The disparaging assessment of the Yu-87 dive bomber was as commonplace in our literature as the praise of the Il-2 attack aircraft. The obsolescence of the “laptezhnik” (as the Yu-87 was called in the Red Army for the characteristic shape of the fairings of the fixed landing gear), its low speed, weak defensive armament, and insufficient armor were constantly emphasized... This aircraft, domestic authors argued , “it was good only in places poorly protected by anti-aircraft air defense systems, and in the absence of fighters covering ground troops. On the Soviet-German front, the Yu-87 suffered heavy losses.

Let us first dwell on the thesis about the “great losses” of the Laptezhniks. In 1943-1944, when the air defense of Soviet ground forces was significantly strengthened and the number of Soviet fighter aircraft increased sharply, cases of the defeat of entire Yu-87 groups actually appeared. Thus, in June 1943, according to German data, red star fighters managed to shoot down or seriously damage exactly half of the 36 Stukas of the II group of the 1st dive squadron, which carried out a raid on the Kursk railway station. However, one cannot help but pay attention to evidence of an opposite nature. Thus, recalling the sorties to bomb the bridge over the Tim River (east of Kursk) in April 1943, the former commander of the III group of the 1st dive squadron, F. Lang, emphasized that the Yu-87 “ almost every time they were met with strong anti-aircraft fire and fighters. The Russians had an excellent pre-warning service. Soon after the start, we heard a message in Russian in our headphones about our departure. However, despite all this, we did not suffer any losses during these flights." The usual exaggeration of a memoirist? But here is a source of a different kind - reports from the service of the Quartermaster General of the Luftwaffe, containing the most complete data on the losses of the 2nd and 77th dive squadrons during Operation Citadel - the Wehrmacht offensive on the Kursk Bulge in July 1943. The data from these reports completely overthrow our traditional ideas about the scale of the losses of the “laptezhniks” on the Soviet-German front.

In fact, the air defense of the Voronezh Front, on whose troops both squadrons fell, cannot be called a weak battle. On July 1, the front had 761 anti-aircraft guns, which made it possible to cover over 60% of the area occupied by combat formations of troops - the main targets of Yu-87 attacks - with multi-layered anti-aircraft artillery fire. At the beginning of the “Citadel”, the 2nd Air Army of the Voronezh Front had 597 Yak-1, Yak-7B and La-5 fighters. True, due to the lack of combat-ready pilots, only about 400 aircraft could be brought into battle, but the enemy in this direction had even fewer fighters - 153. At the same time, the “hawks” of the neighboring South-East were also involved in covering the troops of the Voronezh Front. Western, whose 17th Air Army had 255 Yak-1, Yak-7B and La-5 (including approximately 180 combat-ready). And yet, on the first day of the operation, July 5, the 2nd and 77th dive squadrons, having completed 1071 combat missions, lost only 4 Stukas forever! (For comparison: the assault air units of the 2nd Air Army, in just 220 sorties, irretrievably lost 27 Il-2s that day, according to Soviet data, i.e. one aircraft was lost in them already in 8 sorties, then like in German squadrons - 268!)

On July 7, both squadrons completed 746 combat missions - and only one aircraft had to be written off! On other days of the Citadel, the level of irretrievable losses of Stukas was higher - for one such loss there were no longer 746 or 268 sorties, but 132 (July 6, when after 793 sorties 6 vehicles were written off), 116-117 (July 8 and 9, when 701 and 699 sorties, respectively, accounted for 6 decommissioned Stukas), about 100 (July 10, when about 300 sorties cost 3 decommissioned aircraft) and even 74-75 (July 11 6 Stukas were irretrievably lost in just 447 sorties). But on July 12, having completed 150 sorties, the dive bombers of the 2nd and 77th squadrons did not lose a single aircraft, and in general during the first week of the Battle of Kursk (July 5-12, 1943) one Ju-87 was in these formations was irretrievably lost only in about 153 sorties - while one Il-2 in the 2nd Air Army on July 5-10 - in only 16-17! In other words, the level of IL-2 losses in the 2nd Air Force turned out to be an order of magnitude higher. And in the 9th mixed air corps the 17th air force is two orders of magnitude higher! His 305th Attack Air Division then accumulated only 2.2 sorties per irretrievable combat loss: in three days, the division lost two-thirds of its vehicles - 61 Il-2s - in 137 combat sorties, and on July 8 it was withdrawn to the rear reformation. The 306th Assault was also sent there with its 3.2 sorties for irretrievable combat loss (in three days, in 177 combat sorties, it lost 56 Il-2s).

It is noteworthy that Operation Citadel turned out to be even “safer” for the Laptezhniki than the air battles that took place in the spring of 1943 in the Kuban. However, even there, attacking the Soviet bridgehead at Myskhako near Novorossiysk (the famous “Little Land”) on April 17, 1943, the Yu-87, despite the “dense”, according to the pilots, anti-aircraft fire, was lost in 494 combat missions with only 7 aircraft. Thus, for one irretrievable combat loss, there were about 70 sorties - while the Il-2 averaged only 26 in August 1942 - May 1943.

Meanwhile, the Battle of Kursk continued; July 12 Bryansky and the left wing Western Front- which the Central Front joined on July 15 - began the Oryol offensive operation. By the beginning of the war, the 1st, 15th and 16th Air Armies of these fronts had 1,141 fighters, but in the 6th Air Fleet of the Luftwaffe, which opposed them, on July 12-16, 1943, one Yu-87 was lost in only 148 —149 sorties, July 19 - 23 - in 124 - 125, and July 31 - August 5 - in 216!

Surprisingly low is the level of losses of “laptezhniki” and in Last year war. Thus, during the German-Romanian offensive near Iasi on May 30 - June 8, 1944, Yu-87, according to Soviet VNOS posts, carried out 45% of all enemy aircraft sorties (and there were 9544 of them), i.e. . carried out at least 4,300 sorties (no less, since Soviet observers did not record all the sorties; the Germans alone then made 10,498 sorties). " Air battles between a detachment of dive bombers and a Soviet group of 15-30 P-39, La-5 or Yak-9,” H.U. Rudel, who fought near Iasi as part of the 111th group of the 2nd attack squadron “Immelman” (18 October 1943, dive squadrons were renamed assault squadrons) - were not uncommon, but an everyday occurrence. In them, Russian pilots demonstrated exceptional aggressiveness and showed significantly better qualities than before.” Against the 584 fighters available by June 1 in the 5th Air Army of the 2nd Ukrainian Front operating in the Iasi direction, the Germans and Romanians could only field the 199th. And yet, in eight days of fighting, the Luftwaffe irrevocably lost only 7 Stukas (from Group III and the 10th (anti-tank) detachment of the 2nd assault squadron)... True, at least four more, only 30 —On May 31, the 6th group of dive bombers of the Romanian Air Force was lost. But even if we assume that before June 8 the Romanians lost twenty Ju-87s, then even then for one Stuka irretrievably lost by the enemy there would be about 160 sorties. And if we abandon averaging and take only German units and subunits, then this number will turn out to be significantly larger! Note that in the Soviet Air Force, for one irretrievable combat loss of the Il-2, even in 1945 there were no more than 90 combat sorties, and in 1944 - about 70.

Another thing is that the insignificant (by Soviet standards) losses suffered by the Yu-87, for example, in 1943, were considered by the Germans themselves as unacceptably large. Here it is necessary to take into account, firstly, that by the beginning of the same Operation Citadel there were only about 425-435 Stukas on the entire Soviet-German front. And the Luftwaffe as a whole, apparently, never had more than 550 Ju-87s in its combat units. And secondly, the Germans valued their flying personnel extremely highly! Only taking these two circumstances into account can we evaluate famous saying Luftwaffe attack aviation inspector E. Kupfer, which we cite as evidence of the exorbitant losses of the Yu-87. " Junkers-87", - said Lieutenant Colonel Kupfer in September 1943, - can no longer be used in any theater of war, even in the East. For example, my squadron lost 89 crew in eight months. In annual terms, this corresponds to a 100 percent renewal of the flight crew».

Only the German command could be guided by such logic! If the Soviets had reasoned in the same way, they would inevitably have come to the conclusion that it was impossible to use the Il-2 attack aircraft! After all, on average, the fleet of these aircraft in the active army was renewed by 100% every 7-8 months of the war. And over the course of a year, the percentage of renewal in both ’43 and ’44 reached 150-200! On January 1, 1943, the active army had about 1800-2000 Il-2s, and on January 1, 1944 - 2413. Their combat losses in 1943 amounted to about 3760 vehicles (3515 were lost by the Red Army Air Force and approximately 240 - Navy Air Force), and in 1944 - about 3660 (3344 army and approximately 320 naval) or - if we accept the data of V.I. Alekseenko, according to which the Red Army Air Force in 1944 lost 3722 Il for combat reasons -2 - about 4040. True, fewer crews died than aircraft (on average during the war - 1.35 times), but we can talk about 100 percent renewal in a year here too.

But, as you know, the Soviet command did not take losses into account - and did not raise the question of the impossibility of further use of the Il-2... Kupfer believed that it was absolutely unacceptable to lose flying personnel at the same rate as the Soviet Air Force - and therefore demanded “immediately” begin replacing the Yu-87 with the FV-190. " Since July 5, 1943, he emphasized, I lost two squadron commanders, six squadron commanders and two group adjutants, each of whom flew more than 600 sorties. Such experience can no longer be replaced... We cannot afford to lose those few who remain».

Nevertheless, the Yu-87 continued to be actively used in 1944.

WAS IT EASY TO FIGHT THE LAPTEZHNIKS?

How can we explain the relatively small losses of the Ju-87 on the Soviet-German front even in 1943-1944? They look especially surprising if we adhere to the traditional Soviet idea of ​​​​the “obsolescence” and “low flight characteristics” of this aircraft. However, we must not forget that by the 43rd “laptezhnik” had undergone a significant modernization, which seriously improved, in particular, its speed characteristics. Production of Yu-87V aircraft - according to whom maximum speed We usually judge all “eighty-sevenths” at 340 km/h - it was discontinued in the fall of 1941. Since 1942, the Yu-87D was used on the Soviet-German front, on which instead of the Jumo211A engine there was a Jumo211J, take-off power which was 1410 hp. versus the previous 1010hp. This (as well as the improvement in the aerodynamics of the vehicle) brought the Stuka’s maximum speed to 410 km/h (note that for the serial Il-2 produced in 1943-1944 it did not exceed 405 km/h). Of the 4881 Stukas produced by the Germans, 3564 (i.e. 73%) belonged to modifications of the D family; Thus, the absolute majority of Yu-87 aircraft used during the war on the Soviet-German front were not inferior in maximum speed to the two-seater Il-2 (which, we note, no one criticizes for “low flight data” ").

Of course, the Yu-87D (as, indeed, all Soviet bombers and attack aircraft of the period 1942-1945) could not escape the fighters. However, by 1943, the defensive capabilities of the Stuka had also increased. Already on the D-1 modification, instead of one MG15 machine gun, the shooter received a pair of much faster-firing MG81s (it was designated as MG 81Z). Although the caliber of the machine guns remained the same, rifle-mounted (7.92 mm), the Stuka’s defensive capability at short distances improved significantly (and at long ranges, the fire of Soviet fighters was ineffective). On the O-5 modification (and this included almost a quarter of all Yu-87s produced - 1178 vehicles), instead of two wing-mounted 7.92-mm MG17 machine guns, two 20-mm MG 151/20 cannons were installed - so in front there is a “laptezhnik” "was now protected almost as well as the Il-2 with 23-mm VYa cannons, and better than the Il-2 with 20-mm ShVAK cannons (which were inferior to the German gun in terms of projectile weight). In addition, the cabin and individual units of the propeller-engine group were reserved for the Yu-87D.

Finally, let's take into account that the all-metal construction of the Stuka had excellent survivability. This was especially emphasized, in particular, by the famous H.U. Rudel, a pilot who flew more combat missions on the Yu-87 than anyone else. According to his memoirs, after one of the battles with the Airacobras of the 5th Air Army of the 2nd Ukrainian Front in the Balta region in March 1944, upon inspection at the airfield it was discovered that Rudel's Yu-87G withstood hits not only from many 12 .7 mm bullets, but also eight 37 mm shells! This looks incredible, but a similar fact is reported in Rudel’s report on the battle he conducted against the fighters of the 5th Air Force on May 31, 1944 in the Iasi area. After landing, it is stated there, “the entire Jun-Kere looked like a sieve made by 20- and 37-mm shells.”

But, as we have seen, the Il-2 attack aircraft were not saved from heavy losses by either even more powerful armament than that of the Stuka, or significantly more powerful armor. And Romanian Ju-87s died in the same operation (in terms of one combat sortie) by an order of magnitude more than German ones. Therefore, the first place among the reasons for the relatively small losses of the Yu-87 on the Soviet-German front should be “ human factor“—and above all, the high flight and tactical skill of the German “stukapilots.” A huge role here, in particular, was played by the colossal combat experience accumulated by a significant part of them. Thus, from the information given in the list of German attack pilots - holders of the Knight's Cross - by M.V. Zefirov, it is clear that at least 75 pilots completed over 400 combat missions on the Yu-87 (including 15 - more than 400, 18 - more than 500, 13 - more than 600, 12 - more than 700, 10 - more than 800, 3 - more than 900, 2 - more than 1000, M. Otte from the 2nd dive (then 2nd attack) squadron - 1179, and H.U. Ruded, who fought in the same formation - about 2500). For comparison: out of the much more numerous IL-2 pilots, only 9 to 11 people crossed the 400 sortie bar (including 3 to 8 who completed more than 400, 2 to 5 more than 500, and 1 more than 700).

Extensive combat experience allowed the Yu-87 pilots to “accurately determine when Soviet fighters approached effective fire range and promptly carry out an evasive maneuver. “We are being attacked by over 20 L a-5s,” recalled Kh.U. Rudel about the departure of the Stukas of the III group of the 2nd assault squadron to the Yampol area on March 21, 1944, but we continue to fly forward. When another Russian fighter comes up behind me, I wait, and then at the last moment I sharply go down or to the side.” The same situation is described by I.N. Kozhedub, talking about the battle of the La-5 of the 240th Fighter Aviation Regiment of the 302nd Fighter Aviation Division of the 2nd Air Army of the Voronezh Front with a group of “laptezhniki” over the southern front of the Kursk Bulge on July 6, 1943 .:

« I’m trying to attack the Junkers and get behind them. He maneuvers. Moves out of sight...Under enemy fire, I again lead the plane into the attack. I'm following the Junkers. Getting closer. I'm taking aim. In my opinion, the distance is suitable. I press the triggers. The guns started working. But the Junkers does not fall. I'm shooting again. The German bomber began to maneuver. I forget about everything that is going on around me. I only see “jun-kere” and continue to shoot...I'm getting close to the enemy. "Junkere" is still maneuvering ».

In the end, junior lieutenant Kozhe-dub, according to him, shot down this “Thing” - but used up almost all of its ammunition in several ineffective attacks... Soviet fighters could not respond in a timely manner to the sudden sharp turns of the “laptezhnik” (radius A high-speed car always has more turn than a slow-moving one) and jumped forward, losing sight of the enemy. (The same picture was repeated as in the battles between the Me-109 and Il-2.)

Note that in order to perform a steep turn, which created very large overloads, the pilot also required special training - which was ensured only by significant flight practice. Major H.U. Rudel in June 1944 managed, by making sharp turns, to dodge La-5 shells even on the anti-tank version of the “laptezhnik” - Yu-87G. The maneuverability of this vehicle was significantly worse than that of a conventional Stuka: two 37-mm cannons suspended under the wing caused a large mass distribution along the wing span. But Rudel already had 2000 combat missions under his belt!

The high qualifications of the Yu-87 pilots also made it easier for them to maintain their place in the group’s ranks. But, as the same Rudel noted in a report on the actions of the Stukas on the Yassami floor in May - June 1944, “losses remained small only if the formation was maintained”; “dive bombers that broke away from the formation were immediately shot down.” In fact, while the Yu-87s were flying in tight formation, their gunners (like the gunners of the Soviet Il-2) could organize fire cooperation and mutually cover each other, concentrating the fire of several aircraft on the most dangerous fighter at the moment attacking the group . In addition, an aircraft flying in tight formation could be attacked only from a limited number of directions: from others it was covered by neighboring vehicles. But the Il-2 suffered huge losses due to the inability of poorly trained Soviet pilots to maintain formation when leaving the target; the same thing happened with the Yu-87 of the Romanian Air Force.

In general, the rationality of defensive tactics not only of single aircraft, but also of groups helped the Stukas avoid heavy losses in battles with Stuka fighters. Thus, they often used a “defensive circle”, where the tail of each Yu-87 was covered not only by the fire of its own gunner, but also by the fire of the wing machine guns or cannons of the aircraft flying behind it. Sometimes (for example, in the battles in Right-Bank Ukraine at the beginning of 1944) this “circle” was pressed against the ground itself, so that it was practically impossible to attack the Stukas from below, and dangerous from above: a fighter accelerating in a dive could, leaving the attack, crash into the ground... Near Iasi in May - June 1944, Yu-87s leaving after dropping bombs lined up in a “snake of links”: each link flew above or below the one in front and behind, and in the link itself the planes became each other's tails. This “snake-like compact mass” could (unlike the “circle”) fly freely in the direction it needed; The density of the formation did not allow the fighters to get behind any of the “laptezhniki”, except for the end one, and the spacing of neighboring flights in height made it possible to protect at least half of the aircraft from attacks from below, against which the Yu-87s were defenseless. The Yu-87 target near Iasi was also approached in a “snake of links” (only each link walked in a “wedge” formation), and sometimes in the formation of the bearing of the links or the front. In the last two cases, fighters attacking from behind found themselves under crossfire from several tail gunners at once. And near Narva in February 1944, the Stuka flights walked towards the target, lined up in a diamond formation. As a result, noted V.F. Golubev, then commander of the 4th Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment of the 1st Guards Fighter Aviation Division of the Baltic Fleet Air Force, “ their firepower was so strong that it was very difficult to overcome it with single or scattered attacks».

