnaissance process, the platoon commander carefully assessed the situation and decided to position his tanks on the northern edge of the Dubovaya grove so that when the Nazis tried to break through to the southwest, they would be destroyed by fire in the area of ​​landmarks 1–4.

When choosing a place for an ambush, the platoon commander was guided by the fact that the main direction in which the enemy would most likely advance was along the highway, so it was most convenient to place the tanks on the northern edge of the Dubovaya grove. Having taken this position, the platoon will be able to shoot through flanking fire battle formations the enemy as he moves towards Pliken or strike the sides of his tanks as they advance along the highway.

When organizing interaction with the commander of a motorized rifle company, the commander paid the main attention to coordinating the combat efforts of tanks and infantry in the event of a platoon counterattack in the direction of landmark 4, as well as establishing the order of opening and firing at the attackers.

In the area of ​​the firing positions, where the platoon commander arrived immediately after reconnaissance, he organized observation, assigned combat missions to the tank commanders and indicated the firing positions to each crew. After this, the tankers began to dig out the trenches and carefully camouflage them.

Organizing the platoon's fire, the commander selected landmarks, measured distances to them, prepared data for firing in given directions, and assigned signals for opening and ceasing fire. All these actions, as the course of the battle later showed, ensured surprise and accuracy of fire on the enemy tank landing group and did not allow it to deploy in a timely manner into battle formation.

As soon as the quick winter twilight thickened, the platoon immediately moved to the northern edge of the Dubovaya grove, trying to quickly take up a firing position. In the darkness, the tankers hammered the ground with crowbars and picks, deepening the pits centimeter by centimeter. By dawn all the work was completed; trenches were dug and camouflaged. The enemy could not notice any movement in the area of ​​the firing positions.

Loyalty to the Fatherland. Looking for a fight Kozhedub Ivan Nikitovich

IN AMBUSH"

IN AMBUSH"

A group of our fellow soldiers carried out intense work in those days when the troops liberated Polish land west of Altdamm. Having completed the task, they returned to the regiment as a whole, without losing a single aircraft. Everyone was in a cheerful, upbeat mood.

The command’s order has been fulfilled,” Chupikov said, shaking our hands. - Order has been restored. The pilots fought well, and everyone's number of downed planes increased.

Aseev and I reported to the commander about how the unit lived during his absence. I reported on the battles we had while flying out on call.

This is what our comrades told us that evening after dinner.

Having taken off from our airfield near Wartnitz, they were quickly approaching their target. Soon a narrow gray stripe appeared under the planes: this was the airfield.

To the side, almost next to him, there was a tank battle. Katyushas came to the aid of our tankers. From above you could see how they scattered the enemy tank unit. The surviving tanks crawled back.

The victory of the ground forces inspired the pilots.

The commander shook his wings - this was a conventional sign: an order to the group to immediately land. The group landed unnoticed on the concrete strip.

The weather was bad. Ragged clouds rushed across the sky, fog spread across the ground. Sometimes the sun appeared in the “windows”. It warmed the earth, and the vapors rose upward. There was a thick haze in the air - the proximity of the sea was telling.

Flights in such conditions are difficult, take-offs on alert from an “ambush” are difficult, but the pilots performed both landing and take-off perfectly. There was no accident.

Our comrades flew out several times a day to search for fascist hunters. They flew out “sightedly” - they struck at enemy planes that appeared. And upon calling the guidance radio from a neighboring airfield to help the ILs. We slept four to five hours a day. They carried out attacks on fascist planes from below, camouflaging themselves with the background of the area; They also struck from above, jumping out of the clouds. The enemy could not figure out where the red-nosed fighters suddenly appeared from. The Germans began to be cunning: they tried to take advantage of meteorological conditions, attack only “from around the corner,” and flew out only at sunset, when its rays blinded our pilots. Nazi aces began to appear at higher altitudes, but ours, hunting for them, rose even higher.

Here we often acted together with you when you flew in on call. Fierce battles ensued, and we always emerged victorious. “In just a few days, our group, with your help and the help of the Yakovs, inflicted great damage on the enemy,” our comrades said.

That evening we learned a lot about the military affairs of the group, about the courage and skill of our fellow soldiers. I especially remember Azarov’s story.

One day, together with his constant wingman, Gromov, he flew out of an ambush to hunt. At the very front line, Gromov saw that a pair of Focke-Wulfs were flying towards them at the same altitude, about 5,000 meters. Obviously, seasoned air wolves are confidently heading to our rear, in search of Soviet aircraft.

Gromov conveys to Azarov:

There are a couple of Fokkers ahead.

And now he hears the command:

Let's attack!

The enemy is trying to take a dominant position in the air. But the Lavochkins forestalled him. The fight is heating up.

Our pilots' eyes were rippling from the overload - it seemed as if an enormous weight had fallen on their shoulders.

Here the crosshairs of Azarov’s sight fell on the gray plane.

The Focke-Wulf hangs for a few seconds, as if pausing at the top point during vertical flight. Azarov takes advantage of the design flaws of the German aircraft and the qualities of ours (the power of our engine allowed us to make a better vertical) and from the second turn he lights up the wingman’s car. A bluish flame flashed on the Fokker. Plumes of smoke spread upward. The fascist pilot jumped with a parachute, but the parachute, as it turned out later, did not open. The leader of the enemy pair managed to open fire on Gromov’s plane, which was covering Azarov’s attack.

Azarov makes a quick maneuver and rushes to the rescue of his fighting friend. The enemy plane turns sharply and, picking up speed, flies away.

Gromov reported to the presenter that everything was in order, and they flew after the Fokker. They overtook him over the enemy's position.

Shoot down the fascist! - Azarov orders Gromov. - Attack! I'm covering!

Gromov makes a lightning attack - dives. The fascist manages to escape and again tries to rise above our pilots.

Azarov flies across him, and Gromov makes another approach and attacks again. One burst, then another, and the enemy fighter sharply rolls onto its wing. He loses control and falls.

In the “ambush”, the brave fighting couple, as always, was noisily and joyfully greeted by their comrades. Azarov quickly jumped out of the cabin, and Gromov got out very slowly, holding his cheek with his hand. His face was covered in blood. Friends rushed to him. The doctor was ahead of everyone.

Don't worry, I just scratched my cheek with a piece of shrapnel. Nonsense! - said Gromov.

It turned out that he was already wounded when he reported to the presenter that everything was fine: a fragment from the instrument panel, broken by a machine-gun burst, hit his face. Despite the acute pain, he attacked and knocked down the enemy.

Gromov lost a lot of blood, but flatly refused to go to the medical unit. On the same day, when the doctor removed the shrapnel from his cheek, he went on his next combat mission with his head bandaged.

In the evening, the general, the commander of the air force, flew into the “ambush”. He gathered the pilots and thanked Azarov and Gromov for completing the combat mission: it was established that they had shot down two famous fascist aces.

After the return of Chupikov’s group, we flew out several times a day to hunt to the Zelovsky Heights. Here the Nazis concentrated all means of defense. From above we saw anti-tank ditches, minefields, trenches with fire weapons, and saw the Nazis conducting crossfire on the approaches to the Seelow Heights. There was always haze in this area from fires and spring fumes. It made visibility worse. The flights were difficult. The natural horizon was not visible, and instruments that worked accurately and flawlessly came to the rescue. And every time after fierce battles over the Zelovsky Heights, I thanked the technicians and junior aviation specialists. At regimental meetings, political officer Aseev, summing up the results of the work, always noted that the technical staff helped the pilots complete the task, that we achieved victory over the air enemy thanks to the joint efforts of the entire regiment.

Russian military special forces [ Polite people from GRU] Sever Alexander

Organization of an ambush

Organization of an ambush

The main method of combat operations of reconnaissance groups (detachments) on caravan routes was an ambush. As combat experience shows, an ambush had a number of advantages compared to other methods of action. An ambush made it possible to secretly wait for the enemy in convenient places and attack where he did not expect. The use of sudden fire from heavy weapons (Utes, DShK, AGS-17, BMP-2 machine guns) at close range defeated bandit formations and transported caravans with weapons and ammunition, depriving the rebels of the opportunity for organized resistance. An ambush at night had the greatest effect, had a stunning effect on the enemy and helped reduce the losses of reconnaissance officers, however, in this case, observation, organization of interaction and management of the reconnaissance group (detachment) became much more difficult. In mountainous areas, an ambush was usually carried out

on paths passing through narrow valleys, gorges, on bends and turns of roads, on passes.

The experience of organizing and conducting ambushes has shown that for ambush operations it is necessary to allocate a reconnaissance group as part of a reinforced regular group, preferably with the support of regular military equipment. It is also possible that 2-3 reconnaissance groups can operate in one area at a distance of 5-10 km from each other, so that if necessary they can support each other. The military equipment of the reconnaissance group (detachment) is located 8-20 km from the search and ambush operations. Depending on the terrain, it takes from 1 to 1.5 hours to cover this distance. It is not advisable to place military equipment at a distance of more than 20 km due to the fact that the group’s portable ammunition allows it to conduct combat operations for 2 hours. The battle formation of the RGSpN in an ambush included the identification of subgroups of observation, support, mining, capture of prisoners and documents, and destruction.