The magnitude of combat losses of the Yu-87 was, of course, affected by the insufficient training of the majority of Soviet fighter pilots. According to a number former pilots“Stukas”, in 1941, “Soviet fighters did not pose a serious threat to them” precisely because of their inept and not persistent actions. “Having carried out a bombing attack, the dive bomber squadrons invariably managed to shake off the Soviet aircraft after five minutes of maneuvering in a defensive circle and went home at low altitude.” Things were approximately the same throughout almost the entire 1942. Having tested at the end of 42nd near Stalingrad and successfully used in 43rd in the Battle of Kursk a very dangerous technique for the Yu-87 - an attack from below with shooting at an unprotected “the belly” of the “laptezhnik” - for some reason, Soviet pilots almost did not resort to it in the future (even if the “Junkers” were flying at a sufficient altitude for this). Instead, they preferred to fight their way through the fire of cannons and machine guns - or refused to attack at all. According to H.U. Rudel, the majority of Soviet fighter pilots even in 1944 lacked aggressiveness; "only a few selected units were exceptions to this rule."

As a result, according to the same Rudel, his III group of the 2nd assault (until October 18, 1943 dive) squadron - which fought in the 41st and in Belarus, and near Smolensk, and near Leningrad, passed through the Moscow and The Battle of Stalingrad, air battles in the Kuban, the Battle of Kursk, the Battle of the Dnieper, which repelled the “second Stalinist blow” in Right Bank Ukraine at the beginning of 1944 - by the summer of 1944 there were “virtually no” losses from the Soviet -sky fighters." Apparently, the situation was approximately the same in other units flying the Yu-87. Thus, the III group of the 1st attack (formerly dive) squadron back in January - March 1944, fighting in the Vitebsk region, all its losses were suffered from anti-aircraft fire; numerous fighters of the 1st and 3rd air armies of the Western and 1st Baltic fronts did not manage to shoot down a single Stuka.

As for anti-aircraft artillery - the main enemy of the Yu-87 on the Soviet-German front - it should be taken into account that to hit a diving one, i.e. Constantly and quickly changing the flight altitude, the aircraft is very, very difficult for anti-aircraft gunners. And, “according to the Luftwaffe crews,” Soviet anti-aircraft gunners “absolutely did not know how to fight dive-kicking aircraft.”

But perhaps the strong opposition from anti-aircraft artillery and fighters at least disrupted the Stukas’ performance of combat missions? The memories of Soviet fighter pilots are literally replete with episodes in which the “laptezhniks”, sensing danger, randomly dropped bombs anywhere and gave up trying to get to the target... Of course, this also happened. Here is just one example: as M.E. Morozov showed, it is the actions of the anti-aircraft gunners of the Baltic Fleet and the Leningrad Air Defense Army that can be considered the reason for the low effectiveness of the Yu-87 Sh strikes of the 1st dive squadron group and the I and II groups of the 2nd dive squadron on the ships of the Baltic Fleet on the Neva in April 1942. Fearing to enter the zone of powerful anti-aircraft fire, the dive bombers then bombed from too high altitudes, aimlessly (there may, however, be another explanation: the command of the 1st Air Fleet of the Luftwaffe, which was sorely lacking aircraft to support ground troops in the fierce battles near Pogost, in the Lyuban "cauldron" and near Staraya Russa and which launched attacks on ships only at the insistence of Goering, recommended the crews not to take risks in these unnecessary, in his opinion, sorties).

There are, however, many counter-examples. Thus, 349 anti-aircraft and universal guns of the Kronstadt naval base and the ships stationed in it could not prevent the Yu-87 from the 2nd dive squadron from sinking the battleship "Marat" on September 21-23, 1941, the leader "Minsk", destroyer "Steregushchy", submarine M-74, minesweeper No. 31, hydrographic vessel, transports "Maria", "Bar-ta", "Levanevsky", tug KP-36, floating crane and several barges and damage the battleship "October Revolution", the cruiser "Kirov", the destroyers "Threatening", "Silny" and "Glorious", the gunboat "Pioneer" and several auxiliary ships. “The defense was simply murderous,” a participant in these raids, Kh.U., later emphasized. Rudel, “I never saw anything like this anywhere else during the war.” “Dozens, hundreds of blue-blue explosions dotted the sky,” confirms a Soviet eyewitness to the raid on September 23, the then commander of the Baltic Fleet V.F. Tributs. In general, strong anti-aircraft artillery cover did not at all guarantee the Soviet side’s safety from the attacks of the Yu-87. This was often due to the lack of training of the anti-aircraft gunners and the VNOS service. “As always (almost always) in this case, ground-based air defenses were late until the enemy had almost retreated from the target,” he wrote in his diary after the raid. three Yu-87s to the Tashlyk airfield (west of Kirovograd) in March 1944, the head of communications of the 4th Fighter Air Corps F.M. Smolnikov - but the enemy, apparently, had long studied the air defenses based 100 km from the front line, and Therefore, slowly, methodically shooting back, he went south/west.”

The history of the confrontation between the Luftwaffe and the 1st Tank Corps of the 11th Guards Army of the Western Front during the Oryol operation in July 1943 is also indicative. Massive raids by Yu-87 and Yu-88 on the corps’ combat formations began on July 14, but That day, their effectiveness “was still insignificant due to the massive amount of anti-aircraft fire, which disrupted the enemy’s ability to bomb accurately.” Then, on July 16, the “laptezhniki” attacked the anti-aircraft artillery regiment attached to the corps - and by evening they left only four guns from it. After that, on July 17 and 18, Yu-87 and Hs 129 attack aircraft bombed and shot Soviet tanks from cannons “with impunity.”

True, in both of the examples we gave, the targets of the Stuka attacks were too weakly covered by fighter aircraft. But by the first day of Operation Citadel, the Voronezh Front had, as already noted, not only powerful anti-aircraft weapons, but also a mass of fighters. And yet battle formations His troops were nevertheless subjected to massive attacks by the 2nd and 77th dive squadrons. We will only cite the testimony of N.K. Popel, who personally observed on the morning of July 5, 1943, how the “laptezhniki” processed the positions of units of the 6th Guards Army and the 538th and 1008th anti-tank artillery regiments of the 1st Tank Army (a member of the Military Council of which he was then Popel).

« The regiment has been fighting for less than an hour, and a third of the guns are already out of action. Reduce your calculations. The losses were not so much from tanks as from aviation. The sky is in the undivided power of German dive bombers. They either fly one after another in a closed ring, or stretch out in a line. Then they dance again, dropping bombs one by one. Dozens of such round dances circle in the sky. And columns of smoke and flame rise towards them from below, pieces of gun carriages and logs fly...».

According to both German and Soviet documents, it was the strikes of the “laptezhniks” that broke the resistance of the 52nd Guards Rifle Division that day - one of the three in sections of which the Germans broke through the first line of defense of the Voronezh Front troops.

But this is what happened in the Voronezh Front on July 10, 1943 - when its 2nd Air Army had already been reinforced by an entire division of fighters. “We watched with admiration the actions of the dive bombers that continuously attacked Russian tanks,” this day was recorded in the combat log of the reconnaissance detachment of the Grossdeutschland motorized infantry division, which was gnawing through the defenses of the 1st Panzer Army in the Oboyan direction. — One after another, squadrons of dive bombers appeared and dropped their deadly cargo on Russian vehicles. A blinding flash showed that another enemy tank was “ready.” This happened over and over again." On the same day, the Stukas of the 2nd and 77th squadrons ensured the success of the SS motorized infantry division “Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler” in the Prokhorovsk direction. ..On July 12, they stopped the advance of the 29th Tank Corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army, which was pressing the Leibstandarte near Prokhorovka.

Yu-87, operating on the northern front of the Kursk Bulge, against the troops of the Central Front, also broke through to their targets. " In the first days of the offensive, the Kursk floor,- recalled F. Lang, then commander of the III Group of the 1st dive squadron, - we carried out an average of 5-6 combat missions daily, attacking various purposes[...]. Often we had to engage in battle with Soviet fighters" There were only 386 combat-ready “hawks” in the 16th Air Army of the Central Front (despite the fact that the enemy in this direction only had 186 fighters); There were more anti-aircraft weapons per kilometer of the German breakthrough area than that. Voronezh Front (the Central Front had 1,131 anti-aircraft guns alone by July 1). And yet, the senior officer of the General Staff at the Central Front, Colonel V.T. Fomin, later reported, on July 5, “ enemy bomber and attack aircraft [...] bombed and fired at our combat formations to the entire tactical depth [...]“As can be seen from the reports of front commander K.K. Rokossovsky to I.V. Stalin, the same picture happened on July 6-9. It was the massive Stuka strike that forced the 132nd Rifle Division of the 70th Army to withdraw on July 5, and on July 7 Yu-87 and Yu-88 forced the 17th Guards Rifle Corps of the 13th Army to retreat 2-4 km .

The incompetent use of numerous Soviet fighters, which we described in Chapter II, was already evident here. “An observation and warning service was not organized through the Air Force,” and the headquarters of ground forces had no direct connection with either the headquarters of fighter air divisions or command post headquarters of the 2nd Air Army - and fighters could only be called through the front headquarters! While the request and response order were passing through all intermediate authorities, the “laptezhniki” had already managed to fly away... The same thing happened in the period that began on July 17, 1943. Mius operation of the Southern Front. Here, for example, are the memoirs of the former regimental artilleryman from the 87th Guards Rifle Division of the 2nd Guards Army, I.G. Kobylyansky.

« One approach, another, a third, and nine dive bombers line up for the return trip. And at this time the second nine “Junkers” are already approaching us, repeating the same maneuvers and triple bombing, followed by the third without a break, and there is no end to this hell. We don’t have anti-aircraft guns, we can’t see any aircraft, and the fire is coming from small arms“musicians” [as the Yu-87 was nicknamed by Soviet front-line soldiers because of the sirens it turned on during a dive] are not afraid».

As we can see, contrary to popular belief among us, the Yu-87 aircraft could successfully carry out their missions in mid-1943, when the Soviet Air Force already had a huge number of modern fighters.

And not only in 1943. Back on May 5, 1944, as many as five Escadrilles La-5 from the 3rd and 4th Guards Fighter Aviation Regiments of the 1st Guards Fighter Air Division of the Baltic Fleet Air Force (i.e., about 50 fighters!) were unable to stop the big group Yu-87, breaking through (under cover, however, FV-190) to Soviet ships in the Narva Bay. “Massive anti-aircraft fire from the shore and ships did not stop him,” the former commander of the 4th Guards V.F. Golubev later admitted. True, he adds, only “small groups” of “bast shoes” were able to break through to the target and drop bombs - but they also caused serious damage: they sank two minesweepers and damaged a gunboat. According to H.U. Rudel, enemy fighters only once during the entire war forced him to drop bombs before reaching the target - in July 1944, in the Yaroslav region in Galicia. And even then these were “Mustangs” of the US Air Force... Both before and after that, the famous “stukapilot” emphasized, “we always struck the intended target even in the event of overwhelming superiority of enemy aircraft.”

True, V. Schwabedissen also points to a decrease in the effectiveness of Stuka bomb attacks in 1944-1945. due to strong opposition from Soviet fighters. In order to bypass the latter's barriers, the Yu-87s were forced to approach the target at a very high altitude and, accordingly, dive from it - and this worsened the aiming conditions.

HOW EFFECTIVE WERE THE ACTIONS OF YU-87

The actions of the Stukas of the 2nd and 77th dive squadrons discussed above during Operation Citadel also shed light on the next question - about the degree of effectiveness of the Yu-87’s combat work on the Soviet-German front. As we can see, back in mid-1943, “laptezhniki” were an effective tactical weapon capable of deciding the outcome of a battle for ground troops...

The campaigns of 1941 and 1942 provide even more similar examples. For example, on the Northwestern Front on June 22, 1941, the 5th Panzer Division of the 3rd mechanized corps, - defending strategically important bridges across the Neman in Alytus; in August, the Laptezhiiks made it possible to repel the counterattack of the 34th Army near Staraya Russa. On the Western Front, on June 25, 1941, Yu-87 scattered the 6th Cavalry Division of the 6th Cavalry Corps, which was concentrated in the initial area for the offensive (near Makovlyany, southwest of Grodno), thereby excluding its participation in counterattack of the cavalry-mechanized group of I.V. Boldin on Grodno (on June 26, in the same way, the 13th Infantry Division of the 10th Army, which was retreating from the Narev River to Supraselskaya Pushcha, was dispersed). Largely due to the attacks of the Yu-87, the entire counterattack carried out on June 24-25 south of Grodno by Boldin’s group, as well as three more counterattacks by the troops of the Western Front: the 29th Tank Division of the 11th Mechanized Corps of the 3rd army west of Grodno on June 22, the 30th Panzer Division of the 14th Mechanized Corps of the 4th Army near Pruzhany on June 23, and the 5th and 7th Mechanized Corps of the 20th Army near Senno and Lepel on July 6-9, 1941 ( “The biggest losses were from aviation,” A.V. Borzikov, head of the combat training department of the Main Armored Directorate of the Red Army, reported about the actions of the 5th and 7th mechanized corps.) According to the Soviet side, “Stukas "The 77th dive squadron played a decisive role in the rapid retreat of the 28th Rifle Corps of the 4th Army in the Kobrin-Brest direction on June 23-24, 1941." Due to the constant and brutal bombardment, the infantry is demoralized and does not show persistence in defense.“,” the army headquarters stated on the 24th in an operational report. During the Rzhev-Sychevsk operation in August 1942, Yu-87s more than once thwarted attacks by troops of the 30th Army of the Kalinin Front north of Rzhev even before them. began when the attackers were still accumulating in their original positions. As A.I. Shchukin, who then served as the head of the report collection point in the 140th Infantry Division, noted, the work of the “laptezhniks” “ if not completely, then significantly paralyzed the actions of our troops».

And at the beginning of the battle for Moscow, in October 1941, the Yu-87 turned out to be a factor of not tactical, but operational significance. Continuously bombing the troops of the 43rd Army of the Reserve Front, surrounded by the Vyazma floor, the Stukas of the 2nd dive squadron essentially deprived them of their chances of breaking out of the “cauldron.” " Divisions do not exist as combat units,- the army headquarters reported, for example, in those days, - and There are small groups of infantry fighters, special forces and artillery demoralized by enemy aviation... The divisions suffered very heavy losses, and aviation is especially rampant. It makes systematic raids in groups of 20-25 aircraft. [...] In general, our army is not capable of conducting any kind of battle, since all those remaining have become somehow crazy».

The Yu-87 made exactly the same contribution to the catastrophic outcome of the Kharkov battle of 1942 for the Soviet troops. " Particularly convincing- noted in the report of the High Command of the South-Western direction to I.V. Stalin on the results of the battle, - There were actions of enemy aviation against our troops, who found themselves (on May 22, 1942) surrounded. Continuous air attacks by the enemy made it extremely difficult; regrouping of troops for a strike to the east, disrupted command and control of troops and, disrupting battle formations, disrupted the actions of troops to withdraw from encirclement».

The following month, the continuous attacks of the Yu-87 helped the enemy eliminate another “cauldron” - between Lyuban and Novgorod, where the 2nd Shock Army of the Volkhov Group of Forces of the Leningrad Front (transformed on June 8, 1942 into the Volkhov Front) was surrounded ). " Enemy,— the commander of the Leningrad Front, M.S. Khozin, reported on June 5, — uses a mass of bomber aircraft against our battle formations, which essentially paralyzes the actions of our advancing troops“- both the 2nd shock army and the 59th army making its way towards it. " Lieutenant General Vlasov especially emphasizes the destructive effect of German aviation“- this also appears in the protocol of the interrogation of the captive commander of the 2nd Shock Army, dated July 15, 1942. Of course, prisoners tend to flatter those in whose power they are, but A.A. Vlasov reported “great losses from enemy aviation” between June 16 and 20 to the Military Council of the Volkhov Front (and on the 15th , that “from enemy aviation and fire, the troops of the 2nd strike “suffer huge losses,” the chief of staff of the front, G.D. Stelmakh, also reported to the top). According to the report of Kolesnikov, an employee of the Special Department of the NKVD of the Volkhov Front (who personally observed the agony of the 2nd strike), it was German dive bombers that prevented the main forces of the army from breaking through from the encirclement. The exit of the encirclement through the corridor near the village of Myasnoy Bor, which began on the night of June 25, 1942, was stopped in the morning “due to almost continuous enemy air raids.”