An example of successful military operations of a reconnaissance group in an ambush to destroy a rebel caravan can be seen in the actions of the 431st reconnaissance group. A group of 18 people, reinforced by two AGS-17 crews, was withdrawn at 20.00 on October 8, 1985 to conduct ambush operations to intercept a caravan of rebels with weapons and ammunition in an area 12 km southeast of Baraka.

The group's training was carried out as planned and specifically for the combat mission. Six hours were allotted for the preparation of the group. The officer responsible for the preparation of the group himself knew well the situation in the area of ​​​​the upcoming actions, since he himself had to operate in this area and, in addition, the day before, reconnaissance of this area from the air had been carried out.

Together with the commander of the reconnaissance group, the group’s procedure for various options was developed, the locations of the ambush devices and the group’s battle order were determined. The caravan's intended route ran along a dry river bed, which facilitated the group's secret exit to the ambush site and location on the ground. The battle formation of the reconnaissance group in the ambush consisted of a destruction subgroup (12 people), a support subgroup (4 people) and two observation posts of 3 people each.

The destruction subgroup was located in pairs along a front of 80 m, consisting of 3 light machine guns in the center and AGS-17 crews on the flanks. Observation posts were placed towards the flanks at a distance of 400–500 m.

The support subgroup was located at a distance of up to 300 m from the destruction subgroup towards the nearby village. War vehicles(BMP-2, BTR-70), which were supposed to support the 431st reconnaissance group, were at the point of permanent deployment in 5-minute readiness.

The rebel caravan, as expected, moved along the dry river bed. The marching order of the caravan included:

Head patrol (combat guard) of up to 10 people, moving at a distance of 400–500 m from the main group of the caravan;

The main group, which consisted of 30 pack animals, and a direct guard of up to 30 rebels;

Rear patrol (rear security) of 8 people, which moved at a distance of up to 500 m from the main group of the caravan.

Observers detected the movement of the caravan and reported to the group commander by radio about the approach of the rebels.

The group commander gave the command “Get ready” to the personnel, but warned them to open fire only on his command. The group commander waited until the combat guard passed by him, which subsequently came under fire from the support subgroup. Having brought the main group of the caravan to a distance of 80-100 m, he gave a signal to the personnel to open fire on the caravan. At the same time, having contacted the unit's Central Bureau of Investigation via radio, he reported the situation and called in an armored group. The battle lasted 30 minutes, after which the rebels stopped resisting, and the remnants of the caravan guard were forced to retreat from the battlefield, abandoning their weapons and ammunition.

30 minutes after the discovery of the rebel caravan and after a report to the unit commander, an armored group approached the battlefield, under the cover of which the reconnaissance group inspected the battlefield.

As a result of the skillful management of the group commander, clear interaction between subgroups, skillful camouflage of personnel and the sudden opening of fire on the caravan, the 431st reconnaissance group successfully completed its combat mission.

As a result of the battle, the following were destroyed: rebels - 23 people, pack animals - 25; captured: rockets - 187 pcs., RPGs - 2 pcs., small arms - 4 pcs., RPG rounds - 202 pcs., BO rounds - 65 pcs., mines for an 82-mm mortar - 31 pcs., DShK ammunition - 2000 pcs. , ammunition for small arms- 71000 pcs. One rebel was captured. The reconnaissance group returned to its permanent location using military equipment without losses.

A positive aspect of the actions of the 431st Reconnaissance Group is that during a re-inspection of the battle site (during daylight hours), additional weapons and ammunition were discovered abandoned by the rebels. Therefore, based on experience, if there is time and opportunity, with the onset of daylight it is advisable to re-inspect the places where caravans were destroyed and the surrounding area.

When preparing and conducting ambushes by reconnaissance units, they took into account such a feature as the rebels’ periodic change in the tactics of escorting caravans.

On the night of March 24, 1985, in the area of ​​the village of Noyazi (8 km north of Baraki), the 423rd reconnaissance group carried out an ambush on one of the caravan routes. At 00.30, an unarmed group of rebels of five people passed along the route without observing camouflage measures, which was unhindered by the group commander.