The “laptezhniks” could influence the course of operations even in the summer of 1943 - which we generally consider the year of decline of the Yu-87’s glory... Thus, in the Oryol operation, their attacks on mobile groups advancing in the Oryol salient of the Western, Bryansk and The central front was not allowed to achieve the main goal of the operation - encircling the Oryol group of Germans. First, on July 14-17, 1943, the Yu-87 (with the support of the Yu-88) stopped the 1st Guards Tank Corps of the Bryansk Front, whose attack was supposed to cut through the Oryol group. “Aviation,” the commander of this formation, M.F. Panov, subsequently reported, “was the main means of influencing the enemy on the advancing formations and corps units. Quite often, losses from enemy aircraft exceeded losses on the battlefield.” Then, on July 16-17, the Stukas forced the mobile group of the Western Front - the 1st and 25th Tank Corps of the 11th Guards Army - to stop and take refuge in the forests. But they had already broken into operational space and reconnaissance units had already reached the Khotynets station on the Orel-Bryansk railway, i.e. threatened to cut off the communications of the 2nd Tank Army! The delay of this half of the Soviet “pincers” allowed the Germans to transfer reinforcements to the area north of Khotynets. And after the attacks inflicted by the air force of Lieutenant Colonel E. Kupfer on the 1st and 25th corps on July 19-21, the commander of the 2nd tank and 9th armies defending in the Oryol salient, V. Model, is certainly a patriot of his ground forces - considered that " for the first time in the history of wars, an advancing tank group was destroyed only by aviation forces, without any support from ground troops ».

Meanwhile, the basis of the “Kupffer combat formation” was the same Yu-87 from the 1st, 2nd and 3rd dive squadrons... Finally, on August 1-3, the Yu-87 and twin-engine bombers detained the second , the southern half of the “pincers” that were planned to close in the rear of the Oryol group - the 9th Tank Corps of the Central Front. This allowed the German troops to break away from the pursuit of Soviet tankers and reach the border along the Krom River. And on August 5 - although the Soviet fighters forced some of the Laptezhniki to drop their bombs prematurely - the Yu-87, together with twin-engine bombers, made it extremely difficult for Soviet tankers to cross the Kroma. Among other things, they disabled the entire headquarters of the chief of artillery of the 9th Tank Corps, and forced the 106th Tank Brigade of the 6th Guards Tank Corps of the 3rd Guards Tank Army to return to the southern coast... First of all, on account Yu-87 should also include the assessment of the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters on the Western and Bryansk fronts N.N. Voronov, made by him on July 26, 1943: “ Combat experience shows that no “Tigers” or “Ferdinands” are scary for ground troops, enemy aviation has a strong moral impact on our troops, very often it slows down the pace of our advance ».

Following Orlovskaya, the Smolensk operation, which began on August 7, 1943, was delayed due to opposition. “Laptezhniki” again inflicted heavy losses on the mobile group of Soviet troops - the 5th mechanized corps of the Western Front - and it was never able to turn the tactical breakthrough carried out between Kirov and Spas-Demensk into an operational one...

First of all, the Yu-87 made it a formidable tactical weapon high performance their bomb attacks. We emphasize that it can only be assessed on the basis of information from ground-based observers. Reports from aircraft crews cannot, by definition, differ in accuracy. Not to mention the natural desire to exaggerate their success, aviators are simply not able to notice and count from the air all the soldiers, guns, etc. they destroyed; An on-board photo or film camera is not able to record everything (especially since during a steep dive it was almost impossible to catch the attacked targets in the camera lens)... As for ground observers, we do not know whether the German reports cited in the literature have been confirmed numbers of tanks, pillboxes, etc. destroyed by Stukas. ground inspectors of the Wehrmacht. And such a check could only take place if the area in which Yu-87 was working then came under the control of German troops - and this did not always happen; since the summer of 1943 - generally extremely rare... Therefore, to assess the effectiveness of the Yu-87 strikes, we will use almost exclusively Soviet sources.

These sources paint a very impressive picture. Here are just the results of the work of the Stukas in the first six days of the war in the zone of the Soviet Western Front - attested for the most part by those who were then subjected to their attacks (and whose memories were collected by D.N. Egorov), as well as by reports and reports of commanders and headquarters of Soviet units and formations.

On June 22, 1941, Yu-87 completely (and in just 15 minutes!) destroyed the 171st light artillery regiment of the 49th Infantry Division of the 4th Army on the march, disabled all the equipment of the 75th howitzer artillery regiment of the 27th Infantry division of the 3rd Army, inflicted “noticeable losses” on the 164th light artillery regiment of the 2nd Infantry Division and the 7th howitzer artillery regiment of the 7th Tank Division of the 6th Mechanized Corps of the 10th Army - and completely defeated the artillery -riy defending on the Augustow Canal of the 56th Infantry Division of the 3rd Army. Already the first bomb strike disabled more than half of the guns, many tractors and vehicles and destroyed many soldiers and commanders of its 247th howitzer artillery regiment, and the second completely finished off this part (out of 1,240 personnel, only 78 soon reached the Neman).

A significant contribution was made by the Stukas to the destruction of the 113th light artillery regiment of the 56th division (in which by 18.00 only two guns remained). They inflicted great damage that day on the 85th Infantry Division of the 3rd Army southwest of Grodno (“very serious losses in men, materiel and cavalry" suffered, in particular, one of the divisions of its 223rd howitzer artillery regiment) and the 30th tank division of the 14th mechanized corps of the 4th Army northeast of Brest. Bombing the battle formations of the 57th Tank Regiment of the 29th Tank Division of the 2nd Mechanized Corps of the 3rd Army west of Grodno, the Yu-87 achieved several direct hits on its T-34 and T-26; since the armor of these vehicles was also pierced by fragments of 250 kg air bombs, one should pay attention to the “soldier’s rumor”, which “on the second or third day of the battles” near Grodno “knew that many Soviet tanks were burned by attacks from air."

On June 23, southeast of Grodno, the “laptezhniki” destroyed the 1st division of the 444th corps artillery regiment of the 4th rifle corps of the 3rd army and the rear of the 85th rifle division

(3rd Automobile Battalion and 87th Field Automotive Grain and Water Supply). Attacking the 7th Panzer Division of the 6th Mechanized Corps of the 10th Army east of Bialystok, they (as appears from the report of the 7th Division Commander S.V. Borzilov) disabled 17% of its tanks - 63 vehicles out of 368 available on June 22 - and completely destroyed the rear of both tank regiments of the division. The 30th Tank Division of the 14th Mechanized Corps of the 4th Army, which counterattacked near Pruzhany near Pruzhany, suffered (according to the former chief of staff of the army L.M. Sandalov) “no less losses than from tanks and artillery " Before the battle, the 30th had 120-130 serviceable T-26s, and in the battle, according to the morning report of the Military Council of the 4th Army on June 23, it lost 60 tanks; Consequently, the “laptezhniki” destroyed 20-30 T-26s, or from 16 to 25% of the division’s combat-ready tanks... And near Imenin (north of Kobrin) they burned about 27-30 of the 67 tanks that had survived by that time. kov of the 22nd Panzer Division of the same corps.

On June 24, Yu-87 (together with Hs123 attack aircraft and, possibly, Me-109 fighters) again caused great damage to the people and equipment of the 85th Infantry Division near Grodno, and the 4th Tank Division, which was advancing on Indura (south of Grodno), The vision of the 6th Mechanized Corps from the attacks of the Stukas - again achieving direct hits - lost, according to the report of Divisional Commander-4 A.G. Potaturchev, up to 20-26% of its tanks.

On June 25, in the Makovlyan area (southwest of Grodno), the “lap-tezhniki” destroyed all the artillery and a huge number of people and horses of the 94th cavalry regiment of the 6th cavalry division of the 6th cavalry corps of the horse-mechanized group I. V. Boldin and inflicted heavy losses on the 8th tank regiment of the 36th cavalry division of the same corps.

On June 26, in the area of ​​Bolshaya Berestovitsa (north of Volkovysk), the Stukas scattered the 144th Cavalry Regiment of the 36th Cavalry Division, and north of Bialystok inflicted significant damage on the 200th Infantry Regiment of the 2nd Infantry Division of the 10th, which was retreating from Osovets to Suprasl. army.

On June 27, after the Yu-87 raid, only 3 guns remained in the two batteries of the 128th separate anti-tank division of the 86th rifle division of the 10th Army defending on the Narev River in the Bialystok area, and in the Volkovysk area the “lapte zhni kya” were almost destroyed all the materiel remaining in the 35th Tank Regiment of the 6th Cavalry Division.

On the Northwestern Front, Stukas accounted for a "significant percentage" of the approximately 90 BT-7s, T-28s and T-34s that were lost by the 5th Panzer Division in the Battle of Alytus on 22 June; on the Southern Front, Yu-87 from the 77th dive squadron on July 8 inflicted “significant losses” on the 2nd Mechanized Corps, which had attacked in Northern Bessarabia (north of the city of Balti).

But the results of the Yu-87 attacks on tank units and formations at the end of 1941-1943. July 8, 1943, during the defensive battle of the Voronezh Front on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge, near the village of Storozhevoye: the “laptezhniki” in one raid disabled a quarter of the tanks of the 15th Guards Heavy Tank Regiment of the 2nd Tank Corps breakthrough - two of the 11 British MK-4 vehicles (Churchill) were half destroyed, and two burned out from direct hits from bombs.

On July 12, Yu-87s burned and knocked out 20% of the tanks remaining in the 5th Guards Tank Corps (4 T-34s and 2 Churchills; dive bombers that day accounted for 37.5% of the total corps losses in tanks ). According to the report of the commander of the operational group of the Western Front, I.V. Boldin, on October 4, 1941, in the Kholm-Zhirkovsky Yu-87 area, up to 30% of the equipment of his troops was destroyed - i.e. including the 126th and 128th tank brigades. Considering that the tank brigade was then supposed to have 46 tanks and that the brigades were unlikely to be 100% staffed, we can assume that Boldin’s group lost up to 25 tanks. According to German data, Stukas flew into the Kholm-Zhirkovsky area 152 times that day; Thus, for one destroyed tank there were no more than 6 aircraft sorties (in reality, apparently, less, since the dive bombers probably bombed not only tank units). The latest conclusion is also consistent with information about Yu-87 raids on the 9th Guards Cossack Cavalry Division of the 4th Guards Cossack Cavalry Corps of the 1st Belorussian Front in the Pruzhany region on July 12, 1944, reported by the former commander of the 181st Guards Artillery -mortar regiment of this division B.I. Strelchenko. During the first raid, 7 or 8 “laptezhniki” - despite, by the way, the barrage of 37-mm anti-aircraft batteries - destroyed three Valentine tanks of the 151st Guards Tank Regiment with bombs, i.e. It turned out that 2-3 sorties were spent on one tank.

However, in mid-March 1943, west of Belgorod, one Yu-87 raid in the 3rd Guards Tank Corps of the Voronezh Front killed 26 tanks at once. Since in the Kharkov battle of 1943 the Laptezhniks operated in groups of 10-15 or 50 vehicles, we can conclude that to destroy one tank they only needed 5 to 2 sorties. Equally effective was the strike of a group of 18 Yu-87 and 18 Yu-88 on the 1st Guards Tank Corps of the Bryansk Front near the village of Grachevka (in the Novosil area) on July 13, 1943. - from which the corps lost 23 tanks and 45 vehicles burned and damaged. Even if we assume that the crews of the twin-engine Junkers acted with the same effectiveness as the Stuka pilots trained in attacks on small targets, then it will turn out that there was only about 1 sortie per damaged tank Yu-87.

Let's compare these results with those achieved by Il-2 attack aircraft. As we have seen, since the summer of 1943, the “humpbacks” began to use not only high-explosive bombs (like Yu-87V and D), but also much more effective cumulative bombs against tanks. But even then, as combat experience showed, to guarantee the destruction of one tank on the battlefield, it was necessary to spend from 18 to 30 Il-2 sorties. And in order to be guaranteed to hit one tank with 37-mm NS-37 cannons - as field tests and, again, combat experience revealed - it was necessary to send at least 15 attack aircraft. As we see, in 41, 43, and 44, Yu-87 acted against tanks many times more effectively... And this was using bombs - and two 37-mm cannons mounted on used since the summer of 1943, the Yu-87G was, according to German pilots, an even more effective anti-tank weapon.

The effectiveness of the Yu-87 bomb attacks can also be judged by the fact that in the second of the raids described by B.I. Strelchenko on July 12, 1944. 3, and then 7 “laptezhniki” within two hours disabled approximately 12-15% of the personnel and 20% of the horses of the 32nd Guards Cossack Cavalry Regiment, almost its entire regimental battery (i.e., apparently , three guns out of four) and two out of four guns assigned to him from the 181st Guards Artillery and Mortar Regiment. Let us risk recognizing this damage as significant, and the actions of the seven “laptezhniki” as highly effective... According to the report of the Voronezh Front headquarters on the defensive operation on the Kursk Bulge, on the first day of this battle, July 54, 1943, the loss of troops in manpower from aviation (due to the presence of “widely developed system trenches and shelters) were “insignificant”. However, the log of combat operations of the 52nd Guards Rifle Division of the 6th Guards Army states that the Yu-87 strikes in it that day “put out of action many artillery equipment, weapons and manpower.”

And here are the results of the Yu-87 strikes from the 1st group of the 5th dive squadron on Murmansk. During the raid on the port of Murmansk on April 3, 1942, only 8 Stukas managed to effectively hit seven targets: they sank the British transports S-58 New Westminster City and S-67 Tobruk, the Soviet trawler RT -61 "Vodnik", damaged the transport S-52 "Empire Starlight", the Soviet hydrographic vessel "Ost" and the trawler RT-7 "Salmon" and destroyed the fish factory. On April 15, having dropped 19 high-explosive bombs on the port and roadstead, the Yu-87 sank the S-59 Lancaster Castle transport, again damaged the Empire Starlight, and destroyed pier No. 10, a warehouse, a railway crane and three railway tracks. On April 23, 10 “laptezhniki” destroyed four targets in the port: they sank a 45-ton floating crane, the Stroitel tugboat and destroyed berth No. 9 and a warehouse. On June 1, 14 “Stukas” were able to reliably hit only two objects (they sank the Soviet steamer “Subbotnik” and finished off the “Empire Star-Lite”), but on June 5, pinpoint snow blows completely destroyed the main food reserves of Murmansk and not only hidden in the rocks They destroyed the head station of the city water supply, but also hit the “thread” of the water pipeline in six places (on June 10 they broke it in 18 places, and on the 12th in 30). And on February 28, 1943, a pair of Yu-87s with a targeted strike destroyed the building of the NKVD Directorate in Murmansk...

The effectiveness of the Yu-87 bombing strikes on sea targets becomes especially impressive when comparing it with that of the Soviet Pe-2 dive bombers (comparing the Yu-87 with the Il-2 here would be incorrect: after all, ships and vessels are classic point targets, bombing which in those years was best done from a steep dive). The sources allow a fairly complete comparison of the results of the Yu-87 and Pe-2 attacks on ships of the destroyer class (in the Soviet fleet of those years it was called “destroyers” and included two subclasses: “destroyers” and “destroyers-leaders”).

To sink the destroyer Steregushchy on September 21, 1941 in the Peterhof roadstead, the Stukas of the 2nd dive squadron needed (according to Soviet reports) only 12-16 sorties and one raid. To destroy on October 6, 1943 in the Black Sea a detachment consisting of the leader "Kharkov" and the destroyers "Sposobny" and "Besposchadny", the "Junkers" of the III group of the 3rd dive squadron spent about 50 aircraft in four raids -tov, i.e. 16-17 per ship. (If we take into account that the Kharkov and Besposhchadny sank as a result of the third raid, it turns out that only 27 sorties were required to destroy these destroyers, i.e. 13-14 per ship.) Sinking July 20, 1941 in Polyarny, the destroyer Stremitelny cost 9 sorties) Yu-87 from the IV (dive) group of the 1st training squadron and one raid54. To sink the German destroyer 234 on April 16, 1945 in Danzig Bay, 16 Pe-2 sorties were not enough. According to German data, the ship was only seriously damaged by anti-aircraft artillery - and this damage could have been caused by both “pawns” and the Airacobra fighters participating in the attack. The Romanian destroyer Regele Ferdinand was also damaged, but not sunk, which (more precisely, the harbor in which it was stationed in Constanta) on August 20, 1944 was bombed by 12 to 30 Pe-2s from the 29th and 40th of the 13th air division of dive bombers of the 13th air division of dive bombers of the Black Sea Fleet Air Force. German 7.3] On April 8, 1945, 27 “pawns” of the 12th Guards Air Regiment of dive bombers of the 8th mine-torpedo air division of the Baltic Fleet Air Force attacked in the Danzig Bay - however, they only managed to damage the enemy ship.

In general, the Pe-2 (like the Il-2) does not have a single captured enemy destroyer to its name - and yet in the Baltic at the end of 1944 - beginning of 1945, German ships of this class were very active... "Stukas" also sank 9 Soviet destroyers and leaders (including the “Sovershenny” that sank on November 12, 1941 in the Sevastopol dock) - “Minsk”, “Kharkov”, “Frunze” (September 21, 1941 at Tendra), “Steregushchy” ", "Swift", "Perfect", "Free" (June 10, 1942 in Sevastopol), "Capable" and "Ruthless"98. They inflicted heavy damage on three more (including the subsequently sunk “Besposhchadny”), with the “Strong” on September 21, 1941 suffering in Kronstadt from only 9 “laptezhniki”, and the “Impeccable”, attacked the next day by such due to the number of them near Odessa, it turned out to be half-flooded.