After 40 minutes, a second group of 10 rebels passed along the same route and fired at the nearby mountain slopes. The group commander correctly assessed that this shooting was being carried out in order to expose probable ambush sites, without revealing himself, he let this group through, taking additional measures to camouflage and protect personnel from accidental defeat. And only at 3 o’clock in the morning the main caravan consisting of 20 animals and 30 guards appeared. The caravan was destroyed by dagger fire from 50 meters away. Target designation during the battle was carried out by the group commander and his deputy with tracer ammunition, and the choice of weapons to destroy the target was determined by the length of the burst, which were worked out and understood by the personnel during the preparation period. As a result of the ambush, the following were captured: BO - 1 piece, DShK - 2 pieces, mortars - 1 piece, small arms - 17 pieces, mortar mines - 198 pieces, shots for BO - 90 pieces, hand grenades - 60 pieces, ammunition for DShK - 17 thousand pieces, ammunition for small arms - 25 thousand pieces, rounds for RPGs - 98 pieces, PTM - 36 pieces, engineering equipment; 25 rebels were killed.

Another example: in mid-April 1985, the 432nd Reconnaissance Group also conducted an ambush along the likely route of the caravan. In the first hour of the night, a group of 5 animals and 10 guards followed, periodically giving signals about the safety of the route. The group commander decided that it was a reconnaissance patrol and let her through. After 1 hour, a second group appeared, consisting of 4 animals and 8 guards. It was destroyed by small arms fire, but upon inspection of the caravan it turned out that only a few a large number of ammunition. During the interrogation of the wounded prisoner, it turned out that the main part of the gun and ammunition was in the first part of the caravan.

These two examples clearly show the changes made by the enemy in the tactics of escorting caravans. The last example indicates that the rebels, having analyzed the actions of our units in ambushes, correctly assessed the pattern in passing patrols and used it. In these cases, echelon ambushes were set up to destroy the caravan.

The tactics of escorting rebel caravans were constantly improved and changed. When forming caravans and choosing a route through the territory of the Republic of Armenia, the rebels avoided the template and often changed them. In order to increase survivability, taking into account experience, caravans followed, as a rule, in dismembered groups (3–5 pack animals, 1–2 cars, 20–30 guards) directly to active gangs, bypassing intermediate bases and warehouses. The movement was carried out mainly at night, as well as during the day in weather conditions difficult for aviation. Each group had its own route and final destination. Traffic safety was ensured by a well-organized system of marching security, reconnaissance and warning along the routes. The rebels made extensive use of civilians to carry out reconnaissance and warning tasks. The rebels had a large number of modern radio equipment and skillfully used them (the work of the rebels in radio interception increased significantly).

In the first years of the struggle against people's power, when escorting caravans, the guards were located directly next to the caravan, sending a reconnaissance patrol up to 1 km away. This made it possible to place an ambush directly next to the route of movement. Having passed the head patrol without hindrance, the group destroyed the caravan itself. IN last years a group providing escort for the caravan, disguised as civilians, moved at a distance of up to 10 km along the caravan route, as well as along the ridges of adjacent heights in order to detect possible ambushes. To identify mined areas, the rebels first drove cattle along the likely route of the caravan. The armed guards moved 1–2 km ahead of the caravan. Constant radio communication was maintained between all these groups and the caravan. If an ambush was detected, the caravan either changed its route and bypassed the ambush site, or stopped to wait for the group to leave the ambush site. In this regard, the group was located away from the caravan route (in the waiting area) and carefully observed camouflage measures. After the group supporting the escort of the caravan passed the site of the alleged ambush and the caravan was approaching, the group, at the command of observers, secretly advanced to the site of the ambush and destroyed the caravan.

An example can be given when a reconnaissance group (small in number) destroyed superior rebel forces from a well-organized ambush, using the element of surprise.

The 311th reconnaissance group consisting of 26 people, being in an ambush in the area of ​​​​Mount Buriband (60 km north - east of Kandahar), on 21.8.84 at 1.00, destroyed the caravan with sudden fire from all types of weapons. As a result of the battle, the following were destroyed: rebels - 53 people, vehicles - 2 pieces, RPGs - 2 pieces, small arms - 11 pieces, ammunition for small arms - 20 thousand pieces, ammunition for DShK - 1600 pieces; captured: DShK - 3 pcs., small arms - 73 pcs., ammunition for small arms - 50 thousand pcs., PTM - 15 pcs., shots for ammunition - 47 pcs., vehicles - 1 pc.

The group returned to its permanent deployment point without losses.