One can, of course, point to examples of frankly unsuccessful actions by the Stukas. So, December 1, 1941 15 Yu-87. who bombed the firing positions of the 1st battery of the 196th separate anti-aircraft artillery division of the Western Front in the Kubinka area, managed to disable only one gun - and even then temporarily. Apparently, it was the Yu-87s that were those “dive bombers” that at the end of May 1942, during the offensive of the 16th Army of the Western Front in the Zhizdra direction, practically in vain bombed from the battle formation “circle sa -moletov" tank brigade standing still (!). “There were moments,” recalled former Army 16 commander K.K. Rokossovsky, who observed this raid, “when flames, smoke and dust from air bomb explosions completely blocked the tanks from observation. It seemed that only a pile of twisted metal would remain there. In fact, during the entire time, only two tanks were damaged.” The 11th Guards Tank Brigade of the Central Front, Yu-87 and Yu-88, fighting on the northern front of the Kursk Bulge, was bombed all day on July 7, 1943 - but only one tank was disabled...

“But this doesn’t always happen,” added Rokossovsky, “and the tankers know about it.” At the beginning of July 1942 The Laptezhniki practically destroyed the fully equipped 116th Tank Brigade of the Bryansk Front within a few days. “The losses were colossal,” recalls P.I. Kirichenko, who served in it at that time. “[...] by the time the enemy infantry and tanks arrived, there were only a small number of vehicles left in our brigade.” There is much more evidence in Soviet sources of the high effectiveness of Yu-87 strikes; Here are just a few dating back to 1942. In March 1942, Colonel D.S. Sorokin, the commander of the 372nd Infantry Division of the 59th Army of the Volkhov Front, who fought near Pass Polisti (north of Novgorod), complained of 13 “big losses” from the “strong attacks” of the Yu-87. “German dive bombers, five to six times a day, single file, with a terrible howl, turning on special sirens, dive into intersections,” recalled a former artilleryman from the April battles in the Pogost region (southeast of Leningrad). 311th Infantry Division of the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front N.N. Nikulin. “Bombs scatter logs, dirt, cars, people...” “After half an hour, neither the bridge nor the village itself was gone. Everything that could burn did. I managed to gather only 30 people from the battalion, not a single cart survived,” this is how he describes the consequences of the Yu-87 raid on the crossing of the Bereka River near the village of Bunakovo (south of Kharkov) on May 25, 1942. V.F. Ropotov, who then commanded the 3rd battalion of the 973rd Infantry Regiment of the 270th Infantry Division in the army group of Major General V. Bobkin. And here are the results of the Stuka raid on a column of troops of the 39th Army of the Kalinin Front that retreated along a forest road near Bely (southwest of Rzhev) on July 5, 1942." During the entire war I have never seen anything more terrible“, recalled B.P. Polyakov, who then served as a communications officer in the 634th Infantry Regiment of the 1st! 9th Infantry Division. — Large funnels are already filled to the brim with water. The road was littered with broken carts, cars, dead horses, and corpses of people. A particularly dense pile of mangled vehicles and guns surrounded [...] the lake. [...] It took us a lot of effort to make our way through the continuous rubble of fallen trees and piles of equipment».

Here it is necessary to mention such Stuka weapons as their famous sirens, which emitted “a loud howl, at first in a low tone,” when the aircraft dived. Then, as it approaches the ground and picks up speed, it gets higher and higher and louder and louder. At the ground it’s already some kind of unbearable, piercing screech.” Aircraft designer A.S. Yakov-lev in his famous book made it clear that this could only frighten British colonial soldiers (presumably Indians). However, A.I. Shchukin, who fought in the 140th Infantry Division near Rzhev in the summer of 1942, testifies that the “piercing, howling sound” of sirens “had a depressing effect on the psyche” of Soviet fighters as well. “ More than once I- he writes, - I had to see people who completely lost self-control, rushed around in panic, looking for shelter, and, as a rule, became victims of such “psychic” bombings" E.L. Balakina (Nazarova), who served in the medical unit of the 59th Rifle Brigade of the 2nd Shock Army of the Volkhov Front in June 1942, writes about the same thing: when the Yu-87 “turned on the hellish siren, which made you cry “there is blood in my veins,” the wounded “began to rush about in horror.” " I don’t know of a stronger psychological impact on a person in war than the whistle of a falling bomb or the howl of a dive bomber“,” says veteran of the 116th corps cannon artillery regiment V.A. Khodosh (who came under Stuka bombing in early 1944 on the Narva bridgehead captured by the 2nd Shock Army of the Leningrad Front across the Narova River)109. According to F.N. Segeya, who served in 1942 in the 592nd battery of the 9th anti-aircraft artillery regiment of the Baltic Fleet, sirens also interfered with anti-aircraft gunners: “ [...] It’s not difficult to catch a “hunchback” (nickname Yu-87), but keeping it in your sights is much more difficult - it dives quickly and howls loudly. It requires both skill and endurance." The effectiveness of the Laptezhik sirens is also evidenced by the fact that in the summer of 1943, the Air Force Research Institute, having tested the captured Yu-87V-3, recommended releasing a pilot batch of these devices.

WHY WERE THE STUKA IMPACTS SO EFFECTIVE?

The high effectiveness of Stuka bombing attacks was explained primarily by the high accuracy of bombing. This was affected, firstly, by the use of its most accurate method - from a dive - and the excellent adaptability of the Yu-87 aircraft to deliver a targeted dive strike. Thanks to the high strength of the design, the “laptezhnik” could attack targets from a steep dive - at an angle of 60-90° (for the Il-2, as we remember, the limit was 30°). German sources describe many episodes when "Stukas" dived onto a target completely vertically - so that "the wings of the aircraft vibrated, emitting high-pitched sounds, like a ghostly metal drum." But the closer the dive angle is to 90°, the more the trajectory of the dropped bomb coincides with the aiming line... The Yu-87 dived steadily, without yawing and, what is very important, had a relatively low steady dive speed of -450 km/h at a dive angle of 70° ( here, by the way, not only special brake grilles helped, but also the notorious non-retractable landing gear of the “laptezhnika” - which created significant aerodynamic drag). This gave the Yu-87 pilot more time to aim than the Pe-2 pilot, whose car (due to its greater weight and greater aerodynamic perfection) accelerated in a dive to 680 km/h.

In addition, the slower diving “laptezhnik” had less inertia and, therefore, the exit from the dive could begin at a lower altitude compared to the “pawn”. This means that it could drop bombs from a lower altitude than the Pe-2 - i.e. again more accurate! Usually the Yu-87s were freed from bombs at an altitude of 1500-2000 m, but, according to the Germans, they often dived “almost to the ground”; in any case, they could carry out bombing from a height of only 300 m (Lieutenant H. URudel from the III group of the 2nd dive squadron, diving on September 23, 1941 at an angle of 90° (!) on the battleship " Marat”, after that he still managed to launch the “Shtu-ku” - 3-4 meters above the surface of the water - into horizontal flight). Even in the summer of 1944, the “pawns” of I.S. Polbin’s 2nd Guards Bomber Air Corps, which mastered the dive strike better than all other formations, dropped their bomb load from no less than a 1000-meter altitude. Finally, the Yu-87, which dived at a relatively low speed, obeyed the rudder better than the Pe-2, so that it was easier for its pilot, if necessary, to turn the plane along the course, achieving more accurate aiming. This latter was made easier by both the Stuka’s magnificent bomb sight and the pilot’s high seating position in the cockpit, which provided excellent visibility...

The high accuracy of bombing was also determined by high level training of Stuka pilots (it was not for nothing that the saying was popular among them: “If you don’t train, nothing will work”) and the same enormous combat experience of a significant part of them. Among other things, this experience allowed the “stukapilots” to confidently attack and take careful aim even under powerful anti-aircraft fire. " Many inexperienced pilots- testifies H.W. Rudel, - they began to worry, but quickly calmed down when they heard on the radio that the “old people” were laughing at their fears and even allowing themselves to joke and sing. ... Gradually all the pilots acquired the same icy composure».

All this, however, did not exclude attacks on friendly troops: a number of such cases are recorded, for example, by the combat log of the 58th Infantry Regiment of the 6th Infantry Division

The 9th Army of the Wehrmacht, defending in August 1942 near the village of Polunin north of Rzhev. However, this happened in conditions when Soviet troops were constantly attacking and the enemy battle formations were brought closer together; Apparently, such mistakes in war are generally inevitable. In the same journal we also find reports of successful bombing strikes carried out by Stukas at a minimum distance from the front edge of the 58th Regiment. And a private of one of the motorized infantry regiments of the 16th tank division of the 6th Army of the Wehrmacht, A. Rimmer, on July 31, 1942, during the attack on Stalingrad, watched as targeted strikes destroyed the Stukas (along with heavy guns) 12 Soviet tanks located just 50 meters from the German trenches. We emphasize that this evidence is contained in personal diary; it was made under the direct impression of what he saw and was not intended for publication - and therefore deserves trust...

The reliability of such evidence is also confirmed by Soviet sources - for example, the memoirs of the former officer of the 233rd (then 46th Guards) tank brigade D.F. Loza. As is clear from them, the accuracy of the Stuka strikes was such that at the end of August 1944, during the Iasi-Kishinev operation, in front of the tankers of the entire 5th mechanized corps of the 6th tank army of the 2nd Ukrainian Front stood up as vital important question: How to avoid a direct hit from a Yu-87 bomb on an M4A2 (Sherman) tank? The reality of such a threat is clearly shown by D.FLoza’s description of the “anti-bomb” maneuver, invented then by Senior Lieutenant I.I. Yakushkin from the 233rd Brigade. “The tank commander sees a bomb coming off a Yu-87 diving on his vehicle. Every second she gets closer and bigger. And the officer, taking into account the trajectory of its flight, adjusts the further movement of the Sherman: a jerk forward - and the bomb lands behind the rear of the tank; a reduction in speed or an instant stop - a plume of explosion in front of the tank.” It was the “Immelmanners” who worked - the crews of the 2nd assault (former dive-bomber) squadron, which produced the majority of German dive-bomber aces... And the "Stukas" of the 77th dive-bomber, bombing positions 6- The 1st and 42nd Rifle Divisions of the 4th Army of the Western Front east of Brest, according to the report of Army Commander-4 A.A. Korobkov, “put gun after gun out of action.” Undoubtedly, only very highly qualified pilots could work so accurately...

Especially great importance The experience of the pilots was necessary for successful operations of the assault version of the Stuka Yu-87G, the weapons of which were not bombs, but two 37-mm VKZ guns, 7, and the purpose was to fight Soviet tanks, in order to hit the latter as accurately as possible, the Gustavs “attacked them from a flat glide - at an angle of 15-20° (or even 10-12°): after all, the smaller the dive angle, the faster the plane can come out of the dive and the closer, therefore, it can get to the target. However, this method of attack meant that they would have to shoot from a strafing (or almost strafing) flight. And at an ultra-low altitude, it is very difficult for the average pilot to aim: in order not to crash into the ground, he has to concentrate on controlling the machine. (This is why Il-2 pilots with 37-mm NS-37 cannons attacked German tanks from a dive at an angle of 30°. At the same time, they were forced to open fire from a distance of not 30-100, like the “stuck-lots”, but 300 -400 meters123 - but they did not fall below 100-150 meters and could aim more or less calmly.) And the Yu-87G - due to the long and heavy guns suspended under the wing - was also very difficult to pilot ... But the most experienced pilots of anti-tank squads, starting a shallow dive from a height of about 800 m, were able to bring the car to the tank at a distance of only 15 meters - and still managed to pull it out of the dive! They managed to aim accurately, even flying at low level - and not at the “tank in general,” but precisely at the roof of the engine compartment, which was covered with the thinnest armor! (Theoretically, hitting these horizontal armor plates at an angle of 10-20°, the shells should have ricocheted. But, apparently, the Germans managed to hit the mesh or louvres above the ventilation hatches in the armor.) Note that an aiming error could not have occurred here be corrected due to the dispersion of a large number of fired shells: the rate of fire of the VK3.7 guns was quite low, and the Yu-87G ammunition consisted of only 24 shells (versus 100 for the Il-2 with NS-37 guns). Therefore, the successes achieved by the Yu-87G attack aircraft in the fight against Soviet tanks further highlight the highest qualifications of the pilots of these aircraft.

And the Soviet side also recognized the high effectiveness of the Yu-87G’s actions. After the debut of this vehicle in the Battle of Kursk in July-August 1943, the Soviet command “was seriously concerned about the increased capabilities of German aviation to defeat our armored vehicles.” According to the headquarters of the 1st Tank Army of the Voronezh Front, the effectiveness of the Yu-87G turned out to be “indisputable.” Indeed, on August 12, 1943, near Vysokopolye (south of Bogodukhov), one of their raids in the 200th tank brigade of this army broke down 8 tanks; Since in the Kharkov area the Germans then had - as part of the 10th (anti-tank) detachment of the 2nd dive squadron - no more than 10 Yu-87G, no more than 1 sortie was spent on destroying one tank. The Soviet analogues of the Yu-87G - Il-2 with NS-37 cannons - for this (as shown by field tests and combat experience) required at least 15 sorties. The question of creating a self-propelled anti-aircraft gun, “which could follow directly in the battle formations of tanks and self-propelled artillery,” was raised by the commander of the artillery of the Central Front, V.I. Kazakov, only after the Germans had the Yu-87G - and precisely in connection with this appearance.

The content of radio conversations intercepted by the Germans between Soviet guidance officers and fighter pilots, who were supposed to attack the anti-tank Stukas, is also worthy of attention, as set out in the memoirs of H.U. Rudel. It also indicates the high efficiency of the Yu-87G’s actions. So, in August 1944, during the battles near Vilkaviskis on the border of Lithuania and East Prussia (where the 2nd Guards Tank Corps of the 3rd Belorussian Front then broke through), the guidance officer emphasized that the approaching Ju-87s were “certainly a group of lieutenant colonel Rudel, who always knocks out our tanks.” “A single “laptezhnik” with two stripes intends to attack our tanks - I am sure that this is the fascist bastard who is burning our tanks...”; “Don’t you see that one tank is already on fire?!” - the Germans heard such remarks on the air at the end of October or beginning of November 1944, when Rudel in a Yu-87G attacked a tank column north of Kecskemét in Hungary (from where the 2nd and 4th Guards Mechanized Corps then rushed to Budapest 2nd Ukrainian Front).

In 1944 (as evidenced, in particular, by the same H.U. Rudel), the training of young Ju-87 pilots - as well as all young Luftwaffe recruits in general - deteriorated due to a lack of gasoline for training - but this, we note, by German standards.

The accuracy of the Stuka bomb attacks was complemented by the significant power of a bomb salvo for a single-engine aircraft. The normal bomb load of the Yu-87V was only 500 kg, but in practice the Bertha lifted both 700 and 1000 kg. And on the Dora (Yu-87D), the maximum bomb load was increased to 1800 kg (and the normal load to 700 kg). Thus, since 1942 The Laptezhniki began to surpass in this indicator not only the Il-2 (400 kg of bombs, and 600 when overloaded), but also the twin-engine Pe-2 (600 and 1000-1200 kg, respectively). In practice, the Yu-87D usually carried 700 kg of bombs on board (this was, for example, the usual load of aircraft of the III group of the 1st dive squadron in the spring of 1943) - however, during most of the war no more than (600- 750 kg) was usually lifted by the Pe-2...

The Yu-87 also had a larger maximum caliber of bombs than Soviet vehicles. Unlike the Stukas, the Il-2 could not carry a 500-kg bomb and practically did not use the 250-kg (only 100 or less kilograms), and the Pe-2 could not carry a 1000-kg - while the Yu- 87B were able to lift 1800 kg. This, in particular, significantly increased the effectiveness of Stuka attacks on tanks and ships. Since a direct hit on the tank was still unlikely, the effect of the bombing directly depended on the distance from which the tank armor was pierced by fragments of bombs that exploded away from the vehicle. And here the 250- and 500-kg Yu-87 bombs naturally had all the advantages over the 50- and 100-kg Il-2 bombs... In the same way, the ship could receive heavy damage not only from a direct hit , but also from the close explosion of a large-caliber bomb: this caused such a hydrodynamic shock that a hole with an area of ​​​​several tens of square meters was formed in the side.

WHY WERE THE “LAPTESHNIKS” CONSTANTLY HANGING OVER THE BATTLEFIELD?

The high effectiveness of the Yu-87 bombing attacks was multiplied by the highest intensity of use of these aircraft. Complaints about German dive bombers constantly hanging overhead are a common place in the memoirs and diaries of Soviet participants in the war. Here are just a few such evidence dating back to September 1942; the first of them belongs to I.I. Maslennikov, a staff officer from the 618th Infantry Regiment of the 215th Infantry Division of the 30th Army of the Western Front, which was then advancing on Rzhev. According to his diary (possibly processed later) entry, on September 1, 1942 in the Rzhev area “ Enemy aircraft appeared at sunrise, and there was no clear sky until sunset. Yu-87 and Yu-88 hung over our battle formations and second echelons all the time. Before one echelon of Junkers has time to leave, a second one appears on the horizon and sets from the sun...»

On September 12, 1942, the same picture was described in his diary by the commander of the 861st Infantry Regiment of the 2nd Shock Army of the Volkhov Front, which was advancing on Sinyavino (near the southwestern tip of Lake Ladoga) and attacked by Yu-87, _Yu-88 and He 111: " Enemy aircraft are bombing all the time. The whole earth is shaking from bomb explosions. It seems that the Germans want to raze everything to the ground. Their combat vehicles They come in a continuous stream and bomb, bomb"(quote given in reverse translation from German).

The same thing was happening in those days at the other end of the huge Soviet-German front, near Stalingrad. The pages of the memoirs of V.I. Chuikov, who then commanded the 62nd Army of the South-Eastern Front, are simply filled with references to Yu-87 and Yu-88, “from dawn to dark” hanging in September 1942 “over the city, above our battle formations and over the Volga.” And the responsible editor of “Red Star” D.I. Ortenberg on September 12, 1942. was located north of Stalingrad, at the location of the 173rd Infantry Division of the 24th Army of the Stalingrad Front. " German aviation dominates here too,- he wrote subsequently. — She continuously attacks our infantry. There is a wild howl in the air. These are special devices on the planes (in fact, on the fairings of the landing gear) of the Yu-87 bombers...". The writer K. M. Simonov, who was accompanying Ortenberg, counted 390 dive-bomber flights over units of the 173rd division that day.

On September 22, 1942, “Stukas” from the 2nd dive squadron spent the whole day bombing watercraft in Stalingrad that provided the central crossing of the Volga. On the same day, Yu-87s also raged southeast of Leningrad - where the Germans began an operation to encircle the Soviet 2nd Shock Army that had broken through to Sinyavin. On September 29, they also became involved in Operation Michael, which unfolded south of Staraya Russa - an offensive aimed at expanding the famous “Ramushevsky corridor”, through which the communications of the German group occupying the Demyansk ledge went.

And this despite the fact that in September 1942, in all combat units of the Luftwaffe, there were only about three and a half hundred Ju-87s (on July 1 there were approximately 340, and on October 1 - 365) On the Soviet-German front there were only about 275 of them at that time: three of the twelve Luftwaffe dive groups fought in North Africa. Even more impressive examples of the intensity of use of the Yu-87 are the combat operations on the northern wing of the Soviet-German front in the spring of 1942. So, at the end of March, the Stukas continuously bombed units of the 59th Army of the Volkhov Front north of Novgorod (where they tried to release the 2nd Shock Army encircled in the Ltaban “cauldron”) and the troops of the 11th and 1st shock armies of the North-Western Front southeast of Staraya Russa (where the Germans were already advancing to connect with their group sitting in the Demyansk “sack”)... But in March 1942, the Germans had all over the north-western strategic direction there were (as part of the 1st Air Fleet) only two groups of Stukas (III Group of the 1st and 1st Group of the 2nd Dive Squadron), i.e. only about 60 Yu-87, of which only about 30-35 were combat-ready! And in April - three groups (II group of the 2nd squadron was added), i.e. about 90 “laptezhniki”, including no more than 50-60 combat-ready. And at the same time, they helped their troops at Pogostya (southeast of Leningrad), and at Staraya Russa, and at Kholm - in the zone of as many as three Soviet fronts: Leningrad, North-Western and Kalinin - and even bombed Soviet ships on Neve.

In general, on the Soviet-German front, the Germans never had more than 540-550 Yu-87s - but these few vehicles compared to the Soviet Il-2s did not stand idle, they worked with maximum efficiency! It was previously shown how much more intensively the pilots of German attack aircraft flew compared to the Soviet ones; Let us now pay attention only to the load placed on the “pilot” (and his plane) during the day. Captain A. Burst from the 1st group of the 2nd dive squadron, operating from July 25 to August 28, 1943 against Soviet troops in the Oryol salient, made 100 sorties, i.e. for a whole month he carried out an average of three flights per day. Oberleutnant T. Nordmann from the III group of the 1st dive squadron from February 1 to approximately March 20, 1943, completed 200 combat missions, i.e. over the course of a month and a half, I took to the air an average of four times a week. The crews of the 2nd squadron worked with the same intensity in Belarus in June 1941, and during the fierce battles in the Oryol region in the summer of 1943, Captain H.U. Rudel, who fought in the III group of the Immelman, flew out for three weeks on combat missions on average five times a day: from July 24 to August 12, he flew 100 combat missions143. Not less often (even, most likely, more often) the Stukas of the 1st Air Fleet, opposing three Soviet fronts, took to the air in March 1942 (in this month, for each serviceable bomber of this fleet there were 4 combat departures per day144, but the PD87 operated much more intensively than the twin-engine bombers Yu-88 and Xe-111, which were based further from the front line).

If the airfields were very close to the front line, then the “laptezhniki” flew out on combat missions even more often. As we have already seen, in the first days of the Battle of Kursk, pilots of the III group of the 1st dive squadron flew 5-6 sorties per day. For comparison: the attack aircraft of the 16th Air Army of the Central Front, operating in the same area, on July 5, 1943, with 109 combat-ready crews and 267 serviceable Il-2s, made only 225 sorties - an average of about 2 per crew and 0.84 per aircraft. And in the 2nd Air Army of the Voronezh and 17th Southwestern Front, the intensity of use of the Il-2 was then even less - 372 combat sorties for 359 combat-ready crews and 488 serviceable vehicles, i.e. only about 1 flight per crew and 0.76 per aircraft. On May 30, 1944, at the beginning of the German-Romanian offensive near Iasi, Lieutenant V. Stahler from the III group of the 2nd assault (former dive) squadron carried out 10 combat missions, and on May 31 - 8. Under Stalin - hail in December 1942, the pilots of the 1st group of Immelmann made ten flights a day, and Chief Lieutenant H.U. Rudel took to the air 17 times one day!

Let us pay attention to one more circumstance. In September 1942, on the entire Soviet-German front, the Germans, as already noted, had no more than 275 Stukas - almost an order of magnitude less than the Il-2 on the Soviet side. And yet, the Yu-87, as we have seen, haunted the Soviet troops almost everywhere where the Wehrmacht was then solving the most important strategic tasks - near Sinyavin, where the Germans sought to prevent the release of Leningrad; near Rzhev, where the enemy had to hold the Rzhev-Vyazma ledge hanging over Moscow; near Stalingrad, where he tried to cut off communications through which Baku oil arrived.

Thus, the Yu-87 aircraft were made into a formidable operational-tactical weapon not only by the designer H. Polman and other Junkers engineers, not only by experienced pilots, but also by German aviation commanders. It was they who, skillfully organizing an airfield maneuver and a radius maneuver (i.e., actions in different directions - say, in the Sinyavin area and along the “Ramushevsky corridor” - from one airfield), ensured the timely concentration of the relatively few “Stukas” on the most important sectors of the Soviet-German front at the moment. It was they who - again compensating for the relative small number of these aircraft - ensured the highest intensity of their use - achieving the efficient work of the rear services that supplied the airfields with fuel and ammunition, and establishing reliable communications with ground troops. Liaison officers from the dive groups were constantly in the infantry and tank units, promptly calling their Yu-87s to help them by radio and directing them to the target. The speed with which the “lap-technicians” came to the rescue of their ground troops is constantly noted in the memoirs of Soviet front-line soldiers...

On September 1, 1939, at 4:34 a.m., Lieutenant Bruno Dilli from the 3rd Detachment of the 1st Dive Bomber Squadron pressed the bomb release button, and the first bombs fell on the Polish bank of the Vistula. The Second World War began.

In January 1935, in Germany, the basic requirements for a diving combat aircraft (Sturzkampflugzeug - hence the name of the Junkers Ju 87 - 'Stuka') were determined and a competition for the best project was announced. The companies Arado, Blom Voss, Heinkel and Junkers took part in it.

Despite the presence of such strong competitors, Junkers was the closest to the goal. Its leading designer, Hermann Pohlmann, began developing such an aircraft back in 1933, which received the designation Ju 87. And when the Ministry of Aviation published the requirements for the new dive bomber, they fit perfectly into the almost finished aircraft. She made her first flight in September 1935.

In his aircraft, Pohlman managed to combine such qualities as good controllability, excellent visibility and sufficient structural strength, which was extremely necessary for a dive bomber performing maneuvers with high overload. Not wanting to weaken the wing with cutouts for retractable landing gear niches (typical of the newest aircraft of that period), he made the struts non-retractable, and to reduce aerodynamic drag, enclosed them in fairings. To reduce the height of the landing gear, they used a wing with a “reverse seagull” kink. It gave the “thing” a very distinctive appearance. Good maneuverability and controllability were facilitated by slotted ailerons and Junkers-type flaps and a double-finned tail. True, in one of the dive test flights the tail could not withstand the loads and collapsed. In this case, the test pilot and gunner were killed. On subsequent vehicles the empennage was converted to a single fin.

A distinctive feature of the Ju 87 aircraft was its ability to dive vertically to the ground. To prevent the “thing” from accelerating and exceeding speed limits, air brakes were installed in the form of two underwing deflectable plates. The problem of dropping bombs was solved quite interestingly. To prevent the bomb (placed under the fuselage) from catching the propeller, it was retracted to a safe distance by a special frame-type device, which had a simple and reliable design.

The only thing that caused concern to the designers was the insufficiently powerful engine. The first prototype flew with an English Rolls-Royce with only 525 hp. Ju 87 V-2 and V-3 were already equipped with German 610-horsepower Jumo 210A engines. The first production Ju 87A aircraft, produced at the beginning of 1937, were equipped with Jumo 210D engines with a power of 690 hp. With. But the engine power continued to be insufficient for a combat aircraft. The Stuka had incredible difficulty lifting even a 500 kg bomb. In this case, the shooter had to remain on the ground. The normal bomb load, as a rule, did not exceed 250 kg. Only after installing the latest Jumo 211A engine with a power of 1100 hp. s, there was no longer any doubt about the effectiveness of the new dive bomber.

However, the war against England and France revealed a serious drawback of the Ju 87 - its vulnerability to enemy fighters. Already in the battles of Dunkirk, when the British temporarily seized air superiority, the Junkers, who did not have armor protection and good defensive weapons, suffered significant losses.

German dive bombers suffered even more serious losses during the “Air Battle of Britain.” This was greatly facilitated by the British Spitfires and Hurricanes, which were much more effective than Polish fighters.

By the summer of 1941, a large number of Ju 87s were transferred to the borders of the Soviet Union

The beginning of the war against the USSR for the Germans followed the usual scenario: attacks on airfields, gaining complete air supremacy and unpunished actions of Ju 87 against ground forces and rear targets. Our navy also suffered heavy losses from precise attacks by German dive bombers. The Battle of Stalingrad was the last successful episode of the Ju-87's combat use, the Luftwaffe still dominated the air and the Stukas continued to launch precise bombing attacks on Soviet troops.

However, the battle on the Kursk Bulge was the last for the Junkers. Low-speed “things” were successfully shot down by our fighters, despite the cover of “Messerschmitts”

However, it was precisely at the beginning of the Battle of Kursk that another modification of the Stuka appeared in the Luftwaffe - the anti-tank Ju-87G. armed with a pair of massive, long-barreled VK3.7cm.

A long-barreled anti-aircraft gun with an initial speed of a sabot projectile of more than 1000 m/s penetrated the side armor of not only American and British tanks, but also “thirty-fours”. Containers for guns weighing more than 400 kg were easily removable and could be replaced with bomb racks. Wing machine guns and bomb armament were missing. The aircraft's armor was weakened. Unlike the standard Ju87D-3, the anti-tank Junkers did not have armor for the gunner, gas tanks in the center section, or radiator. The thickness of the pilot's rear armored back was increased to 20 mm. The rest of the vehicle's armor remains unchanged. The attack aircraft received the designation Ju 87G-1. The new Ju 87 also earned many nicknames: “Cannon Bird” (Kanonenvogel) or “Thing with Long Sticks” (Stuka mit den Langen Stangen). A total of 308 aircraft were built.

In testing, the Ju87G-1 proved to be slow and very clumsy, which, combined with reduced armor and weak defensive weapons, made the vehicle an ideal target for fighters. The maximum speed of the aircraft decreased by 30-40 km/h. The Ju87G-1 no longer dived (although the experimental vehicles that were tested had brake flaps), the attack on targets was carried out from planning at angles of no more than 10-12 degrees. In addition, according to the testimony of captured German pilots, entry into planning was difficult. Aiming was also difficult due to the poor directional stability of the aircraft, caused by the aerodynamic influence of the cannon installations, and large spaced masses (the weight of one cannon with a carriage, excluding the weight of the magazine and shells, 473 kg).
The VK 3.7 guns had a rather low rate of fire and low automatic reliability. According to German data, the gun had a rate of fire of up to 70 rounds per minute. However, according to the Air Force Research Institute, the combat rate of fire of the gun was limited to an average of one shot every two seconds. The low practical rate of fire of the guns themselves led to a very limited number of shots (no more than two) in one attack. The situation was further aggravated by the strong recoil of the guns when firing in the air and the specifics of their placement on the vehicle. As a result of these reasons, the attack aircraft experienced a strong diving moment and the aircraft swayed in the longitudinal plane when firing in the air. Maintaining a line of sight on the target while shooting at ground targets and making adjustments to the aiming was an almost impossible task. Therefore, only the first shot could be aimed.

At the same time, the sub-caliber projectile for the VK 3.7, having an initial speed of about 1170 m/s when fired in the air (according to the Air Force Research Institute of Spacecraft), from a distance of up to 400 m could penetrate Soviet tank armor up to 52 mm thick at an impact angle of 0 degrees. The armor-piercing projectile from the ammunition for this gun could not boast of such a result - from 400 m at an impact angle of 0 degrees, the projectile penetrated only 40 mm armor and "thirty-fours" of all types were not hit during attacks from any direction... It would seem that the Ju87G-1 - effective remedy defeat of the Soviet "thirty-fours". In reality, everything turned out to be somewhat different. An analysis of the armor scheme of the Soviet medium tank T-34-76 and the capabilities of the German VK 3.7 cannon shows that at glide angles of the Ju87G-1 of about 5-10 degrees, a sub-caliber projectile for the gun could penetrate the 52 mm armor of the T-34 turret only when firing from a distance not more than 180 m, and the side 40-mm armor - no more than 400 m. However, the time for effective firing was 1.3 seconds and 4.4 seconds, respectively (the minimum allowable height for maneuver at the exit is 15-20 m, the ceasefire distance is about 90 m). That is, only one shell could be “effective” when hitting the tower, and a maximum of two shells when hitting the side. But getting into the vulnerable parts of the tank, given their small areas, even with one shot, is not as easy as it seems. At the same time, one or two hits that penetrate the armor, as is known, are not enough to reliably disable a tank.

The defeat of the T-34-85 tank, which had reinforced armor, when attacked from the side (side - 45 mm, turret - 75 mm) was not ensured at any firing distance. When attacking from behind, defeating the T-34-85 was only possible if a shell hit the rear part of the turret (armor thickness 52 mm) from distances of up to 400 m. The upper armor plate of the hull and the armored roof of the turret of all types of Soviet "thirty-fours" were hit by a sub-caliber projectile for the VK gun 3.7 when firing from 300 m only at dive angles of at least 30 degrees..(P-O) it is interesting to note that the fire efficiency of 37mm Il-2 cannons on tanks of the Pz-2, Pz-3 and 38t types, after the test results at NIIVVS, was close to the armament performance of the Ju-87G. Perhaps the very decision to place heavy and relatively powerful cannons on the wings was wrong.

That is, the successful use of the Ju87G cannon on the battlefield was possible only in the hands of a highly qualified pilot and only in conditions of weak anti-aircraft and fighter counteraction.

Based on the results of the “work” of anti-tank air groups, it was concluded that, given the low effectiveness of single armored “henschels”, any real effect on the battlefield can be achieved only in the case of the massive use of these attack aircraft in narrow sectors of the front in tank-hazardous directions. It was decided to create a special anti-tank air group FuPz on the Hs129B, and within each squadron of dive bombers to form separate anti-tank squadrons on the Ju87G.

According to German data, in the initial phase of the Battle of Kursk, the German anti-tank Henschels and Junkers managed to achieve serious success.

Thus, one of the most famous Luftwaffe pilots, StG2 commander Hauptmann Rudel, already on the first day of the battle, July 5, announced the destruction of 12 Soviet tanks. Moreover, 4 tanks, according to him, were destroyed in the first combat mission. In total, German pilots announced the destruction of 64 Red Army tanks that day. On July 7, 1943, pilots of StG77, StG2 and Sch.G1 reported the destruction of 44 tanks, 20 guns and about 50 vehicles. During July 8, pilots of the same squadrons and the FuPz anti-tank group destroyed and damaged 88 tanks, 5 artillery and 3 anti-aircraft guns, 2 installations of BM-13 guard mortars and about 40 vehicles. Moreover, more than 80 units of Soviet armored vehicles from this number were destroyed and damaged by Hs129B from FuPz. Note that the statements of German pilots about the destruction large quantity Soviet tanks, as well as other ground targets, were usually not confirmed by anything other than their own words. On most aircraft there were no film-photo machine guns, and if there were, they recorded not so much the result of the action as the shells hitting the tank. As one would expect, the real losses of Soviet tank crews from bombs and fire from German aviation actually turned out to be much more modest than reflected in the reports of German pilots.

Thus, according to the headquarters of the Soviet 1st Tank Army of the Voronezh Front, against which anti-tank squadrons of Henschels from FuPz operated, irretrievable combat losses in T-34 tanks from the effects of aviation in general in the period from July 5 to July 20, 1943 amounted to only 7 vehicles, or 1.6% of all T-34 losses. In addition, the army lost about 30 T-60 and T-70 light tanks from Luftwaffe fire and bombs. Combat losses of tank formations and units of the Central Front from bomb attacks by German aviation in July-August 1943 amounted to 187 disabled tanks and self-propelled guns of all types, or 6.3% of all losses. Based on the available statistics on the distribution of combat losses, it can be assumed that of this number, approximately 70 tanks were irretrievable losses. (P-O) D in in this case it should be recognized that the losses recognized by the Soviet side are more likely - the state of the military air defense was clearly unsatisfactory, in some tank brigades there were several anti-aircraft installations DShK, instead of the standard 4 batteries of 4 machine guns. It was even beneficial for unit commanders to slightly overestimate the amount of equipment lost from enemy airstrikes, counting on receiving new combat vehicles.

Subsequently, the Hs129B and Ju87G-1 continued to “massively destroy” Soviet tanks and self-propelled guns and incur significant and very real losses. Thus, FuPz squadrons irretrievably lost 30% of their original strength in 11 days of fighting.

After the end of the Battle of Kursk, the Soviet command launched an offensive in the direction of the river. Dnieper. Trying to contain the Soviet tank offensive, the German command carried out powerful counterattacks with large forces of tanks and motorized infantry with air support, but all to no avail. A tank panic began in the Wehrmacht, reminiscent of the state of some units of the Red Army in 1941. On the night of September 21, 1943, the advanced units of the 3rd Guards Tank Army of the Voronezh Front, and later part of the forces of the 40th and 47th armies, immediately crossed the Dnieper and consolidated on the captured bridgeheads in the Velikiy Bukrin area. Major battles on the Steppe Front sector during the crossing of the Dnieper by units of the 7th Guards Army in the Dneprovokamenka and Domotkan areas, as well as by the 37th Army in the area southeast of Kremenchug, ended with success.

The Wehrmacht's most powerful defensive line was under threat of breakthrough. In an effort to throw the Red Army soldiers into the Dnieper, the German command threw almost all available aircraft into battle. On the battlefield, in addition to Henschels, Eighty-Sevens and attack Fokkers, the “work” of twin-engine Ju88 and He111 bombers was noted from low altitudes and from low altitude flights, which fired at and bombed the battle formations of Soviet units. Almost like the spacecraft air force in the first months of the war, but in conditions more favorable for combat use, since the Soviet units that crossed initially did not have strong anti-aircraft and fighter cover. With the strengthening of Soviet air defense on the bridgehead, the Germans soon had to abandon such actions, but the losses of attack air groups continued to grow and by the end of the year reached alarming proportions... Having analyzed the experience of the combat use of aviation in direct support of troops in summer battles, the Luftwaffe General Staff in September 1943 concluded that it was necessary to centralize the control of battlefield aviation combat forces. For this purpose, it was decided to create an attack aviation inspection unit, which would subordinate all groups of dive bombers, groups of direct support for troops, groups of high-speed bombers, as well as all individual anti-tank squadrons. On September 9, Oberst-Lieutenant E. Kupfer was appointed commander of attack aviation.

Anti-tank squadron 10.(Pz)/SG3 fought in the Tiraspol region in the spring of 1944, then in the Crimea and Romania and flew to Vilnius on July 4, 1944. By the fall of 1944, only one Rudel III/SG2 group remained in the Luftwaffe, still flying during the day on Ju-87D and G along with two other anti-tank squadrons. At the end of the war, they were used mainly as a “plaster” to plug “holes” from Allied tank breakthroughs.

The distinctive features of the aircraft were the inverted gull wing, fixed non-retractable landing gear and the roar of a siren during a dive. The Ju 87 can be seen in many historical war films - as the personification of the power of Germany and a symbol of German victories during the Blitzkrieg of 1939-1942. IN Soviet troops had the nicknames “laptezhnik” (for the non-retractable landing gear of a specific type) and “singer” or “organ grinder” (for the howl of a siren, “Jericho trumpet” or “organ grinder” during a dive).

Despite its low speed and mediocre aerodynamics (the landing gear was non-retractable), it was one of the most effective Luftwaffe combat aircraft due to its ability to bomb from a steep dive.

At the beginning of the Second World War, the Ju 87 was used with great success for close air support of troops and for combating ships. These aircraft formed the backbone of the air raids during the invasion of Poland in September 1939 and the invasion of Norway in 1940. In May 1940, the Ju 87 played an important role in the Blitzkrieg against the Netherlands, Belgium and France. Rugged, accurate and highly effective against ground targets, the Ju 87, like many other dive bombers, was vulnerable to modern fighters. During the Battle of Britain, the lack of maneuverability, speed and defensive weapons took its toll; Ju 87 raids required strong fighter cover.

The Ju 87 continued to be used with success after the Battle of Britain. Its highly accurate bombing capabilities were useful to German forces during the Balkan Campaign, operations in Africa and the Mediterranean, and in the early stages of the Great Patriotic War. Patriotic War, when “laptezhniks” were used for direct air support and combat against ships and tanks.

As the Luftwaffe lost air superiority, the Ju 87 once again became an easy target for fighters. Since there was no replacement for the aircraft, this model continued to be produced until 1944. By the end of the war, the Junkers for the most part replaced the assault modifications of the Focke-Wulf FW-190 fighters, but dive bombers were used until the last days of the war. Production of the Ju 87 of all versions from 1936 to August 1944 is estimated at 6,500.

The most famous pilot of the Ju-87 was Hans Ulrich Rudel, who received the highest decorations among Luftwaffe pilots and Wehrmacht and SS soldiers in general in World War II.

History of creation

In April 1934, the flight technology department of the Army Weapons Directorate announced a competition for the creation of a dive bomber (SturzKampfFlugzeug). The competition was attended by Heinkel with He 118, Arado with Ar 81, Blohm + Voss with Na-137 and Junkers with Ju 87. After comparative tests at the Luftwaffe test center in Rechlin, Ju 87 was declared the winner.

The designer of the car was Hermann Pohlmann (Hermann Pohlmann). First flight in 1935. First combat use- in 1936 as part of the Condor Legion in Spain. In total, more than 6,500 Ju 87s were built.

Design

The Stuka's design contained several innovative ideas. For example, automatic air brakes under both wing consoles to ensure that the aircraft can be pulled out of a dive, even if the pilot loses consciousness from overload, and a siren, called the “Jericho trumpet” (used until 1943), which was activated by the flow of incoming air and produced a howling sound. dive time, helping the pilot estimate the speed of the dive without looking at the instruments (the tonal pitch of the sound increased with increasing speed), and also having a psychological effect on the enemy. The tail unit was a single-fin all-metal empennage with a braced stabilizer. There were two trim tabs on each elevator. The internal trim tabs served the pilot to facilitate control of the aircraft, and the external trim tabs were connected to the Abfanggerat automatic dive and brake flaps. A characteristic touch appearance The stabilizer and, in general, the entire aircraft had weight compensators in the form of semicircular segments at the ends of the elevators.

Before the start of the war, Germany adopted a program designed to last until 1945 for the construction of a series of aircraft carriers consisting of 4 ships of the same type. The first ship Flugzeugträger A (later “Graf Zeppelin”) was laid down in 1936, the second ship Flugzeugträger B (which never received its own name) was laid down in 1938. The planned air group on board the ship was to consist of 42 aircraft for various purposes.

The Kriegsmarine High Command formed the naval unit 4.(Stuka) der Trägergruppe 186 (4th Squadron (Stuka) of Carrier Air Group 186, or 4./Tr.Gr. 186 for short). The air group was armed with Ju 87A aircraft, which were used for training purposes. In the spring of 1939, from two new production Ju 87B-1 vehicles, they were converted into deck prototypes Ju 87.V10 and Ju 87.V11, respectively, then 10 pre-production Ju 87C-0 were built. The latter were equipped with devices for ejection launch, a brake hook, a wing folding back when parked, a reinforced landing gear, inflatable cylinders and a rescue boat. During an emergency landing on water, the non-retractable landing gear could shoot off. To increase buoyancy, additional sealing of the fuselage was carried out.

The first aircraft carrier was launched in 1938, and by the beginning of World War II the ship was 85% complete, but in April 1940, work on the completion of both ships was stopped and resumed again only for the first aircraft carrier in 1942. However, due to the uncertainty of the readiness of special ship aviation systems and equipment, all work was stopped again on January 30, 1943 and was never resumed. The ship was used as a floating barracks, then was scuttled by the German crew, raised by Soviet specialists and continued to be used in the Soviet Navy also as a floating barracks. In accordance with the agreement between the member states of the anti-Hitler coalition on the division of the fleet, the aircraft carrier was subject to destruction, and in 1947, during exercises in the Baltic, it was used as an experimental target for the Soviet naval aviation and sunk by bombing off the coast of Poland.

4.(St.)/Tr.Gr. 186 took part in the attack on Poland, operating from land airfields, after which the experienced carrier-based aircraft were taken out of service. Subsequently, the Kriegsmarine High Command ordered 170 Ju 87C-1 vehicles, developed on the basis of the Ju 87B-2, but only five copies were built. These aircraft were equipped with an electrically folding wing, additional fuel tanks in the wing and a ventral torpedo holder. Due to the uncertainty of the future aircraft carrier program, the aircraft were again brought to the Ju 87B-2 standard and were used until 1944 to test various systems for landing on water and ejection take-off from warships. They also tested special weapons developed for the navy, in particular, an 80-mm smoothbore recoilless rifle suspended under the fuselage.

Ju 87R (Richard)

The aircraft has an extended range and replaced the Ju 87B-2 in production. In service since 1940.

Practically no different in design from the Ju 87B-2, it had additional tanks in the wings (two of 150 liters each) and the ability to mount two 300-liter external fuel tanks, which practically doubled the flight range, bringing it to 1,470 km. The price was a reduction in combat load to 250 kg (with tanks suspended), as well as a decrease in maximum speed and deterioration in the maneuverability of the heavier vehicle. Howler monkeys were not installed.

It was produced in 4 modifications from R-1 to R-4, mainly differing in the completeness of on-board radio equipment, and in an additional tropical version R-2/Trop. Widely used in naval theaters of war.

The Ju 87R-3 was equipped with a hook under the keel and was used as a tow vehicle for landing and transport gliders.

Ju 87D (Dora)

After the first year of the war, the Luftwaffe high command realized that, despite its initial enormous success, the Junkers Ju-87B was no longer adequate under current conditions. Defensive weapons could not fight enemy fighters on equal terms, and armor plates could not withstand increased anti-aircraft fire. The performance of the engine, with only 1,200 horsepower, was also insufficient.

A total modernization of the machine was carried out - a new version received the designation Ju87D-1.

It was planned to install a new powerful Jumo 211F engine, but it was never brought to the required condition, so a Ju 211J-1 engine with a power of 1410 hp was installed. With. with VS 1 1 propeller. This engine was also installed on the Ju 87.V21, V22, V23, V24 and V25 prototypes. The V22 was used to test bomb weapons increased to 1800 kg, a new high-strength chassis was tested on the V23, and tropical equipment was tested on the V24 and V25. The nose section with the new engine was somewhat lengthened, the oil cooler was moved under the engine to the lower part of the hood, and two liquid radiators were placed under the center section.

The landing gear has been redesigned and strengthened, and a new, more streamlined cockpit canopy has appeared. The pilot and gunner-radio operator were protected by 4-10 mm thick armor plates located in the floor, on the sides of the cabin, in front and on the seats. Armored glass 50 mm thick was installed in front.

For defense, a GSL-k 81 Z blister mount made of armored glass was installed with twin 7.9 mm MG 81 Z machine guns (the first prototypes were armed with two MG 17.

The ventral bomb racks and trapeze were completely redesigned, which made it possible to expand the range of bomb weapons. Now the aircraft could carry a 1000 kg fragmentation bomb or a 1400 kg armor-piercing bomb (although no data was found on the suspension of 1800 kg bombs on the Douro in a combat situation: usually SD1000 + 4 × SC50 under the wings). The wing bomb racks were also redesigned, on which four 50 kg bombs or two 250 kg and 100 kg bombs could be hung. There were also weapon options including: containers with incendiary or anti-personnel bombs; or 2 Waffenbehälter containers, each with three coaxial 7.9 mm MG 81Z machine guns, firing at an angle downwards; smoke devices, etc. Suspension of additional fuel tanks is possible.

Problems with the new Jumo 211J engine (a twelve-cylinder engine with a displacement of 35 liters and a take-off power of 1420 hp) led to a long delay in production - production of this model began in September 1941. The first Ju 87Ds were transferred to 1 Group of the 2nd Close Support Squadron fighting in the CCCP in January 1942. Soon the first baptism of fire of the new car took place near Leningrad.

Severe operating conditions are very cold winter 1941-1942 revealed a lot of problems with the aircraft. The first propellers, made by Heine with variable pitch and wooden blades, cracked due to too low temperatures and were soon replaced by Junkers VS 11 propellers, also variable pitch, but made of metal. The Model D's chassis was also considered unsatisfactory. For this reason, the first production aircraft of this model used the chassis from Model B, which, as a result of reducing the size of the wheels, led to a very strong reduction in the maximum take-off weight to 5009 kg. The new normal Ju-87D chassis was introduced much later.

A total of 592 Ju 87D-1s were built in 1942, and almost all of them were lost in the USSR and North Africa.

In the new modification of the D-2, the airframe and canopy were slightly redesigned, and the armor was strengthened. The aircraft received a new Revi C/12C rifle sight. The Ju-87 D-2 is similar in appearance to the D-1 - the main difference is the device for towing the glider, a reinforced tail section and a modified crutch.

By 1943 it became clear that the Ju-87 could no longer be used solely as a dive bomber. Moreover, it became obvious that the Ju-87 had to be converted for low-altitude flights in support of ground forces (Schlachtflugzeug). For this purpose, the Ju-87 D-3 model was developed in Berlin and Bremen in mid-1943. It featured enhanced armor protection for the engines and cockpit. The siren propellers on the landing gear were either removed or shrouded. The aircraft's offensive weapons were in most cases wooden containers (cassettes) loaded with 92 2-kg SC2 anti-personnel bombs (each).

Several flying laboratories were built on the basis of the Ju-87 D-3, in particular the Ju 87D-3Ag (an intelligence aircraft designed to transport and parachute two gondolas with people inside); Ju 87 D-4 (experienced torpedo bomber - carrier of the LT F5b torpedo). Based on the test results, it was decided to return the aircraft to their original configuration.

A total of 1,559 aircraft of this model were built.

A little later, the process of replacing the D-3 with the new model D-5 began. It had a longer wing, additional cabin armor, landing gear that could be fired in case of an emergency landing using squibs, and a new wing weapon (MG-17 machine guns were replaced by MG 151/20 cannons). Armor protection with a total weight of 200 kg (according to the Research Institute of the Red Army Air Force) included: the pilot's armored head - 10 mm, his armored back - 8 mm, his seat (as well as from the sides, bottom and front, protection of water radiators from top to bottom and their armored doors from front to back, oil cooler - plate in the lower hood cover) - 4 mm; fuselage sides, water pipes, center section gas tanks, gunner's floor, gunner's armor plate sidewalls, gunner's turret cap top plate - 5 mm; the shooter's vertical back and side plates of the shooter's armored cap - 8 mm. The canopy canopy is made of 60 mm armored glass. The bomb load is limited to 500 kg on an external sling. After the start of mass production, it was decided not to install an air brake, since the tactics of dive strikes came to naught.

The Ju-87 D-5 first appeared on the Russian front in the summer of 1943. On October 5 of this year, the Luftwaffe command finally abandoned the use of the Ju-87 in a dive and decided to use the aircraft only for direct support of ground forces and fighting tanks. The dive squadrons were renamed assault squadrons (Schlachtgeschwadern).

A total of 1,178 D-5 aircraft were built. Its simplified version of the D-6 did not go into production.

The order for preliminary design and conversion of the prototype into a night bomber was received in September 1943. At the end of 1943 - beginning of 1944, about 300 D-3 and D-5 vehicles were returned to MENIBUM factories for conversion and modernization into night attack aircraft. The standard engines were replaced with Jumo 211P with a power of 1500 hp. With.

The D-7 modification (which was based on the D-3 model) became the first night model of the D series. It was equipped with flame arresters on the exhaust pipes and a set of FuG 16Z radio equipment, complementing the old FuG 25 radio station. There was also a long-wing night version of the D-8, which was converted from D-5.

The exact number of aircraft converted for night flights is not known.

Ju 87E (Emil)

Deck version of the Ju 87D (torpedo bomber), intended for deployment on the aircraft carrier Graf Zeppelin.

The Ju 87E-1 had a folding wing, reinforced landing gear and a landing hook. The aircraft was supposed to be launched from a catapult and with the possibility of using powder accelerators. It was supposed to carry an LTF 5b torpedo or 800 kg of bombs as strike weapons.

Based on one Ju 87D-1 aircraft taken from the assembly line, an experimental carrier-based torpedo bomber Ju 87D-1 /To was built.

It was planned to order 115 Ju 87E-1 aircraft

Ju 87G (Gustav)

Anti-tank attack aircraft. It was armed with two 37 mm BK 37 cannons.

As the war progressed, the Ju-87 was used less and less as a dive bomber. The new main task of the aircraft was to strike from low and ultra-low altitudes against armored vehicles, which are the greatest threat to ground forces, and against supply units. Considering that the new Soviet T-34 tanks received very effective armor protection, the bomb load of the Ju-87 was not at all suitable for destroying them.

The solution was to use the 37 mm BK 37 aircraft cannon, based on the 3.7 cm FlaK 18. In the summer of 1942, two cannons were mounted under the wing consoles of a Ju-87.

The gun magazine held six sub-caliber projectiles with a tungsten carbide core weighing 1.46 kg. In the spring of 1943, conversion of the existing Ju 87 D-3 and D-5 into tank hunters (models G-1 and G-2) began. The first unit to receive the new Ju 87 G was the 4th Group of the 2nd Immelmann Squadron under the command of Colonel Hans-Ulrich Rudel. While other groups switched from Ju-87 to Fw 190, the 4th group continued to fly Ju-87 - it accounted for 519 Soviet tanks. On 7 March 1944, this group was renamed the Tenth Anti-Tank Group and transferred to Jakobstad and Liepaja to provide support to the 18th Army during the Baltic Operation.

Option Ju 87G became known as the "tank hunter" ( Kanonenvogel - Bird with a gun). Low flight speed, good stability and the ability to attack an armored target from the least protected side contributed to success in attacking tanks. It was the Ju 87G that German ace Hans-Ulrich Rudel flew.

Ju 87H (Hans)

Training version, all weapons dismantled, rear workplace intended for the instructor. Rebuilt from combat vehicles. Designated accordingly depending on the converted version: Ju 87 N-1 (from D-l), Ju 87 N-2 (from D-2), Ju 87 N-3 (from D-3), Ju 87 N-5 (from D -5), Ju 87 N-7 (from D-7) and Ju 87 N-8 (from D-8)

Ju 87K (Karl)

Export option. Ju 87K-2 (Ju 87A-1) and Ju 87K-4 (Ju 87B-1) were supplied to Hungary. The Ju 87K-1 was a production Ju 87 A-1 intended for export to Japan (but was not exported).

Ju-87F (“Friedrich”)/187

In fact, a new aircraft, developed on the basis of the Ju-87 D5 according to instructions RLM from 1940: wing consoles are simple in shape (without kinks along the edges), but larger in area and scope, wheels of larger diameter, retractable landing gear, fuselage made of bent armor plates 3-12 mm (according to the IL-2 concept: engine, cockpit , oil and gas tanks, radiators - in a strong supporting armored box), 30 mm side armored glass, the shooter has a 20 mm MG151/20 cannon with 250 rounds and a 13 mm MG131 machine gun with 400 rounds instead of a 7.92 mm twin and a new Jumo213 take-off engine power 1776 hp With. and 1480 l. With. at an altitude of 5700 m. The technical management of the Luftwaffe rejected this project, considering the flight data of the new machine unsatisfactory.

Combat use

The first war for the Ju 87 Stuka was the Spanish Civil War. In 1936-1937, a Ju 87 prototype was tested in Spain. In 1938, three Ju 87 A were transferred to the country. They became part of the Condor Legion. In real combat conditions, the final testing of the vehicle and the new tactics of using dive bombers took place. At the end of 1938, Condor pilots switched to the Ju 87 B. Weak defensive weapons made it easy prey for the enemy. In the Mediterranean Sea, the aircraft was successfully used against ships. The Ju 87 was also used in eastern front, but with the growing power of the Soviet Air Force, units equipped with this aircraft began to suffer heavy losses in the final stages of the war. Thus, Senior Lieutenant Horovets shot down nine bombers in one battle.

IN recent months war, the Ju 87 was replaced by the Fw-190A assault variants.

Dive procedure

Italian pilots, when attacking British ships in the Mediterranean Sea, developed a different method: the dive was carried out at moderate angles - 40-50 degrees - but without using air brakes, as a result of which the speed constantly increased, which made it difficult to conduct anti-aircraft fire. Height

Was in service

Mention in literature

The enemy was close. Just below them, in the Germans’ favorite formation—double goose—were the single-engine Yu-87 dive bombers. They had non-retractable landing gear. These landing gear hung under the belly during flight. The wheels were protected by oblong fairings. It looked like legs wearing bast shoes were sticking out from the belly of the car. Therefore, flying rumors on all fronts dubbed them “sneakers.”

The lead bomber, aiming at the ground with its non-retractable landing gear, similar to the paws of a kite, roared its sirens and went into a steep dive.
- Oh, I started a barrel organ! - the foreman shook his fist at him. - Organ grinders! They're scary... There aren't enough bombs.

...the American turned his head in the direction of Mallory’s outstretched arm. And immediately he discovered the planes.
- Dive bombers?! - he said incredulously. - A whole squadron, damn them! It can't be, boss!
“As you can see,” the captain responded gloomily. - According to Jensen, the Krauts removed them from the Italian front. Behind last weeks overtook more than two hundred cars. - Narrowing his eyes, the New Zealander looked at the squadron, which was already less than half a mile away. - And they sent these vile pterodactyls to the Aegean Sea region.
“But they’re not looking for us,” Miller objected.
“I’m afraid it’s us,” the captain answered sadly. - Both echelons of bombers formed one line. Perhaps Panais was right.
- But... but... But they are flying past...
“No, not by,” Mallory said dispassionately. - And they won’t fly away soon. Look at the lead car.
At that moment, the first Yu-87 in the squadron fell on the left wing and, making a half-turn, rushed from the sky straight into the grove with a howl.

pDOPCHTENEOOOP U OPCHSHCHN CHBTYBOFPN VTPOYTPCHBOOPZP "IEOYEMS" CH YURSHCHFBFEMSHOSHCHK GEOFT CH TEEMYOE RPUFKHRYMYY FTY Ju87D-3, ZMBCHOPK PUPVEOOPUFSHHA LPPTSCHI SCHMSMBUSH KHUFBOPCHLB RPD L TSCHMPN DCHHI 37-NN RKHOYEL Flak 18. chNEUFE U NBZBIOBNY ABOUT 12 UOBTSDPCH SING LTERYMYUSH RPD LTSHMPN UTBH UB UFPKLBNY YBUUY. h LPOFEKOETOPN CHBTYBOFE RHYLB Flak 18 PVPOBYUBMBUSH LBL chl 3.7 (Bord Kannone 3.7 UN). dMYOOPUFCHPMSHOPE ЪООФППТХДЕ У OBYUBMSHOPK ULPTPUFSH RPDLBMYVETOZP UOBTSDB VPMEE 1000 N/U RTPVYCHBMP VPTFPCHHA VTPOA OE FPMSHLP BNETYLBOULYI BOZMYKULYI FBOLP CH, OP Y "FTYDGBFSHUEFCHETPL". lPOFEKOETSH DMS RHYEL CHUPN VPMEE 300 LZ VSHCHMY MEZLPUYENOSCHNYY CHBYNPJBNEOSENSHNYY U PVSHYUOSCHNYY VPNVPDETTSBFEMSNY. lTSCHMSHECHSHCHE RKHMENEFSH Y VPNVPCHPE CHPPTHTSEOYE PFUHFUFCHPCHBMY. vТPOYTPCHBOIE UBNPMEFB VSHMP PUMBVMEOP. h PFMYUYE PF UFBODBTFOPZP Ju87D-3 ABOUT RTPFYCHPFBOLPCHPN "AOLETUE" PFUHFUFCHPCHBMP VTPOYTPCHBOYE UFTEMLB, GEOFTPRMBOSHI VEOЪPVBLPCH Y CHPDPTBDYBFPTB. fPMEYOB ЪBDOOEK VTPOEURYOLY MEFUYLB VSHMB KHCHEMYUEOB DP 20 NN. h PUFBMSHOPN VTPOYTPCHBOYE NBYOSCH PUFBMPUSH VEJNEOOYK. yFKHTNPCHYL RPMKHYUM PVPOBYEOYE Ju87G-1.

ABOUT YURSHCHFBOYSI Ju87G-1 RPLBЪBM UEVS NEDMYFEMSHOSHCHN Y PUEOSH OERPCHPTPFMYCHSHCHN, YUFP CH UPYUEFBOY Y KHNEOSHYEOOOSCHN VTPOYTPCHBOYEN Y UMBVSHCHN PVPPTPOYFEMSHOSCHN CHPPTHTSEOYEN NBYYOKH YDEBMSHOPK NYYEOSHA DMS YUFTEVYFEMEK. nBLUINBMSHOBS ULPTPUFSH UBNPMEFB WOYYMBUSH ABOUT 30-40 LN/S. Ju87G-1 HCE OE RILYTPCHBM (IPFS ABOUT RTPIPDICHYI YURSHCHFBOYS PRSCHFOSCHI NBYOBI YNEMYUSH FPTNPJOSCHE EIFLY), BFBLB GEMEK RTPYCHPDYMBUSH U RMBOYTPCHBOYS RPD KHZMBNY OE VPMEE 10 -12°. lTPNE LFPPZP, RP RPLBBOYSN RMEOOSCHI OENEGLYI MEFUYLPCH CHCHPD CH RMBOYTPCHBOYE VSCHM UBFTKHDOYFEMSHOSHCHN. ъBFTKHDOYFEMSHOSCHN VSHMP Y RTYGEMYCHBOYE CHUMEDUFCHYE RMPIPK RHFECHPK KHUFPKYYCHPUFY UBNPMEFB, PVKHUMPCHMEOOOPK BTPDOBNYUEULYN CHMYSOYEN RKHOYUOSHI KHUFBOPCHPL, VPMSHYYNY TBOEUE OOSCHNY NBUUBNY (CHEU PDOPK RKHYLY U MBZHEFPN, VE KHUEFB CHUB NBZBYOB Y UOBTSDPCH, 473 LZ) Y CHPTPUYN RPMEFOSHCHN CHEUPN.

RHYLY member 3.7 YNEMY DPCHPMSHOP OECHSCHUPLHA ULPTPUFTEMSHOPUFSH Y OILKHA OBDETSOPUFSH BCHFPNBFYLY. rP OENEGLYN DBOOSCHN RKHYLB YNEMB ULPTPUFTEMSHOPUFSH DP 70 CHCHUFTEMPCH CH NYOHFH. pDOBLP RP DBOOSCHN ohy chchu forehead CHUMEDUFCHYE OEDDPCHEDEOOPUFY BCHFPNBFYLY RHYLYY EE VPECHBS ULPTPUFTEMSHOPUFSH PZTBOYUYCHBMBUSH CH UTEDOEN PDOYN CHSHCHUFTEMPN CH DCHE ELKHODSCH. oYLBS CE RTBLFYUEULBS ULPTPUFTEMSHOPUFSH UBNYI RKHOYEL RTYCHPDYMB Y L CHEUSHNB PZTBOYOOOPNH YUYUMH CHCHUFTEMPCH (OE VPMEE DCHHI) CH PDOPK BFBLE. rPMPTSEOYE KHHZHVMSMPUSH EEE Y UYMSHOPK PFDBUEK RKHYEL RTY UFTEMSHVE CH CHPDHIE Y UREGYZHYLPK TBNEEEOOYS YI ABOUT NBIYOE. CHUMEDUFCHYE LFYI RTYUYO YFKHTNPCHYL YURSHCHFSHCHBM UYMSHOSHCHK RYLITHAEIK NPNEOF Y CHP'OILBMB TBULBYULB UBNPMEFB CH RTDDPMSHOPK RMPULPUFY RTY UFTEMSHVE CH CHPDHIE.

xDETTSYCHBOYE MYOYY CHYYTPCHBOYS ABOUT GEMY PE CHTENS UFTEMSHVSHCH RP OBENOSCHN GEMSN Y CHPD RPRTBCPL CH RTYGEMYCHBOYE VSHMP PUEOSH UMPTsOPK ЪBDBUEK Y RTBLFYUEULY OECHSCHRPMOYNPK. RPFPNH RTYGEMSHOSHCHN Refinery VShchFSH FPMSHLP RETCHSHCHK CHSHCHUFTEM.

rPTBTTSEOYE FBOLB f-34-85, YNECHYEZP KHUIMEOOPE VTPOYTPCHBOYE, RTY BFBLE U VPLH (VPTF - 45 NN, VBYOS - 75 NN) OE PVEUREYUYCHBMPUSH RTY MAVSCHI DYUFBOGYSI UFTEMSHVSHCH. rTY BFBLE UBDY RPTBTSEOYE f-34-85 VSHMP CHPNPTSOSCHN FPMSHLP CH UMHYUBE RPRBDBOYS UOBTSDB CH UBDOAA YUBUFSH VBYOY (FPMEYOB VTPOY 52 NN) U DYUFBOGYK DP 400 N oBDNPFPTO. BS VTPOS Y VTPOS LTSCHY VBOY UPCHEFULYI "FTYDGBFSHUEFCHETPL" CHUEI FYRPCH RPTBTSBMBUSH RPDLBMYVETOSHN UOBTSDPN L RHYLE chl 3.7 RTY UFTEMSHVE U 300 N FPMSHLP RTY HZMBI RILYTCHBOYS OE NEOEE 30°. rTY KHZMBY RMBOYTPCHBOYS DP 10° UFTEMSHVB U MAVSHCHI DYUFBOGYK DBCHBMB URMPYOSHE TYLPYEFSHCH. pGEOLY RPLBYSHCHBAF, YuFP CH TEBMSHOSHI VECHSHCHI HUMPCHISI CHETPSFOPUFSH RPTBTSEOYS UTEDOEZP UPCHEFULPZP FBOLB f-34 CH PDOPN ЪBIPDE RTY UFTEMSHVE RPDLBMYVETOSHNY UOBTSDBNY Y RKHOYEL Part 3.7 (BFBLB UVPLH, KHZPM RMBOYTPCHBOYS 5-10°, DYUFBOGYS PFLTSCHFYS PZOS 300-400 N) RTY UBNPN MKHYUYEN " TBULMBDE" OE NPZMB RTECHSHUIFSH 0.02-0.03. lFP PJOBYUBEF, SFP DMS ZBTBOFYTPCHBOOPZP RPTBTSEOYS UPCHEFULPK "FTYDGBFSHYUEFCHETLY" ABOUT RPME VPS FTEVPCHBMUS OBTSD UYM CH RPMUPFOY Ju87G...

FP EUFSH KHUREYOPE RTYNEOOYE RHYYUOPZP Ju87G ABOUT RPME VPS VSHMP CHPNPTSOSCHN MYYSH CH THLBI CHSHCHUPPLLMBUUOPZP RYMPFB Y FPMSHLP CH KHUMPCHYSI UMBVPZP ЪООФОПЗП й YUFTEVYFEMSHOPZP RTPPHYCHPDECUFCHYS. oEUNPFTS ABOUT GEMSHCHK "VHLEF" OEDPUFBFLPC Ju87G-1, YURSHCHFBOYS VSHCHMY RTYOBOSCH HUREYOSCHNY, Y VSHM UDEMBO CHCHCHPD P GEMEUPPVTBOPUFY EZP VPECHPZP YURPMSH'PCHBOYS. rPUME OBCHETYEOYS YURSHCHFBOYK U RKHYEYUOSCHI "AOLETUPCH" UOSMY VPNVPDETTSBFEMY Y UZhPTNYTPCHBMY UREGYBMSHOHA RTPFYCHPFBOLPCHHA ZTHRRRH "Panzerversuchs-kommando" PE ZMBCHE U ZBHRFNBOPN yFERRPN DMS RTPCHEDEOYS CHPKULPCHSHCHI YURSHCHFBOYK ABOUT ZHTPOF. h ZHECHTBME 1943 Z. h iPTFYGE h UPUFBCHE 4-ZP ch VSHMB UZhPTNYTPCHBOB UREGYBMSHOBS RTPFYCHPFBOLPCHBS ZTHRRRB "Weiss" RPD LPNBODPCHBOYEN PVETUF-MEKFEOBOFB CHEKUUB, OB CHPPTHCE OYY LPFPTPK UFPSMY FPMSHLP Hs129B.

h BRTEME-NBE ZTHRRRB "Weiss" Y "Panzerversuchskommando" RTYOSMY KHYUBUFYE h VPSI ABOUT lHVBOY, ZHE RTBLFYUEULY RTPCHETSMYUSH PFTBVPFBOOSCH ABOUT RPMYZPOE FBLFYUEULYE RTYENSH VPTSHVSC UPCH FULNY FBOLBNY Y URPUPVSH PTZBOYBGYY FEUOPZP CHBYNPDEKUFCHYS AT THE UNITED CHPKULBNY.

rP TEKHMSHFBFBN "TBVPFSHCH" RTPFYCHPFBOLPCHSHI BCHYBZTHRR VSHM UDEMBO CHCHPD, YuFP RTY KHUMPCHY OYLPK LZHZHELFYCHOPUFY PDYOPYUSHI VTPOYTPCHBOOSCHI "IOOYEMEK" LBLPK-MYVP TEBM SHOSCHK LZHZHELF ABOUT RPME VPS NPTsOP RPMKHYUFSH FPMSHLP CH UMHYUBE NBUUYTPCHBOOPZP RTYNEOOYS LFYI YFKHTNPCHYLPCH ABOUT KHLYI KHYBUFLBI ZHTPOFB ABOUT FBOLPPRBUOSHI ORTTBCHMEOYS. VSHMP TEYEOP UPЪDBFSH UREGYBMSHOHA RTPFYCHPFBOLPCHHA BCHYBZTHRRH FuPz ABOUT Hs129B, B CH UPUFBCHE LBTSDPK ULBDTSCH RYLYTPCHEYLPCH - ZHTNYTPCHBFSH PFDEMSHOSH RTPPHYCHPFBOLPCH MORE ABOUT Ju87G. rTY LFPN CH FuPz CHLMAYUBMYUSH CHUE YNEAEYEUS CH OBMYUYE RTPFPYCHPFBOLPCHCHE ULBDTYMSHY YI 1-K Y 2-K ULBDT OERPUTEDUFCHOOOPK RPDDETSLY CHPKUL.

h RTEDDCHETY LTHROSCHI FBOLPCHSHHI PECH CH TBKPOE lHTULPZP CHSHCHUFKHRB FuPz VSHMB RETEVTPEOB ABOUT BTPPDTPN nyLPSOPCHLB CH 20 LN UECHETP-ЪBRBDOOEE iBTSHLPCHB. oBLBOKHOE OENEGLPZP OBUFHRMEOYS CH YUEFSHTEI ULBDTYMSHSI RTPFPYCHPFBOLPCHPK ZTHRRSHCH YNEMPUSH 60 VPEURPUPVOSHHI Hs129B-1 Y ch-2. h OBYUBME YAMS 43-ZP U GEMSHA PVEUREYUEOYS LZHZHELFYCHOPK BCHYBGYPOOPK RPDDETSLY CHPKUL CH PRETBGYY "gYFBDEMSH" VSHMP UZHPTNYTPCHBOP UREGYBMSHOPE "vPECHPE UPEDYOOYE lHRZHET", CH UPUFB CH LPFPTPZP CHPIMY I./StG3, II./StG77 Y ZTHRRRB YUFTEVYFEMEK-VPNVBTDYTPCHEYLPC III./JG3. lTPNE FPZP, L VPSN RPD lHTULPN RTYCHMELBMYUSH StG1, III./StG3, StG2, I. И III./StG77 И Sch.G1.

rTPFYCHPFBOLPCHCHE Ju87G-1 UPUFPSMY ABOUT CHPPTHTSEOY CHUEZP DCHHI ULBDTYMYK - 10.(Pz)/StG2 Y 10.(Pz)/StG1. rP OENEGLINE DBOOSHCHN, ABOUT OBYUBMSHOPK ZHBIE UTBTSEOYS OENEGLINE RTPFPYCHPFBOLPCHSHCHN "IEOYEMSN" Y "AOLETUBN" HDBMPUSH DPUFYUSH UETSHESHI KHUREIPCH.

fBL, RP DBOOSCHN YFBVB UPCHEFULPK 1-K FBOLPCHPK BTNYY chPTPOETSULPZP ZhTPOFB, RTPFYCH LPFPTPK DEKUFCHPCHBMY RTPFYCHPFBOLPCHSHE ULBDTYMSHY "IEOYEMEK" YЪ FuPz, VPECHSHCHE VEJCHPCHTBFOSH RPFETY CH FBOLBI f-34 PF CHPDEKUFCHYS BCHYBGYY CH GEMPN CH RETYPD U 5 RP 20 YAMS 1943 Z. UPUFBCHYMY CHUEZP 7 NBYO, YMY 1.6% CHUEI RPFETSH "FTYDGBFSHUEFCHETPL". lTPNE bFPZP, PF BTFPZOS Y VPNV MAJFCHBJZHE BTNYS RPFETSMB PLPMP 30 MEZLYI FBOLPCH f-60 Y f-70. vPECHSHCHE RPFETY FBOLPCHSHI UPEDYOEOYKY YUBUFEK GEOFTBMSHOPZP ZHTPOFB PF VPNVPYFKHTNPCHSHHI HDBTPCH OENEGLPK BCHYBGYY UB YAMSH-BCHZKHUF 1943 Z. UPUFBCHYMY 187 CHSHCHCHEDEOOSCHY Kommersant UFTPS FBOLPCH Y ubkh CHUEI FYRPCH, YMY 6.3% CHUEI RPFETSH. yUIPDS YYNEAEEKUS UFBFYUFYLY TBURTEDEMEOYS VPECHSHCHI RPFETSH, NPTsOP RTEDRPMPTSYFSH, YuFP YЪ LFPPZP YYUMB RTYNETOP 70 FBOLPCH UPUFBCHYMY VECHPCHTBFOSH RPFETY. h DBMSHOEKYEN Hs129B Y Ju87G-1 RTDDPMTSBMY "ZTPNYFSH" UPCHEFULYE FBOLY Y ubkh Y OEUFY RTY LFPN OBYUYFEMSHOSH RPFETY. fBL, ULBDTYMSHY FuPz ЪБ 11 DOEC VPECH VEJCHPCHTBFOP RPFETSMY 30% UCHPEZP RETCHPOBUBMSHOPZP UPUFBCHB. l UETEDYOE BCHZKHUFB CH UPUFBCHE ZTHRRSH OBUYFSHCHBMPUSH PLPMP DCHHI DEUSFLPCH "IEOYEMEK".

rPMPTSEOYE DEM CH ULBDTBY RYLYTPCHEYLPCH OBZMSDOP IBTBLFETYJHEF RTYOBOE LPNBODITB StG2 PVETUF-MEKFEOBOFB l.lKHRZHETB, LPPTSHCHK RYUBM: "Ju-87 VPMSHYE OEMSH" YURPMSHЪPCHBFSHOY ABOUT PDOPN ZhTPOFE, DBTSE ABOUT CHPUFPLE. OBRTYNET, NPS ULBDTB JB CHPUENSH NEUSGECH RPFETSMMB 89 LYRBTSECH RETEUUEFE ABOUT. ZPD LFP UPPFCHEFUFCHHEF. 100-RTPGEOFOPNH PVOPCHMEOYA MEFOPZP UPUFBCHB. NEOS EUFSH ULBDTYMSHY U PDOYN UBNPMEFPN ABOUT CHPPTHTSEOYY. , OBYUBFSH RETECHPPTHTSBFSH YUBUFY U Ju87 ABOUT Fw190. UYFHBGYA U MYUOSCHN UPUFBCHPN YFKHTNPCHSHI YUBUFEK NPTsOP PRTEDEMYFSH LBL "RPUMEDOYK RBTBD y 5 YAMS 1943 Z. S RPFETSM DCHHI L". PNBODYTPCH ULBDT, YEUFSH LPNBODYTPCH ULBDTYMYK Y DCHHI BDYAAFBOFPCH ZTHRR, LBTSDSCHK YЪ LPFPTSCHI UPCHETYM VPMEE 600 VPECHCHI CHSHCHMEFPCH.

rschFBSUSH UDETSBFSH UPCHEFULPE FBOLPCHPE OBUFHRMEOYE, OENEGLPE LPNBODPCHBOIE RTPCHPDYMP NPEOSHE LPOFTBFBLY LTHROSHNY UYMBNY FBOLPCH Y NPFPRIEPFSH RTY RPDDETSLE BCHYBGYY, OP E VEHUREYOP. h CHETNBIFE OBYUBMBUSH FBOLPCHBS RBOILB, OBRPNYOBCHYBS UPUFPSOIE OELPFPTSCHI YUBUFEK lTBUOPK bTNYY CH 1941 Z. h OPYUSH ABOUT 21 UEOFSVTS 1943 Z. RETEDPCHCHE YUBUFY 3-K ZChBTDEKULPK FB OLPChPK BTNYY chPTPOETSULPZP ZhTPOFB, B RPJTSE Y BUFSH UYM 40-K Y 47-K BTNYK, UIPDH ZHPTUITPCHBMY DOERT ЪBLTERYMYUSH ABOUT ЪBICHBUEOOSCHI RMBGDBTNBI CH TBKPOE CHEMYLPZP VHLTYOB. KHUREIPN UBCHETYMYUSH LTHROSHCHE VPY ABOUT HYBUFLE UFEROPZP ZHTPOFB RTY ZHPTUITPCHBOY DOERTB YUBUFSNY 7-K ZCHBTDEKULPK BTNYY CH TBKPOBI DOERTPCHPLBNEOLY Y dPNPFLBOY, B FBLCE 37-K BTNYEK CH TBKPOE AZP-CHPUFPYUOEEE lTENEOYUKHZB.

nPEOEKYK PVPTPPOYFEMSHOSHCHK THVETS CHETNBIFB PLBJBMUS RPD KHZTPPK RTPTSCHB. UFTENSUSH UVTPUIFSH LTBUOPBTNEKGECH CH DOERT, OENEGLPE LPNBODPCHBOYE VTPUYMP CH VPK RPYUFY CHUA OBMYUOHA BCHYBGYA. ABOUT RPME VPS, RPNNYNP "IEOYEMEK", "CHPUENSHDEUSF UEDSHNSHI" Y KHDBTOSHI "ZHPLLETPCH", PFNEYUBMBUSH "TBVPFB" U OYILYI CHCHUPF Y U VTEAEEZP RPMEEFB DCHHINPFPTOSHHI VPNVBTDYTPCHEYLPCH Ju8 8 Y He111, LPFPTSCHE PWUFTEMYCHBMY Y VPNVYMY VPECHSCHE RPTSDLY UPCHEFULYI YUBUFEK. rPYUFY LBL chchu lb CH RETCHSHE NEUSGSH CHPKOSHCH, OP CH HUMPCHYSI VPMEE VMBZPRTYSFOSHI DMS VPECHPZP RTYNEOOYS, FBL LBL RETERTBCHYYEUS UPCHEFULYE YUBUFY RPOBUBMKH OE YNEMY UIMSHOPZP Kommersant EOIFOPZP Y YUFTEVYFEMSHOPZP RTYLTSCHFYS. u KHUYMEOYEN UPCHEFULPK rchp PF RPDPVOSCHI DEKUFCHYK OENGBN RTYYMPUSH CHULPTE PFLBBBFSHUS, OP RPFETY YFKHTNPCHCHI BCHYBZTHRR RTDPDPMTSBMY TBUFY Y L LPOGKH ZPDB DPUFYZMY HZTPTSBAEY AND TBNETPCH... rTPBOBMYYTPCHBCH PRSHCHF VPECHPZP RTYNEOOYS BCHYBGYY OERPUTEDUFCHEOOPK RPDDETSLY CHPKUL CH MEFOI VPSI, ZEOETBMSHOSCHK YFBV MAZHFCHBZZHE CH UEOFSVTE 1943 Z. CHPP P OEPVIPDYNPUFY GEOFTBMYBGYY KHRTBCHMEOYS VPECHSHNY UYMBNY BCHYBGYY RPMS VPS. u LFPC GEMSHA VSHMP TEYEOP UPJDBFSH YOURELGYA YFKHTNPCHPK BCHYBGYY, LPFPTPK RPDYUYOYFSH CHUE ZTHRRSH RYLYTHAEYI VPNVBTDYTPCHEYLPCH, ZTHRRSH OERPUTEDUFCHEOOPK RPDDETSLY CHPKU L, ZTHRRSH ULPTPUFOSCHI VPNVBTDYTPCHEYLPCH, B FBLCE CHUE PFDEMSHOSHE RTPPHYCHPFBOLPCHESHE ULBDTYMSHY. 9 UEOFSVTS LPNBODHAEIN YFKHTNPCHPK BCHYBGYEK VSHM OBYEO PVETUF-MEKFEOBOF l.lHRZHET.

UPZMBUOP TBURPTSTSEOYS LPNBODHAEEZP YFKHTNPCHPK BCHYBGYEK No. 11125/43 PF 5 PLFSVTS 1943 Z. CHUE ULBDTSCH RYLYTPCHEYLPCH StG1, StG2, StG3 Y StG77 VSHMY RETEYNEOPCHBOSHCH, PPFCHEFUFCHOOOP, CH SG1, SG2, SG3 Y SG77, B I./StG5 - CH I./SG5 . I OPCHE ZHTNYTPCHBMYUSH DCHE OPCHCHE YFKHTNPCHCHE ULBDTSCH SG4 Y SG10. CHUE PFDEMSHOSHE RTPPFYCHPFBOLPCHCHES ULBDTYMSHY ABOUT Hs129B VSHHMY UCHEDEOSCH CH PDOKH 4-A RTPPFYCHPFBOLPCHHA ZTHRRH 9-K YFKHTNPCHPK ULBDTSCH - IV.(Pz.)/SG9.

yЪ UPUFBCHB SG2 VSHCHMB CHCHCHEDEOB y ЪBFEN TBUZHPTNYTPCHBOB 2-S ZTKHRRB, LPFPTBS RPOEUMB RETED LFYN VPMSHYIE RPFETY. ABOUT ITS PUOPCH VSHCHMY UZHPTNYTPCHBOSH RTPPHYCHPFBOLPCHCHE ULBDTYMSHY 10.(Pz)/ SG3 Y 10.(Pz)/SG77, CHPPTHTSEOOSHE Ju87G.

rPUMEDOEK CHETUYEK UBNPMEFB UFBM Ju87G-2. NPDYZHYLBGYA G-2 CHSHCHRKHULBMY OERPUTEDUFCHOOOP ABOUT ЪБЧПДЭ Ш МЭНЧЭДДЭД (174 НБИОШЧ Ъ 208 RPUFTPEOOSCHI). eUMY ABOUT G-1 EEE PUFBCHBMYUSH LTPOYFEKOSH FPTNPOSCHI EIFLPCH, FP ABOUT G-2 YI HCE OE VSHMP.

DPR. YOZHTNBGYS: yuetfets "" Junkers Ju.87 Stuka Yuetfets "Junkers Ju.87D/G" YuETFETS "Junkers Ju.87G" UFBFSHS "Ju.87 ABOUT CHPUFPYuOPN ZHTPOFE" zhPFPZTBZHYY: zhPFPZTBZHYY: zhPFPZTBZHYY: zhPFPZTBZHYY: Ju.87g-1 rTEDRPMEFOBS RPDZPFPCHLB Ju.87g-1 37-NN RKHYLB BK 3.7 RETEBTSDLB RHYLB BK 3.7 rTYVPTOBS DPULB RYMPFB Ju.87g-1 :

UIENSCH » Ju-87 is a German dive bomber from World War II. It became one of the symbols of the German military machine and the successes of the German troops in 1939-1942, partly due to its recognizable and unique appearance, partly due to its high combat effectiveness. Dive bomber sounds like "Sturzkampfflugzeug" on German

Junkers Ju-87 photo

Development of the aircraft began in 1934, as part of the overall development of the German military machine and the Luftwaffe (German Air Force) in particular. At that time, the Stuka’s competitors were machines from Arado, Heinkel and Blohm & Voss, but it was the Junkers company that won the competition for a military order. The new aircraft was supposed to perform tasks in direct support of ground troops. By the way, it was for this purpose that a few years later the development of the Il-2 began in the USSR, however, despite similar tasks, these two aircraft have different methods for solving them.

As mentioned above, the Ju-87 is a dive bomber, i.e. It hits its targets from a dive, or rather, from a vertical dive (from 60 to 90 degrees relative to the horizon), this is what the entire design of the aircraft is subordinated to, and it is thanks to this that it has become so recognizable. Why from a dive? This method of bombing provides the highest accuracy, which is already sufficient to hit single targets; when bombing from horizontal flight, this was unattainable at that time.

Junkers Ju-87 photo

This type of attack has its advantages and disadvantages compared to an attack in horizontal flight at a minimum altitude, or a “flat” dive (up to 45 degrees relative to the horizon). Namely: higher accuracy, less time spent under anti-aircraft artillery fire. However, with this type of attack, repeated attacks cannot be carried out from a vertical dive, due to the lack of the required height, so quite often after the first drop, the Stukas simply went home, leaving their ground troops.

Junkers Ju-87 diagram

Flight in a vertical dive and the subsequent successful recovery from it before colliding with the ground places special demands on the design of the aircraft. First of all, powerful aerodynamic braking is necessary, because the force of gravity will instantly accelerate an aircraft weighing 5 tons to critical values. For this reason, the Stuka has rather poor aerodynamics, non-retractable landing gear (for which the plane was also nicknamed the “laptezhnik”) and a deflectable air brake under both wings.

Junkers Ju-87 modifications and characteristics

All this was quite enough to ensure that throughout the dive the aircraft’s speed did not exceed 400-500 km/h, despite the fact that the horizontal speed of the same aircraft was 300-350 km/h. This gave enough time to aim and led to greater accuracy. Further, high strength of the airframe is required, because the aircraft is subject to large overloads during recovery Kirovaniye. In order to increase the strength of the wings, they are shaped like an inverted “gull wing”. Also, the success of the aircraft was due to a large number of innovations, for example, an automatic dive recovery system, a siren to suppress the morale of enemy soldiers during a dive, etc.